No. 3--01--0521

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2002

JUSTICE HOMER delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant John M. Norris was charged with one count ofaggravated criminal sexual abuse, a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS5/12--16(b),(g) (West 1998)), and two counts of Class X predatorycriminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12--14.1(a)(1),

(b)(1) (West 1998)). Pursuant to a fully negotiated agreementwith the State, defendant pled guilty to aggravated criminalsexual abuse and one count of predatory criminal sexual assaultof a child. The State dismissed the other count of predatorycriminal sexual assault of a child, and the court sentenceddefendant to consecutive terms of 3 and 10 years, noting thattruth-in-sentencing applied to the 10-year term. Defendant fileda post-plea motion, which was denied, and he appeals. Defendantargues that (1) his guilty pleas should be vacated because thetrial court failed to admonish him that he was subject to civilcommitment proceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)) and the Sexually ViolentPersons Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998)); and (2) PublicAct 90--593 (Pub. Act 90--593, eff. June 19, 1998) violates thisstate's constitution. We affirm.

Prior to accepting defendant's guilty pleas, the trial courtinformed defendant of the nature of the charges against him andthe minimum and maximum penalties provided by law. The courtalso informed defendant of trial rights he would be giving up bypleading guilty. Defendant acknowledged that he understood thecharges, the penalties and the rights he was waiving. Heacknowledged that he had discussed the consequences of his pleaswith counsel, and he was satisfied with counsel's advice and theplea agreement. Following the State's factual basis, defendantdenied that he had been threatened, coerced or promised anybenefit outside the terms of the plea agreement in exchange forhis pleas of guilty. The court then accepted defendant's pleasand imposed sentence according to the agreement.

Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his pleas. Heclaimed that (1) his sentence was excessive; (2) his pleas werenot entered knowingly and voluntarily, because he misunderstoodthe right to appeal from his sentence; (3) he was neveradmonished by counsel or the court that his guilty pleas exposedhim to liability under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act and theSexually Violent Persons Commitment Act; and (4) the truth-in-sentencing act, as amended by Public Act 90--593, violated thesingle subject rule of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

At a hearing on the motion, defendant's trial counseltestified that he had not informed defendant that he facedpotential civil commitment under the sexually dangerous andsexually violent persons statutes. Defendant and his wifetestified that they believed defendant would receive a jurytrial. After arguments of counsel, the court denied the motion. The court ruled, inter alia, that (1) civil commitment under thesexually dangerous and sexually violent persons statutes was acollateral consequence of defendant's guilty pleas; and (2)Public Act 90--593, which reenacted truth-in-sentencinglegislation, was not unconstitutional.

On appeal, defendant first argues that his pleas were notknowing and voluntary because the trial court failed to admonishhim about the possibility of civil commitment. He contends thatproceedings under the sexually dangerous and sexually violentpersons statutes are direct, rather than collateral consequencesof his guilty pleas.

A defendant must be admonished of the direct consequences ofhis guilty plea to render the plea knowing and voluntary. Peoplev. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 721 N.E.2d 539 (1999). Directconsequences of a guilty plea are those consequences within thetrial judge's control and related to the sentence imposed on thebasis of the plea. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 721 N.E.2d 539. By contrast, collateral consequences are future or contemplated,but not certain consequences, generally resulting from actiontaken by the State's Attorney or another agency that the trialcourt does not control, and not related to the length or natureof the sentence imposed on the basis of the plea. Williams, 188Ill. 2d 365, 721 N.E.2d 539. Guilty pleas are not invalid forfailure of the court to warn a defendant of collateralconsequences. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 721 N.E.2d 539. Whether a consequence of a guilty plea is direct or collateral isa question of law which this court reviews de novo. Williams,188 Ill. 2d 365, 721 N.E.2d 539.

In this case, it was the State's Attorney, not the trialjudge, who had control over whether to prosecute defendant underthe Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. It is further within theState's Attorney's control whether defendant will be exposed tocivil commitment under the Sexually Violent Persons Act uponcompleting his prison sentence. The penalty imposed as a directconsequence of defendant's guilty plea did not automaticallyinclude any period of commitment under either the SexuallyDangerous Persons or the Sexually Violent Persons Act. Consequently, any such potential commitment must be considered acollateral consequence which the trial court was not required toinclude in its admonishments prior to accepting defendant'sguilty pleas. See Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 721 N.E.2d 539. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant'spost-plea motion on the ground of insufficient admonishments.

Next, defendant claims that Public Act 90-593 (Act) isconstitutionally defective in two respects. He first argues thatthe Act violates the "single subject" clause of the IllinoisConstitution of 1970 because persons found not guilty by reasonof insanity are subject to civil portions of the amendinglegislation.

The single subject clause of this state's constitutionprovides as follows:

"Bills, except bills for appropriations and forcodification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall beconfined to one subject." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,