Defendant Joseph McClure was arrested and charged with driving under the influence ofalcohol. Because he refused chemical testing, his driver's license was summarily suspended. Hetimely filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension but then withdrew the petition. Nearly oneyear later he refiled the petition to rescind his suspension. The trial court dismissed the petition asuntimely. McClure appealed. We reverse and hold that a driver who voluntarily withdraws a timelyfiled petition to rescind a summary suspension may refile the petition within one year after thedismissal pursuant to section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 2002)).

FACTS

On April 25, 2003, McClure was arrested for driving under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West Supp. 2003) and issued notice of summary suspension of his driver's licensepursuant to section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2002)). Herequested a hearing to rescind the summary suspension in June 2003 but voluntarily withdrew thepetition in August 2003. In February 2004, McClure pled guilty to reckless driving. On April 1,2004, he refiled a petition to rescind the summary suspension. The State filed a motion to strikeMcClure's petition, alleging that the 90-day limit for filing a petition to rescind set forth in section2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2002)) had expired. In response,McClure argued that because a summary suspension is a civil hearing, it is governed by the Civil Code(735 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2002)), which provides, inter alia, that a plaintiff who voluntarilydismisses an action may refile within one year of the dismissal. 735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 2002). Following a hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion to strike and dismissed as untimelyMcClure's petition to rescind. He appealed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred when it dismissed McClure's petition forrescission as untimely. McClure argues that section 13-217 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/13-217(West 2002)) tolls the time to refile his petition to rescind his summary suspension irrespective of the90-day limitation set forth in section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West2002). Therefore, he contends, the trial court should not have dismissed his petition.

The Vehicle Code requires that a driver's request for a hearing to challenge his summarysuspension be made within 90 days of notice of the summary suspension. 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b)(West 2002). Section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code also provides that a rescission hearing proceedin court "in the same manner as in other civil proceedings." 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2002). TheCivil Code allows actions that have been voluntarily dismissed to be refiled within one year ofdismissal or within the remaining period of limitation for that action, whichever is greater. 735 ILCS5/13-217 (West 2002).

We rely on the rules of statutory interpretation to resolve the seeming incompatibility betweenthe two statutes. The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to thelegislature's intent. People v. Peco, 345 Ill. App. 3d 724, 730, 803 N.E.2d 561, 566 (2004). Indetermining legislative intent, courts first look to the statute itself and interpret it based on its plainand ordinary meaning. Peco, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 731, 803 N.E.2d 566. Where the language is clearand unambiguous, the reviewing court must apply the statute without resort to further aids ofstatutory construction. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443, 677 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1997). Onlyif the statute is ambiguous may the court look to other sources to ascertain the legislature's intent.People v. Stipp, 349 Ill App. 3d 955, 958, 812 N.E.2d 574, 576 (2004). We review issues ofstatutory interpretation de novo. People v. Effler, 349 Ill. App. 3d 217, 218, 811 N.E.2d 291, 292(2004).

The Second District considered the issue raised by McClure in this appeal as a case of firstimpression in People v. Rodriguez, 339 Ill. App. 3d 677, 791 N.E.2d 707 (2003). The facts inRodriguez are similar to the facts in the instant case. Rodriguez was stopped in his vehicle for erraticdriving, refused to submit to chemical testing, and had his license summarily suspended. Rodriguez,339 Ill. App. 3d at 680, 791 N.E.2d at 708. He filed a petition to rescind the suspension within the90-day limit mandated by the Vehicle Code but thereafter withdrew the petition. Rodriguez, 339 Ill.App. 3d at 680, 791 N.E.2d at 708. He later refiled his petition after the 90-day period had expired,claiming, as does McClure, that section 13-217 of the Civil Code allowed him one year aftervoluntary dismissal to refile his petition. Rodriguez, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 680, 791 N.E.2d at 708-9. The trial court disagreed and granted the State's motion to dismiss Rodriguez's petition to rescind. Rodriguez, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 680, 791 N.E.2d at 709. The Rodriguez court concluded that section2-118.1 was ambiguous because it could be interpreted as mandating a 90-day refiling limit or asallowing a driver who voluntarily dismissed his petition for rescission to refile within a one-yearperiod after the dismissal as allowed by the Civil Code. Rodriguez, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 682-83, 791N.E.2d at 710-11. Accordingly, the court looked at the legislative history of 2-118.1 to resolve theambiguity. Rodriguez, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 682-84, 791 N.E.2d at 710-12.

We disagree that the statute is ambiguous and reject the findings of the Rodriguez court thatthe statute prohibits a petition for rescission to be refiled after 90 days. The plain language of thestatute provides a 90-day limit for the initial filing of a petition to rescind. Section 2-118.1(b) issilent as to whether a defendant may refile a voluntarily dismissed petition, and if he may, how longhe has to refile it. However, the statute provides that a rescission hearing is to advance as other civilproceedings; thus, the Civil Code governs the time limit for refiling the petition. Under the CivilCode, a party who has voluntarily dismissed his action has one year to refile that action. 735 ILCS5/13-217 (West 2002). A catch-all savings clause, section 13-217 has broad scope and applies to anyact with a limited time to commence an action. Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 292 Ill. App. 3d 478,486, 685 N.E.2d 941, 946 (1997). Contrary to the Rodriguez court's determination that the twoprovisions are incompatible and therefore ambiguous, construed as a whole, the statute mandates a90-day limit for the initial filing of a petition to rescind and allows one year after a voluntary dismissalfor a petition to be refiled. Further supporting this interpretation are the various cases noted in thedissenting opinion in Rodriguez wherein courts have held that section 13-217 applied to variouscauses of action whose statutes specify a time limitation on initial filings but not on refilings. SeeRodriguez, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 687, 791 N.E.2d at 714-15 (O'Malley, J., dissenting) (and cases citedtherein).

There is no language in section 2-118.1 from which it may be inferred that the savings sectionof 13-217 does not apply. The legislature had the opportunity to include such limiting language whenit amended the statute after this court's decision in People v. Holmes, 268 Ill. App. 3d 802, 805-06,644 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1994), where we held that a petitioner could file a rescission petition nearly fouryears after his license had been summarily suspended because the statute contained no time limit torequest a rescission. Thereafter, the legislature added the 90-day limit for filing a petition to rescindbut left unaltered the phrase referencing the Civil Code. Rodriguez, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 683, 791N.E.2d at 712. Had the legislature intended the 90-day time limit to apply to refilings, it would haveso stated. See People v. Ullrich, 328 Ill. App. 3d 811, 831, 767 N.E.2d 411, 428 (2002) (Greiman,J., dissenting). It is contrary to the rules of statutory construction for a court to determine that thelegislature did not intend what a statute's plain language imports. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d435, 443, 677 N.E.2d 935, 939. (1997). Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court may notdepart from its plain language and read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislaturedid not declare. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 443, 677 N.E.2d at 939. We believe that the Rodriguezcourt mistakenly construed the statute as ambiguous, looking to its legislative history to support itsassertion that the legislature intended the 90-day limit to apply to refilings.

Pursuant to our plain reading of section 2-118.1 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(West 2002)), a driver who timely files a petition for rehearing within the 90-day limit and thenvoluntarily withdraws the petition may refile the petition within the one-year period provided insection 13-217 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 2002)). Our interpretation of the statutedoes not thwart the statute's goals. The driver is provided due process protection in that he isallowed to request a hearing for the determination of whether the State had sufficient grounds tosuspend his license. Holmes, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 806, 644 N.E.2d at 3. The State's objective inkeeping allegedly intoxicated drivers off the road is satisfied in that the driver's license is stillsummarily suspended and the driver remains without his driving privileges pending the outcome ofthe rescission hearing. Rodriguez, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 688, 791 N.E.2d at 715 (O'Malley, J., dissenting).

The record in the instant case reveals that McClure was issued notice of summary suspensionon April 25, 2003, and timely filed a petition to rescind on June 19, 2003. He withdrew his petitionon August 26, 2003 and refiled the petition on April 1, 2004. Because McClure timely refiled hispetition within a year of his voluntary dismissal, pursuant to section 13-217 of the Civil Code, wehold that the trial court erred when it dismissed as untimely his petition for rescission.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is reversedand this cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Holdridge and McDade, JJ., concurring.