No. 3--01--0826
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2003
| THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD LITTLEJOHN, Defendant-Appellant. | ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) | Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 14th Judicial Circuit Henry County, Illinois,
Honorable |
The defendant, Richard Littlejohn, appeals from a portion ofthe circuit court's sentencing order instructing him to pay variousfines, fees and costs. He claims that he is entitled to a monetarycredit for the 340 days he spent in custody prior to sentencing. We modify the mittimus to apply the credit against all theassessments except the $50 laboratory analysis fee.
The defendant was sentenced to probation for unlawfulpossession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2000)) and unlawful possession of cannabis(720 ILCS 550/4(c) (West 2000)). In addition to probation, thetrial court ordered the defendant to pay drug assessment feestotaling $800, street-value fines in the amount of $450, a traumacenter fine of $100, a laboratory analysis fee of $50 and a $10Henry County crime stoppers fee. The defendant's probation wassubsequently revoked. He was sentenced to four years' imprisonmentfor unlawful possession with intent to deliver and 364 days in jailfor unlawful possession of cannabis. The sentencing orderspecified that the defendant was to receive 340 days of credit fortime served. The court again ordered the payment of the originalfees, fines and costs.
On appeal, the defendant argues that he should be awarded a $5per day credit against all of his probation assessments pursuant tosection 110--14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code) (725 ILCS5/110--14 (West 2000)). The State agrees that the defendant shouldbe awarded a monetary credit for time served. However, itmaintains that the credit should not apply to the laboratoryanalysis fee or the crime stoppers fee.
The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effectto the legislative intent. People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 720N.E.2d 225 (1999). The best indicator of such intent is the plainand ordinary meaning of the language used. People v. Jones, 306Ill. App. 3d 793, 715 N.E.2d 256 (1999). Courts should not addrequirements that are inconsistent with the plain meaning of thestatute. People v. Holmes, 268 Ill. App. 3d 802, 644 N.E.2d 1(1994).
Section 110--14 of the Code provides that a defendant "againstwhom a fine is levied" shall be allowed a credit of $5 for each dayincarcerated on a bailable offense when he does not make bail. 725ILCS 5/110--14 (West 2000). According to the statute's plainlanguage, the credit applies only to "fines" that are imposed inconjunction with a conviction. It does not suggest that the creditshould apply to costs or charges.
To resolve the question raised on appeal, we must determinewhether the lab analysis fee and the crime stoppers fee fall withinthe category of a fine rather than a cost. "Fines" have beendefined as pecuniary punishments imposed as part of a sentence ona person convicted of a crime. People v. Despenza, 318 Ill. App.3d 1155, 744 N.E.2d 912 (2001). By contrast, a "cost" or "fee" isa charge taxed by a court such as a filing fee, courthouse fee, orreporter fee. A cost is compensatory in nature. People v. White,333 Ill. App. 3d 777, 776 N.E.2d 836 (2002).
A laboratory analysis fee is used to defray costs incurred inproviding analysis for controlled substances. See White, 333 Ill.App. 3d 777, 776 N.E.2d 836. It is compensatory in nature ratherthan a pecuniary fine. We find that the $50 lab fee is moreanalogous to a cost or charge by the court. The $5 per day creditagainst "fines" does not apply to the lab fee.
Whether the monetary credit applies against the $10 HenryCounty crime stoppers fee is a more difficult question. The feewas imposed under section 5--6--3(b)(13) of the Unified Code ofCorrections (730 ILCS 5/5--6--3(b)(13) (West 2000)). That sectionpermits a judge to require the defendant to "contribute areasonable sum of money, not to exceed the maximum amount of thefine authorized for the offense" to a local anti-crime program. 730 ILCS 5/5--6--3(b)(13) (West 2000). Nothing in the statutoryprovision authorizing this contribution suggests that the moneywill be used to reimburse the local anti-crime programs for costsassociated with criminal prosecution, or as a restitution for anyloss suffered by the program. The mandatory donation more closelyresembles a punishment on the defendant in addition to the sentencehe received. Accordingly, we conclude that the crime stoppers' feeis a fine against which the $5 per day credit should apply.
Pursuant to section 110--14, the defendant should be awardeda credit of $1,360 against his drug assessment fines, his street-value fines, the trauma center fine and the crime stoppers fine. The sentencing order of the circuit court of Henry County shall bemodified to reflect this credit.
Affirmed as modified.
BARRY, J., concurs, SCHMIDT, J., partiallyconcurring/partially dissenting.
JUSTICE SCHMIDT, concurs in part and dissents in part:
I concur with the majority with the exception of that portionof the opinion holding that defendant is entitled to a monetarycredit for time served against the crime stoppers fee. While Ialso agree that the legislature could have made this clearer, Ibelieve that the crime stoppers fee imposed under 735 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(13) (West 2000), qualifies as a fee or cost as opposed to afine. I cannot think of any other reason the legislature enactedthis statute except to defray the costs of local anti-crimeprograms. Therefore, I see this section as analogous to thelaboratory fee statute and would deny defendant credit against thecrime stopper fee as well as the laboratory analysis fee.