JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs sued defendant, Illinois Power Company, allegingthat its negligent conduct caused them injury when theirsnowmobiles collided with support wires owned by Illinois Power. Illinois Power filed a motion to dismiss based on language in theSnowmobile Registration and Safety Act (Act), which provides thata land owner, lessee, or occupant is liable only for willful ormalicious conduct. The trial court determined that Illinois Powerwas not an owner, lessee or occupant and denied the motion. Illinois Power sought leave to appeal under Rule 308, which thetrial court granted. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Plaintiffs were snowmobiling through a field and struck asupport wire, which anchored the top of a tall, wooden pole to theground. The pole is one among a system of poles which carryelectrical transmission lines across the countryside. IllinoisPower owned the pole, the support wires and the electrical lines. The plaintiffs suffered injuries, and one of them subsequentlydied. The pole and lines were erected in 1948, and Illinois Powerhas maintained them ever since. Illinois Power is not an owner orlessee of the property on which the pole and lines existed.

The plaintiffs sued Illinois Power alleging negligence.⁽¹⁾Illinois Power filed a motion to dismiss arguing that it owed noduty to plaintiffs under the Act. The court denied the motion andgranted leave to file this interlocutory appeal under Supreme CourtRule 308.

ANALYSIS

Since this case involves the construction of a statute, ourreview is de novo. People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202Ill. 2d 26, 46 (2002).

The Act provides that snowmobilers have no action in negligence against owners, lessees, or occupants of property:

"[n]otwithstanding any other law to the contrary, anowner, lessee, or occupant of premises owes no duty ofcare to keep the premises safe for entry or use by othersfor snowmobiling, or to give warning of any condition,use, structure or activity on such premises ***. Nothingin this section limits in any way liability whichotherwise exists for willful or malicious failure toguard or warn against a dangerous condition, use,structure, or activity." 625 ILCS 40/5-1(I) (West 2002).Since both parties in this case agree that Illinois Power isneither an owner nor a lessee, the issue is whether it is an"occupant."

Since the Act does not define occupant, we look to the statuteto derive the best indication of the legislature's intent, and wemust ascribe ordinary meaning to the Act's terms. In re Judgment& Sale of Delinquent Property for Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill. 2d 161,168 (1995). Where a statute's language is clear and unambiguous,we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms. Board ofEducation of Rockford School District No. 205 v. IllinoisEducational Labor Relations Board, 165 Ill. 2d 80, 87 (1995).

An occupant need not have ownership rights in the property. See S.I. Securities v. Weatherly, 285 Ill. App. 3d 930 (1997)(analyzing the term "occupant" under the Property Tax Code andfinding that it does not require any ownership interest in theproperty). Black's Law Dictionary defines occupant as "[o]ne whohas possessory rights in, or control over, certain property orpremises." Black's Law Dictionary 1106 (7th ed. 1999). We thinkthis is a reasonable definition of an occupant under the statute.One who exercises control over property can be said to occupy it. Here, Illinois Power installed and owned the pole and wires, andmaintained them for 55 years. We believe these facts indicate asufficient amount of control over the property to consider IllinoisPower an occupant under the Act.

Moreover, the Act illustrates our state's policy to place theburden to protect snowmobilers on the snowmobilers themselves. Oursupreme court has held that snowmobiles are inherently dangerousinstrumentalities and that the legislature acted properly when itdetermined that no duty exists to keep premises safe forsnowmobiling. Ostergren v. Forest Preserve District, 104 Ill. 2d128 (1984).

Illinois Power owed no duty to keep the premises safe forplaintiffs, absent willful or malicious conduct. The trial courterred by denying Illinois Power's motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION

The order of the circuit court of LaSalle County is reversedand the cause remanded for further proceedings under the willfuland malicious counts of the complaint.

Reversed and remanded.

SCHMIDT and SLATER, JJ., concur.

1. Plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint to addcounts alleging willful or malicious conduct.