People v. Woods

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People v. Woods

State: Illinois

Court: 3rd District Appellate

Docket No: 3-04-0742 Rel

Case Date: 04/19/2007

Preview:No. 3--04--0742 _________________________________________________________________ Filed April 19, 2007. IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2007 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Peoria County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 01--CF--1186 ) SAMUEL E. WOODS, ) Honorable ) Jerelyn D. Maher, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. _________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court: _________________________________________________________________ In a bench trial, the defendant, Samuel E. Woods, was found guilty of aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/18--5(a) (West 2000)) and home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12--11(a)(2) (West 2000)). The

trial court sentenced him to extended terms of 20 and 40 years of imprisonment for these offenses, respectively. On appeal, the

defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to remove his leg shackles during three court proceedings and by allowing one of his wrists to remain handcuffed during one of these proceedings. Additionally, he contends that the State failed to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offenses. We affirm.

I. FACTS A. Leg Shackles and Handcuffs The bench trial took place on July 23 and October 17, 2003, and February 18, 2004. At the July 23 proceeding, the following

exchange took place among the court, defense counsel, and the court's deputy: "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: *** I would ask that Mr. Woods be unhandcuffed or in some fashion handcuffed differently so he can take notes during the trial, whatever methodology is appropriate on that. THE COURT: Any problem with that, Officer? THE DEPUTY: Usually we don't if they are in uniform, there is no jury trial, your Honor. up to you. THE COURT: Do you have an alternative? THE DEPUTY: That's it. THE COURT: That's it. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He is shackled, so it's not like-THE COURT: What about legs? legs? THE DEPUTY: Uh-huh. THE COURT: All right, take his cuffs off then." Is he shackled by his But it's

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At the October 17 proceeding, the following exchange took place among the court, defense counsel, and the deputy: "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, could we have Mr. Wood's [sic] hands in some way unsecured so he could take notes[?] THE COURT: Does he have--is he shackled in some way? THE COURT DEPUTY: Yes, Judge. THE COURT: Okay. He can have his hands uncuffed."

At the February 18 proceeding, the following exchange took place between the court and defense counsel: "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: *** Judge, could I have one or both of his handcuffs removed for note-taking purpose[s] please? THE COURT: You can have one." B. Aggravated Robbery The defendant was charged with having committed aggravated robbery and home invasion in Peoria on the evening of December 8, 2001. Lynda Beckwith testified that she was a cashier at a gas During the trial, the court

station in Peoria that evening.

viewed an audio-video tape of the incident, which was recorded by the gas station's security camera and microphone. In the tape, the defendant asked Beckwith how much a bag of peanuts cost. After Beckwith replied, the defendant brought the The defendant gave money to Beckwith. 3

peanuts to the counter.

Beckwith opened the cash register, placed the defendant's money in the cash drawer, and got change out of the drawer. While

Beckwith was occupied with the cash register, the defendant opened his jacket with his right hand. As Beckwith began to

close the cash drawer, the defendant reached across the counter and placed his left hand on the drawer, preventing Beckwith from closing it. The defendant raised his right hand above the level He then

of his shoulder with his right index finger extended.

brought his right hand down to his waist and gestured to his waist with his right hand. After the defendant's gesture,

Beckwith immediately stepped back from the area of the counter and cash register and placed her hands behind her back. Next,

the defendant reached across the counter with his right hand and removed the paper currency from the cash drawer. then exited the building through its front door. Beckwith testified that after the defendant opened his jacket, she saw "something wooden" in the defendant's waistband and "presumed it was a gun." She said, "So, I just stepped back Beckwith later identified the The defendant

and *** let him take the money."

defendant as the robber both in an in-person lineup at the police station and in the courtroom during the trial. After the defendant was arrested, he told police that the wooden object in his waistband was the end of a crutch. He could

not remember whether the piece of the crutch was all wood or was 4

wood covered with padding.

The defendant did not produce the The police did not recover a

piece of crutch for the police.

wooden object during their investigation after the defendant's arrest. C. Home Invasion A witness at the gas station provided police with a description of the car the defendant was driving, which was registered to the defendant's former girlfriend. As the police

followed the vehicle in their squad cars, the defendant stopped the car, exited, and fled on foot through the backyards of nearby residences. The police pursued the defendant on foot.

Shonda Sledge said that on the evening in question, she was in her home, which is near the gas station. and her children also were in the home. Her husband Darrell

While Shonda was in the

bedroom, she noticed that there were several police officers in her backyard. Next, Shonda heard the defendant open the screen door and kick open the French doors to the house. Shonda met the She then ran As

defendant in the living room and told him to leave.

to the kitchen and picked up the phone with her left hand.

Shonda was attempting to call the police, the defendant applied pressure to her left wrist with one of his hands, which caused her to drop the phone. Regarding her wrist, Shonda said, "It was After Shonda

tender and real sore a couple of days afterwards." 5

dropped the phone, she ran out of the house through the kitchen's exterior door and into the backyard. Darrell testified that during the incident, he retrieved his handgun from the bedroom. When he went into the kitchen, he saw

the defendant and his wife struggling for control of the phone. After Shonda ran out of the house, Darrell told the defendant to leave. Instead of leaving, the defendant walked to the living In the living room, the defendant

room, and Darrell pursued him.

attempted to take the gun from Darrell. While Shonda was in the backyard, she yelled to the police for help. She told the police that a man had broken into her The police then entered the residence

home and was still there. and arrested the defendant.

At the conclusion of the trial, the court found the defendant guilty of the offenses. Defendant filed a motion for a

new trial which did not raise an issue with respect to the shackles/handcuffs. The court denied the motion. The court

sentenced the defendant, and he appealed. II. ANALYSIS A. Leg Shackles and Handcuffs The defendant submits that the trial court erred by failing to remove his leg shackles during three court proceedings and by allowing only one of his handcuffs to be removed during one of these proceedings. The State argues that the defendant has 6

forfeited these issues by failing to raise them both in the trial court and in a posttrial motion. The defendant, therefore, asks

us to analyze these issues for plain error. Initially, we note that the defendant in this case invited two of the alleged errors that he has raised. A defendant cannot

invite the trial court to adopt a certain procedure and then argue on appeal that the trial court's action was error. People

v. Rossi, 52 Ill. 2d 13, 284 N.E.2d 275 (1972); People v. Carbona 27 Ill. App. 3d 988, 327 N.E.2d 546 (1975). At the July 23 proceeding, defense counsel asked that the defendant's handcuffs be removed. The court's deputy asserted

that the standard procedure was not to remove the handcuffs of a defendant in prison uniform. Defense counsel then began to

suggest to the trial court that removing the defendant's handcuffs was permissible because the defendant was otherwise shackled. From the comments of the judge and the court deputy

that followed defense counsel's suggestion, it is apparent that defense counsel was referring to leg shackles. Thus, defense

counsel's request to remove the defendant's handcuffs depended upon the defendant's leg shackles remaining in place. The

defendant cannot now challenge the fact that his legs were shackled at the July 23 proceeding when this instance of leg shackling was invited by defense counsel.

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At the February 18 proceeding, defense counsel gave the trial court a choice between removing one or both of the defendant's handcuffs. handcuffs. The court chose to remove one of the

Because defense counsel invited the court to remove

only one of the defendant's handcuffs, the defendant cannot now complain that one of his hands remained cuffed. We next examine

whether it was error for the trial court to fail to remove the defendant's leg shackles at the October 17 and February 18 proceedings. Generally, an issue is forfeited on appeal if it was not raised in the trial court through both a contemporaneous objection and a written posttrial motion. Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). People v. Enoch, 122

In the instant case, the

defendant did not object to remaining in leg shackles at the October 17 and February 18 proceedings. Additionally, the

defendant did not argue the issue of leg shackling in a posttrial motion. Thus, the defendant has forfeited this issue on appeal.

See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124. However, the forfeiture rule does not apply if plain error occurred. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). We can find plain error only

where (1) the evidence was closely balanced, or (2) the error so prejudiced the defendant's case that it resulted in an unfair trial. People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 856 N.E.2d 349 (2006).

We, therefore, analyze the defendant's claims regarding his leg 8

shackling at the October 17 and February 18 proceedings for plain error. In the present case, the evidence concerning the offenses was not closely balanced, as we discuss below regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. Next, we consider whether the

defendant's trial was unfair because he remained in leg shackles on October 17 and February 18. In Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 856 N.E.2d 349, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that even in the absence of a jury, the trial court must consider the factors listed in People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 362 N.E.2d 303 (1977), to determine if restraining the defendant is necessary. A trial court's failure

to consider the Boose factors is a violation of a defendant's due process rights. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 856 N.E.2d 349. In the

instant case, the record shows that the trial court did not consider the Boose factors. Therefore, the trial court committed

due process errors by failing to hold Boose hearings before the October 17 and February 18 proceedings. However, the Allen court also stated that the trial court's failure to conduct a Boose hearing does not amount to plain error unless the defendant can show that his restraint caused an unfair trial because it hindered his ability to assist his counsel, compromised his presumption of innocence, or demeaned the dignity of the proceedings. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 856 N.E.2d 349. 9 In

the present case, the record does not show that the defendant's leg shackling on October 17 and February 18 hindered his ability to assist his attorney, compromised his presumption of innocence, or demeaned the dignity of the proceedings. In summary, the evidence in this case was not closely balanced, and the defendant has not shown that his physical restraint resulted in an unfair trial. Therefore, we hold that

the trial court did not commit plain error by allowing the defendant to remain in leg shackles during the October 17 and February 18 proceedings. B. Aggravated Robbery The defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the elements of aggravated robbery. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to show

that he indicated verbally or by his actions that he was armed with a firearm. "A person commits aggravated robbery when he *** takes property from the person or presence of another by *** threatening the imminent use of force while indicating verbally or by his *** actions to the victim that he *** is presently armed with a firearm or other dangerous weapon ***. This offense shall be applicable

even though it is later determined that he *** had no firearm or other dangerous weapon *** when he *** 10

committed the robbery." 2000).

720 ILCS 5/18--5(a) (West

When we review a claim of insufficient evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 365 (2006). In this case, the wooden object that the defendant had in his waistband was neither recovered by the police nor produced by the defendant. However, Beckwith said that she saw a wooden People v. Bishop, 218 Ill. 2d 232, 843 N.E.2d

object in the defendant's waistband and presumed that it was a gun. The defendant told the police that the wooden object in his Regardless of whether the object

waistband was part of a crutch.

was an actual weapon, a rational trier of fact could have inferred that it appeared to be a dangerous weapon. handguns have wood grips. The videotape showed that the defendant made a gesture to his waist with his right hand. A rational trier of fact could Many

have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that by this gesture, the defendant indicated that he was armed with a firearm or other dangerous weapon. In summary, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found 11

beyond a reasonable doubt that the State proved the elements of aggravated robbery. C. Home Invasion The defendant asserts that the State failed to show that he committed the elements of home invasion beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, he contends that the State did not prove

that he injured Shonda, under this court's holdings in People v Bitner, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 412 N.E.2d 721 (1980), and People v. Boyer, 138 Ill. App. 3d 16, 485 N.E.2d 460 (1985). Both the

Bitner and Boyer courts stated that in order to prove an "injury" under the home invasion statute, one must show that the victim suffered "bodily harm." "(a) A person *** commits home invasion when without authority he *** knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he *** knows *** that one or more persons is present *** and *** (2) Intentionally causes an injury *** to any person *** within such dwelling place." ILCS 5/12--11(a) (West 2000). In People v. Mays, 91 Ill. 2d 251, 256, 437 N.E.2d 633, 63536 (1982), the Illinois Supreme Court defined "bodily harm," in the context of criminal battery, as "some sort of physical pain or damage to the body, like lacerations, bruises or abrasions, 12 720

whether temporary or permanent."

In the present case, the

defendant submits that because Shonda did not suffer a laceration, bruise, or abrasion, she did not suffer "bodily harm," as required by Bitner and Boyer. Although the Bitner and Boyer courts required a showing of "bodily harm" as an element of home invasion, more recent cases from other districts of the appellate court have looked to the plain language of the home invasion statute regarding the "injury" element of the offense. See, e.g., People v. Ehrich,

165 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 519 N.E.2d 1137 (4th Dist. 1988); People v. Garrett, 281 Ill. App. 3d 535, 667 N.E.2d 130 (5th Dist. 1996). The primary goal of statutory construction is to People v.

determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 824 N.E.2d 239 (2005). The best

indication of the legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 824 N.E.2d 239. We will

not read exceptions, limitations, or conditions into a statute that depart from its plain meaning. 2d 375, 843 N.E.2d 308 (2006). In the present case, the legislature used the term "injury" rather than the term "bodily harm" in the home invasion statute. We will not read an exception, limitation, or condition into the statute to say that "injury" means "bodily harm," contrary to our previous rulings in Bitner and Boyer. 13 People v. McClure, 218 Ill.

Furthermore, even if we were to consider, arguendo, our supreme court's definition of "bodily harm" in Mays, the definition only requires "some sort of physical pain or damage to the body." The definition then provides examples "like The definition does not Thus,

lacerations, bruises or abrasions."

indicate that the examples are exclusive or exhaustive.

although "lacerations, bruises or abrasions" are sufficient to prove that the victim suffered "physical pain or damage to the body," these conditions are not necessary to show "physical pain or damage to the body, *** whether temporary or permanent." Mays, 91 Ill. 2d at 256, 437 N.E.2d at 635-36. In this case, the record indicates that Shonda suffered pain for a few days after the defendant applied pressure to her wrist. Clearly, Shonda was injured by the defendant's actions. Thus, we

reject the defendant's assertion that the State failed to prove that he committed the "injury" element of home invasion. Taking

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the State also proved the elements of this offense. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Peoria County circuit court. Affirmed. CARTER, J., concurs. 14

JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting: The majority has found that defendant cannot challenge the fact that his legs were shackled at the July 23 proceeding or that one of his hands remained cuffed at the February 18 proceeding, and that the trial court did not commit plain error by allowing defendant to remain in leg shackles during the October 17 and February 18 proceedings because the record does not show that the shackling on October 17 and February 18 hindered defendant's ability to assist his attorney, compromised his presumption of innocence, or demeaned the dignity of the proceedings. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the

trial court did not commit plain error when it, as the majority admits, committed due process errors by failing to hold Boose hearings before the October 17 and February 18 proceedings. order at 8. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. Slip

I agree with the majority that the supreme court's decision in Allen controls the disposition of this appeal. The basis for

my disagreement lies in my belief that Allen actually requires reversal of the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County rather than affirmance. I think a summary of my argument, that

will be set out in greater detail below, would be helpful. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Our supreme court has held that (1) "In the absence of exceptional circumstances, an accused has the right to stand 15

trial with the appearance, dignity and self-respect of an innocent and free person" and (2) "[i]t jeopardizes the presumption's [of innocence] value and protection and demeans our justice for an accused without clear cause to be required to stand in a courtroom in manacles or other restraints while he is being judged." (Emphasis added.) In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33,

37, 364 N.E.2d 72, 73 (1977). Staley:

The Allen court concluded, citing

"Thus, even when there is no jury, any unnecessary

restraint is impermissible because it hinders the defendant's ability to assist his counsel, runs afoul of the presumption of innocence, and demeans both the defendant and the proceedings." (Emphasis added.) 353. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 347, 856 N.E.2d 349,

Thus, trying defendant in "unnecessary" restraints is, by

definition, plain error. Although these are the same reasons cited by the supreme court in mandating a hearing to determine whether there are legitimate reasons for restraining the defendant during his trial (People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 265-66, 362 N.E. 2d 305 (1977)), the court decided in Allen that the mere failure to have that hearing is not "plain error." Therefore, without an

objection by the defendant to the restraints and a showing that the failure to hold the Boose hearing undermined his ability to assist in his defense, jeopardized the presumption of innocence

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and demeaned our system of justice, a forfeiture of this due process right occurs. To avoid the inadvertent nullification of case law that retains the approval of the supreme court and remains good and valid law of this state, we should utilize the presumption present in those earlier cases that without a determination of special circumstances, a defendant who is restrained during his/her trial has been "unnecessarily restrained." Thus, we

would have to find "plain error" by operation of law. ANALYSIS The supreme court has stated unequivocally that "[i]n the absence of exceptional circumstances," presumably as determined by a Boose hearing, "an accused has the right to stand trial with the appearance, dignity and self-respect of an innocent and free person." Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 37, 364 N.E.2d at 73. The

supreme court has further stated that it "demeans our justice for an accused without clear cause to be required to stand in a courtroom in manacles or other restraints while he is being judged." at 73. (Emphasis added.) Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 37, 364 N.E.2d

With those clearly-stated principles in mind, I turn to

what constitutes plain error in cases where the evidence is not closely balanced but where a defendant, contrary to his rights, is tried in shackles without a finding on the record of

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exceptional circumstances to justify depriving him of those rights. In Allen, the supreme court discussed the second prong of the plain error test, relying on its holding in People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005). stated as follows: "In the second instance, the defendant must prove there was plain error and that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. [Citation.] Prejudice to the In Herron, the court

defendant is presumed because of the importance of the right involved, `regardless of the strength of the evidence.' [Citation.] In both instances, the burden

of persuasion remains with the defendant. [Citation.]" (Emphasis added.) Herron, 215

Ill. 2d at 186-87, 830 N.E.2d at 479-80. Thus, it seems, the second prong of the plain error doctrine embodies a two-part test. trial. First there must have been an error at

Second, that error must be one that a) affects the

fairness of the defendant's trial and b) challenges the integrity of the judicial process. The Allen court found that "while 18

defendant herein has proven a due process violation which amounted to error by showing that he was required to wear an electronic stun belt at trial without the court having first determined that it was necessary, defendant has failed to persuade this court `that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of [his] trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.'" Allen, slip op. at 10, quoting

Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187, 830 N.E.2d at 479-80. I agree with the majority's finding that the evidence in this case is not closely balanced. Therefore, if we are to find plain error, it would be under the second prong of the plain error rule. The failure to conduct the Boose hearing is error. More so, "a trial court's failure to

See Allen, slip op. at 10.

examine the necessity of requiring a defendant to wear restraints at trial is a due process violation." Allen, slip op. at 14. Herron, with which the Allen court obviously agrees, tells us that prejudice on account of this violation is presumed. We now

know that a due process violation that prejudices defendant is not enough to satisfy the second prong. What we do not know is

what exactly a) affects the fairness of a defendant's trial and b) challenges the integrity of the judicial process--if not, in either case, the prejudicial due process violation resulting from the failure to conduct the "requisite [mandatory] hearing." although the Allen court did say that this showing was 19 But,

insufficient to prove "that [defendant's] presumption of innocence, ability to assist his counsel, or the dignity of the proceedings was compromised" said:. "Any unnecessary restraint is impermissible because it hinders the defendant's ability to assist his counsel, runs afoul of the presumption of innocence, and demeans both the defendant and the proceedings." (Emphasis added.) Allen, slip op. at 4, Allen, slip op. at 10), it also

citing Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 36-37, 364 N.E.2d at 73. The only reasonable conclusion is that "plain error" as defined by Allen in this context occurs not from the failure to hold the Boose hearing but rather from a showing that the restraints are unnecessary. I also note with particularity the

court's reference to any unnecessary restraint, precluding any argument in this case that removing defendant's handcuffs sufficed to permit him to assist his counsel while both legs remained shackled. The problem, of course, is how to determine that the restraints were unnecessary when there was no hearing and were no findings. Although it appears that, without the hearing, this is

an impossible showing for the defendant to make, I think there is 20

an answer

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