People v. Smolley

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People v. Smolley

State: Illinois

Court: 3rd District Appellate

Docket No: 3-05-0793 NRel

Case Date: 07/24/2007

Preview:No. 3--05--0793 Filed July 24, 2007. IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2007 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIZE SMOLLEY, Defendant-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 10th Judicial Circuit, Peoria County, Illinois No. 04--CF--613

Honorable Scott Shore, Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court: At the conclusion of a bench trial, defendant, Martize Smolley, was convicted in the circuit court of Peoria County of two counts of felony murder in violation of section 9--1(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9--1(a)(3)(West 2004)) for Defendant was Pursuant

killing Kelly Houser and her daughter, Amy Allen.

also found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm. to section 5--8--1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of

Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/5--8--1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2004)), defendant received a mandatory sentence of natural life

in prison.

He appeals, claiming section 5--8--1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of Specifically,

the Code is unconstitutional as applied to him.

defendant argues the sentence mandated by the Code violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. disagree and affirm his sentence. BACKGROUND On June 14, 2004, Kelly Houser and her daughter, Amy Allen, got into the car and left home with the intent to buy some ice cream. Houser would need some money to pay for the ice cream so We

she drove to an ATM located in the 500 block of Northeast Jefferson Street in Peoria, Illinois. On the same evening, defendant armed himself with a fully loaded handgun and proceeded toward the same ATM. With the

intent to rob someone at the ATM, defendant waited across the street and watched until Houser's car approached the machine. Defendant ran across the street. As Houser withdrew $10 from the

ATM, defendant moved toward the car from the rear on the driver's side. He removed the gun from his waistband and stuck it in the Thereafter, the defendant

driver's-side front window of the car. fired a single shot.

The bullet entered Kelly Houser's left

cheek, perforating her brain stem before exiting the back of her head. The bullet then entered the left side of Amy Allen's head 2

between her eye and her ear, lodging in the back of her brain. Kelly Houser and her daughter both died as a result of gunshot wounds to the head. The gun that killed Houser and Allen was recovered from defendant's bedroom; defendant ultimately confessed to the murders. Defendant acknowledged that he intended to rob Houser, Defendant

but claimed that he did not intend to fire the weapon.

informed police that Houser began to drive away after he stuck the gun in the window and movement from the car caused his hand to be struck by the door frame. to accidentally discharge. Following arguments by the parties, the court found defendant guilty of two counts of felony first degree murder and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. The court entered This contact caused the weapon

not guilty verdicts on two first-degree murder counts that charged defendant with knowingly discharging a handgun into a motor vehicle occupied by the victims while knowing that such an act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report, but noted that it ultimately had no discretion in sentencing defendant due to the mandatory natural life sentence requirements contained in the Code applicable to multiple convictions for 3

murder.

At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that a

natural life sentence was appropriate and required by the Code. Defense counsel argued that mitigating circumstances existed that should be considered, most notably that the defendant's juvenile record contained only nonviolent burglaries and that the defendant received good grades as he pursued an education while detained in juvenile facilities. Defense counsel also argued

that the defendant claimed not to intend to kill anyone while committing the armed robbery. The court imposed the term of

natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS Defendant raises a single issue on appeal: the constitutionality of the mandatory natural life sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/5--8--1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2004)) as it applies to him. We review questions concerning the People v. Moss, 206 Ill.

constitutionality of a statute de novo. 2d 503, 795 N.E.2d 208 (2003).

Section 5--8--1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Code states: "(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court 4

under this Section, according to the following limitations: (1) for first degree murder *** (c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment when the death penalty is not imposed if the defendant *** (ii) ***irrespective of the defendant's age at the time of the commission of the offense, is found guilty of murdering more than one victim[.]" 730 ILCS 5/5--

8--1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2004). Defendant argues that this statute, as applied to him, violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. It is axiomatic to note that the legislature has People

discretion to prescribe penalties for defined offenses. v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 464 N.E.2d 1059 (1984). The

legislature's discretion includes the power to prescribe mandatory sentences, even if such sentences restrict the judiciary's discretion in imposing sentences. 2d at 208. Taylor, 102 Ill.

However, the power to prescribe sentences is not 5

absolute as the penalty must satisfy constitutional constrictions. People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 687 N.E.2d 24

(1997); People v. Morris, 136 Ill. 2d 157, 554 N.E.2d 235 (1990). One such constitutional constriction that legislation must satisfy is the proportional penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. (2002). The proportional penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution states that all "penalties shall be determined *** according to the seriousness of the offense." art. I,

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