Defendant Lisa Muzzarelli was charged with two counts offorgery under the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961. 720 ILCS 5/17-3(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000). She was found guilty on both counts. We affirm.

FACTS

In 1999, Lisa Muzzarelli was convicted of retail theft. Priorto her sentencing hearing, the trial judge, James Lanuti, receiveda letter asking him for leniency in her sentencing. The letter wason a school letterhead, appeared to be signed by a teacher at theschool and stated that Muzzarelli was a gifted teacher whom theschool district did not wish to lose. After Muzzarelli wassentenced, the prosecutor discovered that the letter wasunauthorized. During a subsequent investigation, Muzzarelliadmitted to a police investigator that she had written the letterherself.

Muzzarelli was then charged with two counts of forgerypursuant to the Illinois Criminal Code. 720 ILCS 5/17-3(a)(1),(a)(2) (West 2000). She was tried on both counts. At the close ofthe prosecution's case, Muzzarelli filed motions to dismiss thecharge and for a directed verdict. The trial court denied bothmotions, and the jury found Muzzarelli guilty on both counts of theindictment.

DISCUSSION

I

Muzzarelli argues that the letter on which these charges werebased is not a document that can be the basis of a forgery charge. She first contends that the use of the word "defraud" in theforgery statute only applies to attempts to obtain economic gain. She also asserts that the letter is outside the scope of the crimeof forgery because it does not affect a legal right or obligation.

A

To establish the offense of forgery, the State must prove thata defendant (1) had an intent to defraud; (2) knowingly made oraltered a document; (3) did so in such a manner that the documentpurported to have been made by another; and (4) that the documentwas apparently capable of defrauding another. 720 ILCS 5/17-3(West 2000). Muzzarelli admits that she made the letter in such amanner that it purported to be made by another. However, shecontends the other elements of the crime could not be proved.

Muzzarelli argues that the word "defraud" must be defined withreference to the common law definition of fraud. She states thatunder the common law, fraud requires some kind of legallyrecognized injury, such as financial injury or property loss. SeeGlazewski v. Coronet Insurance Co., 108 Ill. 2d 243, 254, 483N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (1985). Since her letter to Judge Lanuti couldnot affect any property or monetary interest, she argues that shecould not be convicted of forgery.

"Intent to defraud" in the forgery statute is defined as "anintention to cause another to assume, create, transfer, alter orterminate any right, obligation or power with reference to anyperson or property." 720 ILCS 5/17-3(b) (West 2000). A "documentapparently capable of defrauding another" is one that "includes,but is not limited to, one by which any right, obligation or powerwith reference to any person or property may be created,transferred, altered or terminated." 720 ILCS 5/17-3(c) (West2000).

A legislative body has the power to articulate reasonabledefinitions of terms within a statute and may broaden or narrow themeaning that terms otherwise would have. People v. Johnson, 231Ill. App. 3d 412, 419-22, 595 N.E.2d 1381, 1387-88 (1992). Whenthe General Assembly has defined the terms relating to fraud, acourt cannot look beyond the statute to determine what it means to"inten[d] to defraud" or for a document to be "capable ofdefrauding." See Johnson, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 419-22, 595 N.E.2dat 1387-88.

If the legislature had not spoken, Muzzarelli's argument wouldbe an appealing one, but we cannot impose a common law definitionover a statutory one. See Heerey v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 82Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1091-92, 403 N.E.2d 617, 620 (1980). Becausethe statute adds language that includes documents affecting legalrights, obligations and powers, Illinois courts have rejectedMuzzarelli's argument that only potential monetary loss is a properfocus of forgery. In People v. Merchant, 5 Ill. App. 3d 636, 283N.E.2d 724 (1972), the defendant was charged with forgery forpresenting to a pharmacist a prescription that he had written andsigned with the name of a doctor. Defendant argued that since hewas ready to pay for the drugs, the pharmacist would have sufferedno pecuniary loss; thus, intent to defraud could not be proven. Merchant, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 638, 283 N.E.2d at 725.

The appellate court disagreed, citing the broad definition of"intent to defraud" contained in the statute. The court noted thata pharmacist can only dispense a prescriptive drug pursuant to avalid prescription; defendant's intent to cause the pharmacist to"assume he had the right to dispense a prescriptive drug * * * tothe defendant" was sufficient intent to defraud. Merchant, 5 Ill.App. 3d at 638, 283 N.E.2d at 725.

The defendant in People v. Gawlak, 276 Ill. App. 3d 286, 657N.E.2d 1057 (1995), was convicted of forgery for falsifying labelson barrels containing hazardous waste at the chemical storage anddisposal facility where he worked. He argued that he had no intentto defraud, since he had not altered the labels in an effort togain pecuniary advantage. The court held that when defendantaltered the labels, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency'sright to monitor and regulate the hazardous waste at the plant wassufficient to constitute "intent to defraud" under the forgerystatute. Gawlak, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 292, 657 N.E.2d at 1062.

The statutory definitions of "intent to defraud" and"apparently capable of defrauding" are broad enough to include anintent to deceive for reasons other than pecuniary gain. SeeMerchant, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 638, 283 N.E.2d at 725; Gawlak, 276Ill. App. 3d at 292, 657 N.E.2d at 1062. The word "defraud" in thestatute does not limit its scope, and the trial court properlydenied Muzzarelli's motions.

Muzzarelli also argues that the long-standing rule that toprove forgery a document must have an apparent legal effect or becapable of affecting the rights or obligations of another. SeePeople v. Kent, 40 Ill. App. 3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890 (1976).

The crime of forgery only applies to documents that couldaffect another person's legal rights. People v. Kelley, 129 Ill.App. 3d 920, 473 N.E.2d 572 (1985); Waterman v. People, 67 Ill. 91(1873). Though property or monetary loss may be the most commonforgeries, they are not exclusive. See Merchant, 5 Ill. App. 3d at638, 283 N.E.2d at 725; Gawlak, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 292, 657 N.E.2dat 1062. The statute speaks of a "right, obligation or power withreference to any person or property." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS5/17-3(b) (West 2000).

Muzzarelli cites Waterman v. People, where the defendant hadgiven to the superintendent of a railroad a falsified letter in anattempt to procure a free pass on the railroad. The letter,purported to be from the superintendent of another railroad, askedother railroad superintendents to show "courtesies" to the bearerof the letter. The court held that the letter was not a forgerybecause it did not create any legal obligation, even though itcould cause financial loss to a railroad acting on it. Waterman,67 Ill. at 92-93. Thus, if no legal obligation or right wascreated, the document was not a forgery even where a legallycognizable injury might exist.

Muzzarelli contends that her letter, like the letter inWaterman, merely asked Judge Lanuti to consider Muzzarelli'spurported skills as a teacher. It also asked him to impose arelatively light sentence upon her, but did not require him to doso. However, there is an important distinction between the letterin Waterman and the letter here. No one was obligated to considerthe request of the letter in Waterman. In contrast, Judge Lanutiwas statutorily bound to consider all "evidence and informationoffered by the parties in aggravation and mitigation" in exercisinghis discretion to impose a sentence on Muzzarelli. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(a)(4) (West 2000).

Thus, the letter to Judge Lanuti created a legal obligation toconsider its contents when sentencing Muzzarelli; it could havealtered his right and obligation to impose a proper sentence inlight of all of the facts available to him. The letter was capableof having a legal effect and was a proper subject of a forgerycharge under the statute.

Muzzarelli further contends that the indictment against herwas insufficient because it lacks allegations of extrinsic factssufficient to render the document "apparently capable ofdefrauding" and the letter does not show a tendency to defraud onits face. See People v. Moyer, 1 Ill. App. 3d 245, 248, 273 N.E.2d210, 212 (1971). Here, the letter does not show a tendency todefraud on its face. It appears to be written by an acquaintanceat the school where she sometimes worked as a substitute teacherand presents mitigating evidence. However, the indictment doesplead sufficient extrinsic facts.

"'An indictment which charges an offense in the language ofthe statute is deemed sufficient when the words of the statute sofar particularize the offense that by their use alone an accused isapprised * * * of the precise offense with which he or she ischarged.'" People v. Hockaday, 93 Ill. 2d 279, 283-84, 443 N.E.2d566, 568 (1982), quoting People v. Patrick, 38 Ill. 2d 255, 258(1967). An indictment in the language of the forgery statute issufficient to inform a defendant of the crime with which she ischarged. An indictment stating that a document is apparentlycapable of defrauding in that it was purported to be made byanother sufficiently pleads extrinsic facts demonstrating thefraudulent character of the document. Hockaday, 93 Ill. 2d at 283,443 N.E.2d at 568.

As in Hockaday, the indictment in this case was in thelanguage of the forgery statute. It alleged the fraudulentcharacter of the letter by stating that "it was purported to havebeen made by another." The trial judge did not err in denyingMuzzarelli's motion to dismiss charge on these grounds.

Finally, Muzzarelli contends that the state failed to provethat the document in question was one that a reasonable andordinary person might be deceived into accepting as genuine. Evidence in a criminal case is sufficient if any reasonable factfinder could have found the elements of the crime beyond areasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the prosecution. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237,261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277 (1985).

At trial, the State adduced evidence that this letter wasprinted on Peru Public School District stationery and that it wasapparently signed by a teacher in that district. Where a letter ison official letterhead, apparently signed by a person withauthority to create it, a reasonable mind could fairly concludethat an ordinary and reasonable person might accept the letter asgenuine. See People v. Hagan, 145 Ill. 2d 287, 306, 583 N.E.2d494, 502-3 (1991). The evidence here meets the Collins standardfor sufficiency. See Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261, 478 N.E.2d at277.

The judgment of the circuit court of LaSalle County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

HOMER, J., concurring, and McDADE, J., dissenting.

JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majoritybecause I believe the finding that defendant's actions constituteforgery unnecessarily and incorrectly stretches the statutorymeaning of "intent to defraud."

Defendant does not dispute the fact that she wrote a letter onletterhead of the Peru School District and signed it with a nameother than her own. She does dispute that this was done for thepurpose of defrauding anyone.

As noted by the majority, the statute defines "intent todefraud" as "an intention to cause another to assume, create,transfer, alter, or terminate any right, obligation or power withreference to any person or property." 720 ILCS 5/17-3(b) (West2000). In the specific situation before us, defendant signed thename of a teacher in the Peru School District to a letter that she,herself, had written to Judge Lanuti, apparently hoping to persuadehim to sentence her more leniently following her conviction forshoplifting. I believe this would appropriately be characterizedas an attempt to influence the exercise of his discretion.

No right, obligation or power of Judge Lanuti was affected byvirtue of defendant's action. His right to sentence defendant uponher conviction; his obligation to sentence her justly and withinthe statutory range; and his power to exercise his discretion indetermining where within the range her actual sentence should fallall remained intact despite the receipt of defendant's letter.

If we consider this particular exercise of the court'sdiscretion without the fact of an unauthorized signature, we cansee that the judge was not "defrauded." We know that judges incriminal cases receive letters -- sometimes they are flooded withthem -- from people advancing arguments for greater or lesserleniency in sentencing a convicted defendant. Some of the letterwriters are truthful, honestly portraying defendant as worthy ofcompassion or deserving of the maximum penalty. Others are perhapsdevious or misleading, but hopeful of gaining either more favorableor more punitive treatment. And still others may be downrightdishonest in putting forth their arguments. It is the function ofthe judge to review and weigh all of this input. The dishonestletters do not modify any right, obligation, or power of the judgeany more than the truthful ones do.

Similarly, Muzzarelli's letter with the false signature didnot modify, nor was it capable on its face of modifying, any right,obligation or power of Judge Lanuti. Indeed, the State reports atpage 12 of its brief that, while the judge did not actually knowthe document was false prior to sentencing, he had concerns aboutit because it was on a school district letterhead and suggested aterm limited to weekends. He testified that he considered theletter (as he was statutorily required to do) but did not know howmuch weight he gave it. The statute does not, in fact, requirethat he give it any weight or any credence -- only that he read andassess it. It bears noting that the letter did not achieve itspurpose. The defendant was not sentenced to weekends as the letterrecommended but, rather, was required to serve two years in thedepartment of corrections.

I believe that this is the first time the forgery statute hasbeen applied to this particular situation, and I think we must becautious not to extend it beyond the legislature's intended reach. Defendant has cited a plethora of cases, ranging from ancient torecent, finding the statute inapplicable because the interestaffected was not a legal right in property or money.

In arguing that the statute is applicable in the presentcircumstance, the State relied almost exclusively on the IllinoisSupreme Court's decision in People v. Hagan, 145 Ill. 2d 287, 583N.E.2d 494 (1991), in which the court found that a lettermisrepresenting defendant's bank balances in two accounts wascapable of defrauding. In my opinion, neither Hagan; People v.Gawlak, 276 Ill. App. 3d 286, 657 N.E.2d 1057 (1995); nor People v.Merchant, 5 Ill. App. 3d 636, 283 N.E.2d 724 (1972); each of whichis discussed in the opinion supports the result reached by themajority.

In Hagan, the counterfeit letter was capable of altering orterminating the right of a property owner to enter into a leaseagreement only with a person with adequate financial resourcesbecause the letter represented falsely that defendant wasfinancially secure rather than relatively insolvent. In Gawlak,defendant falsified labels on barrels of hazardous waste at thedisposal facility where he was employed. In so doing, he impededthe Illinois Environmental Protection Agency's right and obligationto monitor and regulate hazardous waste by providing data thatfalsely indicated there was no problem with the waste levels. Similarly in Merchant, defendant's forged prescription deprived thepharmacist of his right, power and obligation to issue regulatedmedication only when authorized by a doctor to do so.

In each of these cases, a legal right has been either short-circuited or deprived. By contrast, a judge's statutory right,power or obligation to consider evidence and information inmitigation or aggravation is not undermined by a false letter, evenone with a counterfeit signature.

My departure from the opinion of the majority is very narrowbut, I think, very important. We open a Pandora's box and rendera statute vague and overly broad by judicial action when weartificially stretch its reach, and I think that is what thisdecision does. Moreover, there is no need to do so because thereare other more appropriate legal vehicles for punishing thisdefendant's misconduct.

For these reasons, I believe the trial court should havegranted the motion to dismiss, and having not done so, should havegranted defendant's motion for directed verdict. I would reversedefendant's conviction for forgery and I, therefore, dissent.