On February 24, 2000, Rexroat signed an admission in opencourt stating that he was a sexually violent person under theAct. The court thus committed him to the custody of the DHS forinstitutional care in a secure facility. Other than identifyingsuch care, the court did not provide any guidelines or goals forRexroat's treatment. He is currently held in a facility locatedin Joliet (the only DHS facility designated for sexually violentpersons), although the DHS does have other facilities forrendering mental health treatment.

Pursuant to the Act's requirement that Rexroat beperiodically reexamined (725 ILCS 207/55 (West 2002)), the courtappointed Doctor Robert Chapman to examine him on March 14, 2003. Doctor Chapman made diagnoses of depression, borderlinepersonality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and adultattention deficit disorder. In his written report, he opinedthat Rexroat was not receiving appropriate treatment in theJoliet facility, and thus he recommended a transfer to anotherfacility where appropriate treatment could be rendered. In thedoctor's own words:

"Paul E. Rexroat is currently and since 1999 (4years ago), has been receiving none of the propercompetent psychiatric treatment required. Rather thanobsess about his alleged sexual deviant thoughts andopining about his motivation such as to 'gainattention,' he must first be provided with competentpsychiatric treatment to render him mentally stableenough to benefit from sex offender treatment if indeedthere is any benefit. It appears the [DHS] Treatmentand Detention Facility Program is a one trick pony thatdoes not have competence or apparent interest intreating Paul E. Rexroat's mental disorder asenvisioned by this Sexually Violent [Person] Act.

It is therefore my opinion he be transferred to a[DHS] mental health treatment facility where there iscompetent treatment, personnel, and therapeuticenvironment which permits treatment and relief of hissymptoms of volatile mood, affect, and psychoticepisodes. At that time he may be able to benefit fromsex offender treatment."

Rexroat subsequently filed a petition for conditionalrelease, citing Doctor Chapman's report and requesting a transferto a DHS mental health treatment facility. The matter proceededto a scheduled hearing date, but on that date Rexroat advisedthat he also wished to file a motion challenging theconstitutionality of the Act. The judge thus reserved his rulingon the conditional release issue until Rexroat presented hisconstitutional arguments.

On October 16, 2003, the judge heard arguments on bothissues. Regarding the constitutional issue, Rexroat sought totestify about the factual allegations in his motion (allegedlypunitive conditions in the Joliet facility). The judge notedthat the supreme court had already declared the Actconstitutional (see In re Varner, 207 Ill. 2d 425 (2003)), andthat he was not going to "reinvent the wheel." Rexroat arguedthat his motion was distinguishable because he sought adeclaration that the Act was unconstitutional "as applied." Nevertheless, the judge refused to "conduct a hearing whose endis pretty obvious." Accordingly, he denied Rexroat's motionchallenging the constitutionality of the Act.

The judge also denied Rexroat's petition for conditionalrelease, stating:

"I don't think I have the power to order histransfer within the [DHS] like that. The decision thatthis Court can make is whether or not he is to remainin a facility such as where he is now that is run bythe [DHS] or he be given the conditional release with aprogram. As a good analogy, I would think would belike a halfway house type of a situation. That I couldorder. But all the doctor is recommending is thatthere be a lateral transfer within the [DHS] which issomething that would better be served by those peoplethat are in the [DHS] itself to make that decision. Idon't think I can tell them to do that. It's aquestion of whether or not he remains where he is intheir programs or the conditional release. And thisreport certainly doesn't call for conditional release."

Rexroat filed this appeal from the judge's order. Particularly, Rexroat claims the judge erred in not allowingevidentiary hearings on his two pleadings.
 

When a court's authority to act is controlled by statute,the court is governed by rules of limited jurisdiction and mustproceed within the strictures of the statute. In re M.M., 156Ill. 2d 53 (1993). Thus, in the instant case, the circuit courtwas bound by the strictures of the Act. Under the Act, the courthad only two options regarding Rexroat's commitment:institutional care in a secure facility, or conditional release. See 725 ILCS 207/40(b)(2) (West 2002). The legislature's use ofthe word "or" between these options signals that they aredifferent, and thus that conditional release does not involveplacement in a secure facility. Cf. 725 ILCS 207/60(f) (West2002) (conditional release occurs "in the community"); 725 ILCS207/40(b)(4) (West 2002) ("[b]efore a person is placed onconditional release ***, the court shall so notify the municipalpolice department and county sheriff for the municipality andcounty in which the person will be residing").

Since Rexroat's request--even if granted--would not haveremoved him from care in a secure facility, he was not asking forconditional release at all. In his oral argument before thiscourt, Rexroat acknowledged that he did not request a releasefrom institutional care in a secure facility. Instead, he askedthe trial court to order that he be transferred to a differentDHS facility for appropriate treatment. We find no reversibleerror in the judge's ruling on this issue.

Regarding cases where a sexually violent person is committedto a secure facility, the Act states: "The [DHS] shall ***provide by rule for the nature of the facility, the level of careto be provided in the facility, and the custody and discipline ofpersons placed in the facility." 725 ILCS 207/50(b) (West 2002). This provision illustrates that decisions about the nature of thesecure facility belong to the DHS, not to circuit courts. Generally, a trial court lacks authority to dictate the manner inwhich an agency of the executive branch carries out its statutoryduties. See In re R.V., 288 Ill. App. 3d 860 (1997); Cf. In reDetention of Hayes, 321 Ill. App. 3d 178 (2001) (circuit courtcould not order DHS to employ a particular doctor to overseerespondent's treatment). The instant judge's order reflectsthese principles.

Both parties cite Hayes, where the Second District held thata judge had authority to order the DHS to provide treatment inaccordance with the report of an expert medical psychiatrist. However, the court also held that the judge lacked authority toorder the DHS to employ the psychiatrist to oversee therespondent's treatment. The court summarized its holding asfollows:

"[T]he Act contemplates an interplay between thecourts and the [DHS] and an individualized plan oftreatment for sexually violent persons committed to asecure facility. Accordingly, the trial court may makefindings of fact regarding an individual's mentalcondition and enter reasonable orders regarding thetypes of treatment required. However, it is the[DHS's] duty under the Act to determine the nature ofthe secure facility and the manner in which treatmentwill be provided to those individuals detained orcommitted. *** In other words, the trial court mayidentify the goals for a sexually violent person'streatment, but the [DHS] has the duty of determiningthe means for achieving those goals." Hayes, 321 Ill.App. 3d at 196.

In the instant case, Rexroat asked the trial court to domore than identify goals for his treatment; he wanted an ordertelling the DHS where to hold him (thus encroaching on the DHS'sstatutory authority to determine the nature of the facility). Accordingly, we see no reversible error in the judge's decision.

In so holding, we note that Rexroat still has viable optionsunder the Hayes decision. Although the circuit court cannotorder the DHS to transfer him to a different facility, the courtmay establish goals (based on recommendations from DoctorChapman) for the treatment he receives at the Joliet facility. Apetition fashioned in this manner would avoid the problemsdiscussed above. As the Hayes court noted, the Act contemplatesindividualized consideration, by circuit courts, of treatmentneeds for sexually violent persons. See Hayes, 321 Ill. App. 3dat 194. Although Hayes dealt only with an initial commitmentorder, we see no reason why a sexually violent person cannotpetition for changes in his treatment based on recommendationsstemming from a mandatory reexamination.
 

Next, Rexroat claims the judge erred in denying his motionchallenging the constitutionality of the Act. Specifically,Rexroat claims the judge erred in not allowing him to testify. According to his brief: "The purpose for testimony by [Rexroat]was to demonstrate that the extremely punitive conditions ofconfinement serve[] to impose additional criminal punishment upon[him] after he has served a full criminal sentence."

Such a claim failed in Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 148 L.Ed. 2d 734, 121 S. Ct. 727 (2001). According to Rexroat, ratherthan rearguing the claim raised in Seling, he is trying to accessother remedies mentioned by the Supreme Court in its opinion. For instance, when alluding to a state cause of action, the Courtnoted: "The text of the Washington Act states that those confinedunder its authority have the right to adequate care andindividualized treatment." Seling, 531 U.S. at 265, 148 L. Ed.2d at 748, 121 S. Ct. at 736. As discussed above, thisobservation applies equally under the Illinois Act. See Hayes,321 Ill. App. 3d 178. Accordingly, Rexroat may seek appropriaterelief through a properly drafted petition. Moreover, in Selingthe Supreme Court noted that a federal civil rights action isavailable to sexually violent persons.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the LaSalleCounty circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

MCDADE and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.