Rock Island County Sheriff v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board
State: Illinois
Court: 3rd District Appellate
Docket No: 3-97-0043
Case Date: 08/07/1997
NO. 3--97--0043
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1997
ROCK ISLAND COUNTY SHERIFF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
MICHAEL GRCHAN and ROCK ISLAND ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
COUNTY, ) Rock Island County, Illinois
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. ) No. 96--MR--215
)
ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS )
BOARD; ILLINOIS FRATERNAL )
ORDER OF POLICE LABOR COUNCIL; )
and MICHAEL HUFF, ) Honorable
) Martin Conway
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding
JUSTICE BRESLIN delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff Michael Grchan, the Sheriff of Rock Island County,
appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for a preliminary
injunction. That motion sought an order enjoining the Illinois
State Labor Relations Board (Board) from commencing a hearing on
unfair labor practice claims brought against the Sheriff by
defendant Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council (Union)
on behalf of itself and defendant Michael Huff, an officer under
the Sheriff's command. The court denied the motion, finding that
the Sheriff failed to establish any of the necessary criteria to
justify a preliminary injunction. For the reasons which follow, we
affirm.
This case involves a long dispute among parties who have
accused one another of repeated misconduct, discrimination and
retaliation. First, the Union filed an unfair labor practice
charge against the Sheriff alleging that he violated the Illinois
Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA) (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West
1996)) when he retaliated against Huff with a reprimand and two
suspensions after Huff was successful in asserting a grievance
against the Sheriff.
Shortly thereafter, the Sheriff filed a complaint with the
Sheriff's Merit Commission. In the complaint, the Sheriff alleged
that Huff failed to properly investigate a domestic disturbance
three months earlier. Huff was suspended without pay, and after a
hearing the Commission entered an order discharging Huff. Huff
filed for a review of the decision. On review, the court found
that the Commission acted unreasonably and/or arbitrarily when it
discharged Huff, and the court remanded the case back to the
Commission for it to consider a different sanction. Huff v. Rock
Island County Sheriff's Merit Commission, No. 96--MR--28 (Cir. Ct.
Rock Isl. Co.).
The Union then filed a second unfair labor practice charge
against the Sheriff and claimed that he violated the IPLRA by
initiating the proceedings against Huff in retaliation for the
Union's first charge. After an investigation, the Board
consolidated the two charges and issued a complaint.
The Sheriff filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against
the Board in the circuit court to prevent it from initiating a
hearing. The Sheriff argued that the Union was impermissibly
attempting to circumvent the Sheriff's Merit System Law (55 ILCS
5/3--8001 et seq. (West 1996)), and that the writ should be granted
because holding a hearing on the matter was beyond the authority of
the Board. Because a ruling was not expected on the Sheriff's
complaint before the Board held a hearing, the Sheriff filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction. The trial court denied the
motion finding that none of the criteria necessary to award a
preliminary injunction had been established. The Sheriff appeals.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the court abused its
discretion when it denied the Sheriff's request for a preliminary
injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, which is
warranted only in the most urgent of circumstances when serious
harm will result if an injunction is not issued. Hartlein v.
Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill. 2d 142, 601 N.E.2d 720 (1992). In
order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must
demonstrate: (1) a clearly ascertainable right in need of
protection; (2) the risk of irreparable harm absent the injunction;
(3) the lack of any adequate legal remedy; and (4) the likelihood
of success on the merits. Hartlein, 151 Ill. 2d at 156, 601 N.E.2d
at 726-27. The failure to establish any of the four factors will
preclude the court from issuing an injunction. Hartlein, 151 Ill.
2d at 156, 601 N.E.2d at 726. The trial court's decision to grant
or deny a preliminary injunction will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. Desnick v. Department of Professional
Regulation, 171 Ill. 2d 510, 665 N.E.2d 1346 (1996).
Turning to the prerequisites for a preliminary injunction, the
Sheriff argues that he will suffer irreparable harm in the form of
the dilution of his command authority, which in turn will lead to
an inefficient operation in his office and imperil the citizens of
Rock Island County. The Sheriff contends that allowing the Board
to proceed will increase the "probability" that his officers will
engage in misconduct.
The Sheriff's contention that allowing the Board to hear this
case will endanger the citizens of Rock Island or result in
irreparable harm to himself is pure speculation. But, even if the
Sheriff is correct in his prophecy that there is a "probability"
that officers will engage in misconduct if the Board is permitted
to investigate the matter, these acts of misconduct can be
adequately addressed through disciplinary channels. Because the
present case does not require an extraordinary remedy to avoid
serious harm, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied the Sheriff's request for a preliminary
injunction.
In light of the above holding, we need not address the
remaining factors.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Rock Island County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
HOMER and MICHELA, JJ., concur.
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