No. 3--04--0529

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2005

                    JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Senachwine Club (the Club) appeals from an orderof the circuit court of Putnam County affirming theadministrative determination of the Illinois Property Tax AppealBoard (PTAB) denying the Club's request to change the assessmentclassification of several parcels of land it owned in PutnamCounty from residential (recreational) to agricultural. Becausewe conclude that PTAB did not err, we affirm.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff's propertyshould be classified as agricultural for property tax purposes. Section 1--60 of the Illinois Property Tax Code governs theclassification of the parcels at issue:

"Farm. When used in connection with valuingland and buildings for an agricultural use,any property used solely for the growing andharvesting of crops; for the feeding,breeding and management of livestock; fordairying or any other agricultural orhorticultural use of combination thereof;including but not limited to, hay, grain,fruit * * *. The dwellings and parcels ofproperty on which farm dwellings areimmediately situated shall be assessed as apart of the farm. * * * For purposes of thisCode, 'farm' does not include property whichis primarily used for residential purposeseven though some farm products may be grownor farm animals bred or fed on the propertyincidental to its primary use." (Emphasisadded). 35 ILCS 200/1--60 (West 1994).

Thus, only parcels used "solely for the growing andharvesting of crops" are entitled to an agricultural assessment.⁽¹⁾

Parcels used primarily for any other purpose are not entitled toagricultural assessment. Further, it is the present use of theland that determines whether it receives agricultural ornonagricultural valuation. Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v.PTAB, 113 Ill. App. 3d 872, 875 (1983). A parcel of land may beclassified as farmland even if that parcel is part of a parcelthat has other uses, so long as the parcel at issue is usedsolely for the growing and harvesting of crops. Kankakee CountyBoard of Review v. PTAB, 305 Ill. App. 3d 799, 803 (1999). Additionally, multiple uses of a parcel may be made so long asthe uses are not inconsistent with and are incidental to theprimary purpose. McLean County Board of Review v. PTAB, 286 Ill.App. 3d 1076, 1078 (1997).

This court reviews decisions of the PTAB, not the decisionof the circuit court. Metropolitan Airport Authority v. PTAB,307 Ill. App. 3d 52, 55 (1999). As in other administrativereview actions, the PTAB's factual findings are deemed primafacie true and correct and will not be disturbed unless they arecontrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. National CityBank of Michigan/Illinois v. PTAB, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1042(2002). How the land at issue is used is a question of fact. McLean, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1081.

Here, PTAB determined that the parcels in question were notused solely for the growing and harvesting of crops, but were, infact, used primarily for the hunting of ducks. The questionbefore this court is whether the land usage determination by PTABwas supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. We findthat PTAB's determination was supported by the manifest weight ofthe evidence.

The parties herein are familiar with the record, and we seeno need to recite in great detail the evidence presented by thePTAB hearing officer. The evidence established that the Clubplanted crops on approximately 115 acres on several parcels atissue in the instant matter. Specifically, the Club plantedcorn, buckwheat and sudax in the two years prior to theassessment year in question. The Club maintains that theplanting of these crops leads to the conclusion that the propertyat issue is agricultural. However, the record is quite clearthat the Club's purpose in planting those crops was to facilitatethe hunting of ducks, not "the growing and harvesting of crops." Testimony established that the crops planted were speciallyselected for their attractiveness to ducks. Rather than harvestthese crops, the Club either allowed the crops to remain in thefield or intentionally flooded the crop area in order to providea constant source of food, habitat and cover to attract and holdducks, which thereby facilitated duck hunting.

Based upon this evidence, PTAB determined that the primarypurpose of the parcels at issue was not "the growing andharvesting of crops" but rather was the hunting of ducks. Themanifest weight of the record evidence amply supports the PTAB'sconclusion.

The Club argues, nonetheless, that PTAB's decision iscontrary to law. PTAB's conclusions of law are subject to denovo review. Metropolitan Airport, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 55. Wefind that PTAB's decision was not contrary to law.

The Club maintains that PTAB failed to consider certainDepartment of Revenue guidelines when determining whether toassess the property at issue as agricultural. It argued that oursupreme court's holding in O'Connor v. A&P Enterprises, 81 Ill.2d260, 269 (1980), somehow mandates a finding in its favor in theinstant matter. We disagree. First, O'Connor does not mandate adifferent result here. Rather, the court therein merely notedthat Department guidelines were available to personnel attemptingto apply the statutory definition of farmland. O'Connor, 81Ill.2d at 269. Second, we find nothing in PTAB's finding hereinto be in conflict with the guidelines, which in relevant partmerely note that land planted with cover crops or land wherecrops go unharvested may still be assessed as agricultural, ifthe land was used solely for the planting and harvesting ofcrops. Here, the fact that crops were planted but not harvestedwas not the reason the land was non-agricultural. The land wasnon-agricultural because its primary purpose was duck hunting.

The Club also maintains that PTAB's decision is contrary tothe law articulated in Santa Fe Land Impovement. Again, wedisagree. Santa Fe Land Impovement stands for the propositionthat it is the use of the real property that determines if theproperty is to be given an agricultural assessment. Santa FeLand Improvement, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 874. Here, PTAB looked atthe use of the property and determined, based upon the evidence,that the use of the property was duck hunting, not agriculture. We see no improper interpretation of the law.

Next, the Club maintains that PTAB's decision was contraryto the law articulated in Kankakee County Board of Review. Again, we disagree. Kankakee County Board of Review stands forthe proposition that a parcel of land may be classified asfarmland provided that those portions of the property soclassified are used solely for the growing of and harvesting ofcrops, even if the farm is part of a parcel that has other uses. Kankakee County Board of Review, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 802. PTAB'sdecision herein is consistent with Kankakee County Board ofReview. Simply put, PTAB found that the primary purpose of allthe land at issue was duck hunting. As such, it did not need toconsider whether certain parts of the property had agriculturaluses and other parts had other uses. Since there clearly wasonly one primary use for all the property, we see no error.

Finally, the Club maintains that PTAB's decision wascontrary to the law articulated in McLean County Board of Review. Again, we find no error of law. McLean County Board of Reviewstands for the proposition that multiple uses may be made of theproperty so long as the uses are not inconsistent with theprimary agricultural purpose. McLean County Board of Review, 286Ill. App. 3d at 1079. Again, PTAB found that there was only oneuse for the property at issue -- duck hunting. This was not acase where there were multiple uses for the property and PTAB wascalled upon to determine whether one of the uses was inconsistentwith an agricultural use. Here, the facts supported PTAB'sconclusion that the only use of the property was duck hunting. All activities maintained upon the property were to support andfacilitate that one purpose -- the hunting of ducks. We find noerror at law in PTAB's decision.

We find no error in fact or law in PTAB's decision. Therecord clearly establishes that the primary purpose for which theparcels at issue were used, indeed the primary or sole purpose ofall assets of the Senachwine Club, was the hunting of ducks. Everything the Club had, everything it maintained, every actionit took, every decision it made, was for one single purpose --ducks; the attracting of ducks, the holding of ducks, the huntingof ducks. Despite the Club's protests to the contrary, here itcan truly be said -- if it walks like a duck and quacks like aduck, it's a duck.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board is affirmed.

Affirmed.

LYTTON and MCDADE, JJ., concur.

1. While the statute provides alternative criteria fordetermining whether property is properly assessed asagricultural, i.e., feeding, breeding and management oflivestock, etc., the only question in the instant matter iswhether the land at issue was used solely for the growing andharvesting of crops.