People v. Lucas

SUPREME COURT CASES

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People v. Lucas

State: Illinois

Court: 3rd District Appellate

Docket No: 3-05-0757 Rel

Case Date: 03/29/2007

Preview:No. 3-05-0757 Filed March 29, 2007. _________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2007 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit, ) Bureau County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 05-CF-31 ) ROBERT T. LUCAS, ) Honorable ) Scott A. Madson, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. _________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the Opinion of the court: _________________________________________________________________ Defendant Robert T. Lucas was found guilty of driving while his license was revoked (DWLR) (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a), (d) (West 2004)), unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/241.1(a) (West 2004)) and armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2004)). The trial court sentenced him to 30 years in prison. On

appeal, defendant argues that his conviction for armed violence should be vacated because (1) a conviction for enhanced DWLR cannot serve as a predicate felony for armed violence and (2) if enhanced DWLR can be used as a predicate felony, it must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also claims that his

sentence should be vacated because it is (1) unconstitutional, (2)

an abuse of the court's discretion and (3) violates one-act, onecrime principles. We affirm.

Defendant was charged by information with DWLR, unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and armed violence. The indictment provided

that defendant had a previous conviction for DWLR and that the prior revocation was based on a conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) (see 625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2004)). The

indictment further alleged that defendant, while armed with a switchblade knife, committed the offense of driving while his license was revoked. At trial, Officer Gary Becket testified that on May 1, 2005, he was on patrol near downtown De Pue. At approximately 12:30

a.m., he observed defendant's vehicle cross the center line two times. Becket initiated his emergency lights and attempted to stop defendant's vehicle. Defendant continued driving and pulled into He then exited the vehicle and Becket yelled at defendant to

the driveway of a residence.

started running toward the house. stop. inside.

Defendant ran around the side of the house and disappeared

Becket called for backup before attempting to remove defendant from the house. When other officers arrived, they entered the home and ordered defendant to come out of a locked bathroom. The

officers heard a toilet flush, and then defendant emerged from the bathroom. After defendant was handcuffed, he asked for his

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lighter.

The officers searched the bathroom and found defendant's

wallet, some cash, and a cigarette lighter in a pile on the sink. The lighter contained a spring-loaded switchblade knife. Both

residents of the apartment testified that they had never seen the lighter before that night. The State then introduced a certified record indicating that defendant's drivers' license was revoked on the date of his arrest. Following closing arguments, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts. At sentencing, the trial court considered the presentencing investigation report. Defendant was forty-one and had been

convicted of numerous offenses between 1981 and 1996, including carrying an uncased weapon, DUI, three felony convictions for possession of a controlled substance, resisting arrest, reckless driving, attempting to elude a police officer, leaving the scene of an accident, and theft. In 1997, defendant was charged with

unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, aggravated battery of a peace officer, armed violence, DUI, reckless driving and aggravated fleeing from a police officer. Defendant was sentenced to a 12In July of

year term and was released on parole in September 2002.

2003, while still on parole, he was convicted of resisting a peace officer and domestic battery. He was returned to prison and was He was later found

again released on parole in September of 2003.

guilty of illegal transportation of alcohol and was on probation

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when he was arrested for this offense. Becket testified that upon arrest, defendant was slurring his speech and appeared to be impaired. test. He blew 0.00 on a Breathalyzer He also had $1,279 in cash

He refused to take a urine test.

when he was arrested.

Jail Officer Jeremy Roush testified that

after defendant's arrest, defendant told him that if he could get close enough to State's Attorney Patrick Herrmann, he would snap Herrmann's neck. Officer Smith testified regarding a 1997 incident that lead to defendant's conviction for aggravated battery of an officer. Smith had stopped defendant for a traffic violation. defendant leaned forward. of defendant's waistband. During the stop,

Smith saw a handgun tucked in the back Smith attempted to grab the gun.

Defendant leaned back, trapped Smith's arm, and proceeded to drive away with Smith attached to the car. and then released. Smith was drug several feet During

Defendant was captured 24 miles later.

the chase, officers believed defendant was shooting at them. After the chase, police found a loaded handgun and several bags of drugs in defendant's vehicle. They also found numerous bags of cocaine Defendant was convicted of armed

strewn along the chase route.

violence, aggravated battery of a police officer, unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, driving under the influence, aggravated fleeing and eluding, and reckless driving. In mitigation, several letters were submitted by defendant's

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friends, family and church members. Defendant had obtained his GED and had a ten-year-old son. A local employer testified that

defendant had done some work for him in the past and was able to complete the job as requested. During arguments, the State presented a certified record which indicated that defendant's driver's license was revoked following a DUI conviction in 1983. Defendant was convicted of DWLR in 1987. His license was reinstated. It was again revoked in 1997 and was

still revoked as of May 1, 2005. The trial judge found that defendant had committed a Class 4 felony of DWLR. He sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 30

years for armed violence and 5 years for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. ANALYSIS I. Predicate Felony

Defendant contends that his conviction for armed violence must be vacated because a DWLR conviction, which has been increased to a Class 4 felony based on a prior conviction for DWLR, cannot be used as a predicate felony for an armed violence conviction. He

claims that enhancement of DWLR from a misdemeanor to a felony is for sentencing purposes only and not as a predicate felony for an armed violence charge. A person commits armed violence when, "while armed with a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony defined by Illinois Law,

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except

first

degree

murder,

attempted

first

degree

murder,

intentional homicide of an unborn child, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated battery of a child, home invasion, armed robbery, or aggravated vehicular hijacking." 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a)

(West 2004). In addition to those felonies that have been exempted by the legislature, the Illinois supreme court, under certain circumstances, has limited the type of felonies contemplated by the "any felony" language of the armed violence statute. For example,

the offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter cannot serve as predicate felonies for an armed violence conviction because the legislature did not intend for the statute to apply to conduct People v. Alejos,

that is not a deliberate or deterrable offense.

97 Ill. 2d 502 (1983); People v. Fernetti, 104 Ill. 2d 19 (1984). However, if the decision to use a weapon is not forced upon a defendant or is not the result of a spontaneous decision, then the defendant's conduct can be deterred and the purpose of the armed violence statute is satisfied. 980 (2000). Defendant's DWLR charge, which served as the predicate felony for the armed violence conviction, was for a violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2004)). The purpose of the DWLR statute is to punish those People v. Becker, 315 Ill. App. 3d

people who drive a motor vehicle at a time when their license is

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suspended or revoked.

The statute provides that "[a]ny person who

drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such person's driver's license permit *** is revoked *** shall be guilty of a Class A

misdemeanor."

625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2002).

The statute

further states that "[a]ny person convicted of a second violation of this [s]ection shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony *** if the revocation or suspension was for a violation of [s]ection 11-401 or 11-501 of this Code." 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d) (West 2004). Section

11-501 of the Code involves the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2004).

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435 (1997). People v.

Since the language used by the

legislature is the best indication of legislative intent, courts look first to the words of the statute. 2d 386 (1996). Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill.

When the language of the statute is plain and

unambiguous, courts will not read in exceptions, limitations, or other conditions. People v. Daniels, 172 Ill. 2d 154 (1996).

Here, the plain language of section 6-303(a) and (d) of the Code states that any person convicted of a second violation of DWLR, when that person has been previously convicted of DWLR and the revocation was for DUI, "shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." At trial, the State introduced a certified record from the

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Secretary of State indicating that defendant's license was revoked. Evidence was also presented at sentencing demonstrating that

defendant had a prior conviction for DWLR and that his license had been previously revoked for driving under the influence of alcohol. Thus, according to the statutory language of section 5/6-303(d), defendant was properly charged and convicted of a Class 4 felony for driving with a revoked license. Defendant argues that felony DWLR should be exempt as a predicate offense for armed violence because such a felony does not further the statute's purpose. Defendant admits that DWLR is not

an undeterrable offense but claims that using felony DWLR as a predicate felony would deter the carrying of weapons "in all instances for whatever purposes people wish to carry them." Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d at 510. We disagree. See

In Alejos, the court noted that the presence of a weapon enhances the danger that any felony that is committed will have deadly consequences should the victim offer resistence. stiff punishment mandated by the armed violence Thus, the "is

statute

intended not only to punish the criminal and protect society from him but also to deter his conduct-that of carrying the weapon while committing a felony." Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d at 509. Using DWLR as a Using DWLR as

predicate felony furthers that legislative purpose.

a predicate felony does not deter any person from carrying a weapon while driving, an otherwise legal activity. Using DWLR as a

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predicate felony deters individuals from carrying a weapon while they are committing the felony of driving while their license is revoked. violence. II. Proof of Predicate Felony at Trial It is therefore a proper predicate offense for armed

Defendant claims that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as elements of his crimes, that his license was revoked for the grounds set forth in section 6-303(d) (625 ILCS 5/6-303(d) (West 2004)) and section 11-501(a) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) (West 2004)) of the Vehicle Code. Defendant maintains that to be

convicted of a Class 4 felony DWLR, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element of the crime at trial, that the "enhancing" factors were present. The State claims that

it was prevented from producing such evidence at trial under section 5/111-3(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/111-3(c) (West 2004)). Section 5/111-3(c) of the Code provides: "When the State seeks an enhanced sentence because of a prior conviction, the charge shall also state the

intention to seek an enhanced sentence and shall state such prior conviction so as to give notice to the

defendant.

However, the fact of such prior conviction

and the State's intention to seek an enhanced sentence are not elements of the offense and may not be disclosed

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to the jury during trial ***.

For the purposes of this

section, `enhanced sentence' means a sentence which is increased by a prior conviction form one classification of offense to another higher level classification of offense set forth in Section 5-5-1 of the [Code] ***; it does not include an increase in the sentence applied within the same level of classification of offense." This provision of the Code applies to those situations where the State intends to enhance the charge by raising the classification of the offense due to a prior conviction. The language explicitly

excludes situations where the sentence is increased because of a prior conviction but the classification of the offense remains the same. People v. Contreras, 241 Ill. App. 3d 1023 (1993).

In this case, defendant was charged with and convicted of DWLR. Due to his prior convictions for DWLR and DUI, section 5/6-

303 (d)of the Vehicle Code mandated the elevation of the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a higher-level classification, a Class 4 felony. See 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d) (West 2004). Because the

prior conviction enhanced the "classification" of the offense, rather than just the the sentence, was section 5/111-3(c) proving applied. the prior

Therefore,

State

prohibited

from

commissions of DWLR and DUI as an element of the Class 4 felony DWLR. People v. DiPace, 354 Ill. App. 3d 104 (2004); People v.

Braman, 327 Ill. App. 3d 1091 (2002); People v. Bowman, 221 Ill.

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App. 3d 663 (1991).

Instead, the existence of the predicate

offenses was properly used after defendant's conviction to increase the classification of his crime at sentencing. See People v.

Thompson, 328 Ill. App. 3d 360 (2002); Bowman, 221 Ill. App. 3d 663 (State not required to show defendant's prior conviction, or the grounds for those prior convictions, until sentencing). Requiring

the State to prove the grounds for a prior conviction or revocation beyond a reasonable doubt at an earlier stage in the proceedings would contravene the plain language of section 111-3(c) of the Code. Defendant claims that section 5/111-3(c) only applies to the prosecution of the DWLR count, not the armed violence count. However, as acknowledged by defendant, accepting this argument produces an incongruous result. To simultaneously require the

State to prove the defendant's prior conviction for purposes of the armed violence count, but prohibit it from proving the same facts for purposes of the DWLR count leads to an absurd outcome and frustrates the intent of the legislature. When interpreting a

statute, we must presume the legislature did not intend to produce an absurd or unjust result. Ill.2d 101 (2005). This Andrews v. Kowa Printing Corp., 217 court will not read exceptions,

conditions, or limitations into a statute which the legislature did not express if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 216 Ill.2d 402 (2005).

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The statutory language of section 5/111-3(c) is clear and does not impose any limitations or exceptions as to its application. In this case, the evidence demonstrated that defendant carried a weapon while driving a vehicle illegally. When the officer

attempted to stop him, defendant purposefully evaded him and attempted to hide in a nearby house. These acts were deliberate.

Had the officer tried to arrest defendant for driving with a revoked license without assistance, the consequences could have been deadly. Under the facts of this case, we decline to find a

legislative intent to exclude felony DWLR as a predicate felony for an armed violence charge. We are mindful of the apparent difficulty created by the statute under the circumstances of this case. However, nothing in

its language convinces us that the legislature intended to carve out an exception which would require the State to prove to the jury a prior convictions when that prior conviction is the basis for a predicate felony in an armed violence case. III. Defendant next Proportionate Penalties Clause claims that his sentence violated the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,

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