Following a jury trial in 1997, Span was found guilty ofarmed violence and sentenced to 25 years in prison. He was alsofound guilty of violating the terms of his probation for priorconvictions of unlawful use of a credit card and burglary. Forthose offenses, Span received concurrent sentences of three andfive years. Because the trial court determined that the natureof the offenses and Span's character warranted that consecutivesentences be imposed to protect the public, it ordered that thesentence for armed violence be served consecutively to the othertwo sentences.

In a subsequent appeal, this court held that Span had beensentenced under an unconstitutional version of the armed violencesentencing statute. We remanded the matter to the trial courtfor resentencing. People v. Span, No. 3--00--0837 (2001)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On remand, anupdated presentence investigation report (PSI report) was filedand a new sentencing hearing was held. At the hearing, Spanaddressed the court and apologized to the victim and his family. Span advised the court that while incarcerated he had completed achild parenting program, obtained his associate's degree andparticipated in various religious programs. At the conclusion ofthe hearing, the trial court sentenced Span to a term of 20 yearsfor armed violence and ordered the sentence to run consecutivelyto the other sentences. The court noted that Span had shown someremorse and rehabilitation and that it had considered theevidence received at the jury trial, the new PSI report andSpan's statements at the hearing. Though he did not file amotion to reconsider with the trial court, Span appealed.

Span argues that after the first sentence was vacated, thetrial court was required to make a new finding that the public'sprotection required consecutive sentences. He also argues thatthe court erroneously believed that the new sentence had to runconsecutively to the previously imposed sentences. The Stateresponds that Span waived this issue because he failed to file aposttrial motion challenging the consecutive nature of the newsentence. The State also argues that the court's remarks at thesecond hearing failed to show that it had abandoned its earlierfinding. This court reviews the trial court's decision for abuseof discretion. People v. Golden, 323 Ill. App. 3d 892, 753N.E.2d 475 (2001).

Section 5--8--4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code)states as follows:

"The court shall not impose a consecutive sentence*** unless, having regard to the nature andcircumstances of the offense and the history andcharacter of the defendant, it is of the opinion thatsuch a term is required to protect the public fromfurther criminal conduct by the defendant, the basisfor which the court shall set forth in the record." 730 ILCS 5/5--8--4(b) (West 2000).

Though the court is not required to recite the specific languageof section 5--8--4(b) when imposing consecutive sentences, therecord must show that consecutive sentences were motivated by thecourt's belief that the public's protection required them. People v. Dorosz, 217 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 578 N.E.2d 67 (1991).

Based on our review of the record, we hold that the trialcourt failed to articulate a sufficient rationale for theimposition of consecutive sentences. We acknowledge that thecourt stated that it had considered the trial record, the updatedPSI report, and the new evidence relating to Span's remorse andrehabilitation. However, a general statement that this evidencewas considered is inadequate to show that consecutive sentenceswere motivated by a belief that the public's protection requiredthem. Nor does it show that the nature and circumstances ofSpan's offenses or his history and character were considered. See People v. Jones, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 598 N.E.2d 380 (1992)(stating that the imposition of consecutive sentences does notautomatically warrant a conclusion that the court believed theywere necessary to protect the public).

The State argues that the trial court's comments during thesecond sentencing hearing did not indicate that it had abandonedits earlier finding that consecutive sentences were necessary. We do not agree. In our view, the record of the hearing fails toset forth a clear basis for the court's belief that consecutivesentences were warranted. While the State asserts that Spanwaived this issue because he did not request a specific findingin the trial court or challenge the imposition of the consecutivesentences, we refuse to apply the waiver rule in this case. SeeDorosz, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 1023, 578 N.E.2d at 71 (rejecting anargument that defendant waived his right to contest hisconsecutive sentences because a sufficient rationale for thesentences was not articulated or reflected in the record). Accordingly, under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4)(134 Ill. 2dR. 615(b)(4)), defendant's 20 year sentence for armed violence ismodified to run concurrently with his previous 3-year and 5-yearsentences. This cause is remanded to the circuit court of RockIsland County to correct the mittimus.

Sentence modified; and cause remanded with directions.

SLATER and LYTTON, JJ., concurring.