JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Scott Parker was convicted of first degree murder(720 ILCS 5/9--1 (West 2000)) in the death of Catherine Kelleyand was sentenced to a 60-year term of imprisonment. Defendantwas also convicted of involuntary manslaughter and residentialburglary arising from the same incident. On appeal, defendantcontends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motionto suppress; (2) his defense counsel was ineffective; (3) thetrial court failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 605(a); and(4) he is entitled to an additional day of sentencing credit. Weaffirm and remand with directions.

As the defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of theevidence, we will not set out a detailed recitation of the trialproceedings. We present only a brief overview of the facts; moreinformation will be related as necessary to resolve particularissues.

On November 12, 2001, the defendant, who had previouslyperformed maintenance work for Kelley, went to her home inMoline, Illinois. Kelley's car was in the driveway, but she didnot answer her door when defendant knocked. Defendant enteredthe home, saw Kelley's purse on the table, and took a credit cardfrom the purse. Defendant heard a noise in the basement andwalked toward the basement stairwell, where he encountered Kelleyat the top of the stairs. Kelley began screaming and thedefendant grabbed onto her as she ran or slipped back down thestairs. Defendant fell going down the stairs and as he got up hewrapped his arm around Kelley and held onto her "real tight"because she was screaming and yelling. Defendant then tried totie a white piece of cloth around Kelley's mouth. He pulled ittight, tied it, and left in Kelley's car. An autopsy revealedthat Kelly died from strangulation, probably by the bathrobe beltfound tied around her.

Defendant subsequently used the credit card he had taken tobuy power tools which he then pawned. Defendant was arrested onNovember 16 at a bus stop in Davenport, Iowa, by Davenport policepursuant to an arrest warrant for forgery and theft based ondefendant's use of Kelley's credit card. The Davenport policeinformed Moline police of defendant's arrest, and two Molinedetectives, Pablo Reyna and Douglas Garrison, went to Davenportto interview the defendant. Garrison informed the defendant ofhis Miranda rights and he acknowledged that he understood them. Defendant was then given a form containing the Miranda rights andhe was asked to place his initials next to each statement on theform. Defendant began initialing the form but stopped and said"I think I need a lawyer."⁽¹⁾ He then said, "I didn't mean to hurther." Reyna and Garrison then left and went to another room tointerview the defendant's mother.

Approximately ten minutes after Reyna and Garrison left,Davenport Detective Thomas entered the interview room and toldthe defendant that he was going to read to him the warrant thathad been the basis for his arrest. According to Thomas, he wasrequired by Iowa law to read the warrant to the defendant. Detective Brown also testified that reading the arrest warrantwas an Iowa statutory requirement. After Thomas began readingthe warrant, the defendant interrupted him and made someinculpatory statements. Thomas did not respond. The defendantthen asked Thomas to get Officer Reyna. Thomas told Reyna andGarrison what had occurred and they went back into the interviewroom. After the defendant said that he now wished to speakwithout his lawyer being present, defendant was re-Mirandized andhe signed a written waiver of his rights. Defendant subsequentlygave a video-taped statement in which he admitted killing Kelley.

The defendant first contends that the trial court erred indenying his motion to suppress the statements he made to policeafter invoking his right to counsel. Specifically, defendantargues that Detective Thomas's reading of the Iowa arrest warrantconstituted further interrogation in violation of Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981). We disagree.

Miranda established that a defendant subjected to custodialinterrogation was entitled to certain procedural safeguards,including the right to have an attorney present duringquestioning. Moreover, "[i]f the individual states that he wantsan attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney ispresent." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723, 86 S.Ct. at ___. Once a defendant has invoked his right to counsel,he may not be subject to renewed interrogation without hisattorney present, "unless the accused himself initiates furthercommunications, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards, 452 U.S. at 485, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 386, 101 S. Ct. at ___.

In this case the defendant instituted a conversation withDetective Thomas and asked to speak with Officer Reyna. He didso, however, only after Thomas began reading the arrest warrant,and a defendant does not waive his right to counsel merely byresponding to further police-initiated custodial interrogation. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, 68 L. Ed 2d at 386, 101 S. Ct. at ___. The critical issue, therefore, is whether Thomas's reading of thearrest warrant constituted "interrogation."

In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Supreme Court held that"interrogation" for Miranda purposes includes not only expressquestioning, but also any words or actions by the police, otherthan those normally attendant to arrest and custody, that thepolice should know are reasonably likely to elicit anincriminating response. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d297, 308, 100 S. Ct. 1682, ___ (1980). This definition focusesprimarily upon the perceptions of the defendant, rather than theintent of the police. However, "since the police surely cannotbe held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their wordsor actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only towords or acts on the part of police officers that they shouldhave known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatingresponse." (Emphasis in original.) Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02,64 L. Ed. 2d at 308, 100 S. Ct. at ___.

Should Detective Thomas have known that reading the Iowaarrest warrant to the defendant was reasonably likely to elicitan incriminating response? Thomas testified that he was requiredby Iowa law to read the warrant to defendant, and he did so atwhat he felt was the first opportunity. He described whatoccurred as follows:

"I entered the room and I had thewarrant in my hand. I did not even sit downin the chair. *** I informed Mr. Parker thatI would read to him the warrant that I hadissued for his arrest. I read to him, to anypeace officer in the State of Iowa[,]information upon oath having been filed thisday before the Iowa District Court, ScottCounty, Iowa that the crime of forgery,715A.6[,] theft fourth degree 714.2 sub-paragraph 4, theft fifth degree 714.2 sub-paragraph 5. After I got done reading thetheft fifth [degree] charge Mr. Parkerinterrupted me.

Q. [Assistant States Attorney] Whatdid he say?

A. He told me that he was a patient atthe Robert Young Center for drug abuse. Informed me that he had been going there andthey told him that he did not have any typeof a problem. He said to me, with all thatyou have charged me with does that sound likeI have a problem or not? I didn'tacknowledge him. I didn't say anything. Hethen told me, thank God you guys got me whenI hurt one person and not a thousand. Hethen asked me to send back in either said[sic] Detective Reyna [or] the Mexicandetective. I can't recall which one he said.

Q. Now, why were you reading him thatdocument?

A. It's required by law, Iowa law, thatthe arrestee is read the warrant.

Q. Whether or not Mr. Parker was asuspect in a murder investigation in Illinoiswould you have read that charge to him, thatwarrant to him, no matter whether or not hewas a suspect or not?

A. I have, by law I have to read it tohim regardless of anything else going on.

Q. Did you ask him any questionsregarding the Moline, alleged Moline murder?

A. At no time during this incident didI ever ask Scott Parker anything about thedeath investigation.

Q. When you were in that room andreading him the warrant [and] he makes thesestatements did you say anything more to Mr.Parker?

A. No, he interrupted me.

Q. And he made these statements?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you left the room withoutmaking any further statements?

A. Yes."

As we indicated previously, Detective Brown also testifiedthat reading the warrant was a statutory requirement. Defendantasserts, however, that Iowa law required only that he be informedof the existence of the warrant, and that it be shown to thedefendant upon his request. See Iowa Code