Defendant Epifanio Salgado was convicted of unlawfulpossession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(g)(West 2002)) and he was sentenced to a ten-year term ofimprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that he was denied afair trial when: (1) the State was allowed to introduce evidencethat defendant had posted $75,000 as bail; and (2) the Stateimproperly commented on the exercise of his right against self-incrimination. We reverse and remand.

The 55-year old defendant testified that he was born inMexico and came to the United States in 1966. He is a legalresident and lives in Chicago. Defendant primarily worked as awaiter or bartender at various hotels and private clubs, but healso worked as a day laborer on construction jobs. Two or threetimes per week, around 7 a.m., defendant would go to a gasstation at Belmont and Milwaukee avenues near his home where heand others would gather and wait to be hired by contractors orhomeowners.

On the morning of March 27, 2002, the defendant went to thegas station looking for work. A man in a truck told defendantthat he had a construction job in Joliet and gave him a telephonenumber. The man told defendant to call later to see about thejob. Defendant waited around looking for other work, but wasunsuccessful and went home between 9 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.

Between 11 and 11:30 a.m., defendant called the telephonenumber he had been given to make sure he had the job. He wastold to call back around 1 p.m.; when he did, he was given theaddress of a Clark truck stop in Joliet. Defendant drove hiswife's minivan to the truck stop and arrived at about 1:45 p.m. When he arrived, defendant did not see anyone and he called thenumber again. He was told to drive to the back of the gasstation, where he saw a man waving at him near a tractor-trailer. Defendant parked his van, exited, and retrieved his tool belt. He walked up to the truck and told the man that he was there forthe job; the man was now inside the cab of the truck. The manbegan pushing a big box toward the door, and he asked defendantto help him put the box on the ground. Defendant helped the manunload the box and 10 to 12 law enforcement agents jumped out andplaced the defendant under arrest.

Inside the box and two others was cannabis. Defendanttestified that he did not know what was in the box and that hehad gone to the truck stop for a construction job. The man atthe gas station had never mentioned anything about picking up orhandling any boxes. Once at the police station, the defendanttold the police how he had come to be at the truck stop. Defendant specifically denied telling the police that he wassupposed to drive the van to a gas station at Cicero and Chicagoavenues and leave it there.

The truck from which the defendant unloaded the box had leftEl Paso, Texas, with a shipment of car parts. Cesar Ortega andOscar Munoz drove the truck and stopped on the way to Chicago topick up the boxes of cannabis. Ortega testified that when heleft El Paso, he had a telephone number of the person to whom hewas to deliver the boxes. Ortega was given a code phrase, "vamoscaminos de Durango," to use when he called the number. Ortegastated that he called the number five times after enteringIllinois. During the first call, Ortega uttered the code phraseand kept driving. According to Ortega, he did not recognize thevoice of the person who answered the first call. No one answeredthe second call, Ortega testified. After the second call, Ortegastated that they delivered the car parts to Indiana. During thedrive to Indiana, Ortega said he made a third call and told theperson that he was not ready because he was late for his deliveryin Indiana. He recognized the voice as the same person whoanswered the first call. Ortega then testified that he made afourth call before he arrived in Joliet. During this fourthcall, Ortega told the person that he needed to set up a time forthe delivery and to bring another person because the boxes wereheavy. Ortega then made a fifth call while at the truck stop inJoliet to tell the person where his truck was. Ortega recognizedthe person's voice as the same during the first, third, fourthand fifth calls. At trial Ortega identified the voice asbelonging to defendant.

While Ortega was waiting, law enforcement agents approached. The agents searched the truck, found the marijuana and arrestedOrtega and Munoz. Ortega agreed to cooperate with the agents,who then climbed into the truck with him and waited for someoneto pick up the boxes.

Officer Eugene Talley is a detective with the Palos Parkpolice and was assigned to a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) taskforce group. On March 27, 2002, Talley and another agent, RonBaffield, went to the Clark truck stop in Joliet as part of theirdrug interdiction duties. Talley's suspicion was aroused when hesaw a truck with two people inside pull into the truck stop andpark in a remote area. Talley and Baffield spoke to the peoplein the truck -- Ortega and Munoz -- and obtained their consent tosearch the truck with a canine unit. Talley found three boxeslabeled "Panasonic TV/VCR" which contained cellophane wrappedbricks of marijuana. He then learned that someone would arrivein about 40 minutes to pick up the drugs. Another officer,Master Sergeant Juan DeLeon, then joined them. DeLeon waitedwith Ortega in the truck for the person to pick up the marijuana.

DeLeon testified that he saw the defendant drive into thetruck stop and that he waved him over to the truck. Thedefendant parked next to the truck, got out of his car and put athick belt on around his waist. DeLeon asked the defendant if hewas there for the marijuana. DeLeon testified that defendanteither did not hear him or ignored him. According to DeLeon, thedefendant said that they should hurry up. Defendant then helpedhim unload one of the boxes, and DeLeon gave the arrest signal. Each box weighed over 200 pounds.

DeLeon testified that when he interviewed defendant at thepolice station, the defendant told him that he had gone to a gasstation at the intersection of Cicero and Chicago avenues thatmorning where he and other day laborers congregate to look forjobs. Defendant told DeLeon that he had been given a phonenumber to call for a job. When he called, the defendant was toldto drive to the Clark truck stop to pick up some boxes. WhenDeLeon asked the defendant if he knew what was in the boxes, hesaid that he had not asked and he did not want to know. DeLeonalso testified that the defendant told him that he was supposedto take the boxes to the gas station at Chicago and Ciceroavenues and leave his van there with the keys inside. When hereturned a few hours later, payment for the job would be in thevan.

Officer Gregory Jordan of the Joliet Police Departmenttestified that he was present when Officer DeLeon was questioningthe defendant. Jordan heard the defendant say that he was toleave the van at the gas station at Chicago and Cicero avenues.

Guadalupe Rodriguez, a former DEA agent and a retired 27year veteran of the Chicago Police Department, testified for thedefense. Rodriguez testified that drug cartels often involveinnocent people in the distribution of narcotics. The reasoncartels use innocent people is that they are less likely to stealthe drugs and if caught they cannot provide police with anyinformation which would incriminate those in the chain ofdistribution. According to Rodriguez, the greater the quantityof drugs transported, the more likely drug traffickers will usean unwitting person, whom law enforcement people call "mules."
 

During a sidebar from the State's cross-examination of thedefendant, the prosecutor informed the court that he intended toinquire about the fact that defendant posted $75,000 cash bail onthe day after his arrest. The State argued that defendant'sability to raise such an amount undermined the credibility of histestimony that he was a waiter and a day laborer. The trialcourt agreed that, since defendant had presented evidence of hisemployment history and his income, the State could attack hiscredibility in those areas. Thereafter, the State elicited fromthe defendant that $75,000 in cash had been posted to securedefendant's release from jail on the day after his arrest. Thetrial court then gave a limiting instruction informing the jurythat such testimony was offered for the sole purpose of weighingdefendant's credibility and was not to be considered as bearingdirectly on defendant's guilt. On redirect examination, thedefendant testified that he had nothing to do with raising the$75,000 and was unaware that it had been posted until he wasreleased from jail. He later learned that $19,000 had come fromhis savings and the remainder was a loan from his wife's family.
 

The defendant first contends that the trial court erred inallowing the State to introduce evidence concerning thedefendant's bail, which resulted in a denial of due process. Weagree.
 

The scope of cross-examination generally rests within thetrial court's discretion and will not be interfered with onreview absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifestprejudice to the defendant. See People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1,743 N.E.2d 126 (2000); People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 708N.E.2d 309 (1998). The same abuse of discretion standard isapplied to a trial court's rulings concerning the relevance andadmissibility of evidence. See People v. Green, 339 Ill. App. 3d443, 791 N.E.2d 134 (2003).

Defendant asserts that evidence regarding his posting ofbail was not relevant to any material issue before the jury. Weagree. "Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make theexistence of a fact that is of consequence to the determinationof the action more or less probable than it would be without theevidence." People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 115, 735 N.E.2d616, 629 (2000). Probability in this context is considered inthe light of logic, experience and accepted assumptionsconcerning human behavior. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 115, 735N.E.2d at 629-30.

The central issue in this case concerned defendant'sknowledge of the cannabis. The State's theory was that defendantwas the person who was to receive the delivery from Ortega andMunoz. Defendant, on the other hand, essentially claimed that hewas an innocent dupe. We fail to see how the fact thatdefendant, or someone on his behalf, was able to quickly raise$75,000 for bail makes either the State's or the defendant'sposition more or less probable. Although one could speculatethat a drug dealer might have ready access to substantial sums ofcash, without some evidentiary link between the $75,000 andillegal activity, it remains pure speculation. There arenumerous ways that such a sum could be obtained, including, asthe defendant explained, from one's relatives and from savings. "Evidence is admissible if it is relevant to an issue in disputeand if its prejudicial effect does not substantially outweigh itsprobative value." (Emphasis added.) Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at114-15, 735 N.E.2d at 629. The evidence that defendant posted$75,000 in bail was not only irrelevant but was prejudicialbecause it invited the jury to speculate about the source of thefunds. See People v. Alamo, 406 N.Y.S. 2d 787, 63 A.D. 2d 6(1978) (improper to question defendant concerning source of$5,000 bail, as it suggested that defendant had committedunrelated crimes); see also People v. Jones, 404 N.Y.S. 2d 865,62 A.D. 2d 356 (1978) (evidence that defendant had $831 at timeof arrest for drug offense was improperly admitted; defendantcould have acquired money in variety of ways). In view of itslack of probative value and potentially prejudicial effect, thebail evidence should have been excluded.

The State argues that the bail evidence was admissible as anattempt to undermine defendant's credibility. The Statecorrectly notes that, in general, any permissible kind ofimpeaching matter may be presented on cross-examination, as onepurpose of such questioning is to test the credibility of thewitnesses. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 743 N.E.2d 126. Accordingly,the scope of cross-examination is liberally construed "to allowinquiry into whatever subject tends to explain, discredit, ordestroy the witness' direct testimony." Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d at498, 708 N.E.2d at 325. The State contends that the bailevidence refuted defendant's direct testimony which presented a"wholesome image" of defendant as a "poor handyman." Wedisagree. Although defendant testified about various jobs he hadheld such as a waiter, bartender, and construction laborer, verylittle information was offered concerning his income or hisfinancial situation. Defendant testified that three of his fourdaughters lived with him and his wife in an apartment that theyrented for $700 per month. Defendant's wife could not workbecause she had been injured in an accident. Before moving toChicago in 1994, defendant owned a home in California that waspartially destroyed by an earthquake. The home was not insured. The only evidence concerning defendant's income was elicited bythe State on cross-examination, when defendant testified that hemade $12.50 per hour plus tips as a waiter and $100 to $150 perday as a construction laborer. While defendant's ability toraise $75,000 might seem unexpected in light of his choice ofprofessions, it does not impeach his testimony regarding his workhistory. What it does do, however, is suggest that the $75,000may be the proceeds of illegal activity, despite the lack of anyevidence in that regard.

There is yet another reason, apart from the lack ofrelevance and the prejudicial effect of the bail evidence, fordenying its admissibility. The Illinois Constitution creates arebuttable presumption that a defendant is eligible for bail. People v. Purcell, 201 Ill. 2d 542, 778 N.E.2d 695 (2002); seeIll. Const. 1970, art. I,