State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm)filed a declaratory judgment action against James J. George. StateFarm moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted themotion. We affirm.

James J. George and Erin Lyn Hitch had a minor child, TaylorN. Hitch. James and Erin never married or lived together, andTaylor lived with James at all times relevant to this case. OnJuly 2, 1998, Erin was a passenger in a vehicle that was involvedin a single car accident. Erin was killed. The driver of thevehicle had no liability insurance.

James had an automobile insurance policy with State Farm. Erin was not an insured under James' policy, but Taylor was insuredbecause she resided with her father.

James made an uninsured motorist claim on behalf of Taylor forthe loss of society she suffered because of her mother's death. State Farm filed an action asking the court to declare that Taylorcould not recover under James' policy and later filed a motion forsummary judgment, which the trial court granted.

On appeal, James argues that Illinois' uninsured motorist act,section 143a of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a (West2000)) (Act), requires that an insured be covered for loss ofsociety caused by the death of an individual who is not insuredunder the policy. He claims that more restrictive language in thepolicy violates the Act.

The statute requires coverage "for the protection of personsinsured who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners oroperators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motorvehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, includingdeath, resulting therefrom." (215 ILCS 5/143a (1) (West 2000)). Wemust decide whether the Act mandates coverage for loss of societywhen the actual bodily injury is sustained by any person, or solelyby an insured person.

Because no Illinois cases have reached this issue, the partiesrely on cases from several other states that have construedidentical, or nearly identical, language. The majority ofjurisdictions have held that insurance policies need not compensatefor damages for loss of society. See, e.g., Valiant Insurance Co.v. Webster, 567 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1990); Farmers Insurance Exchangev. Chacon, 939 P.2d 517 (Colo. App. 1997); Livingston v. OmahaProperty and Casualty Insurance Co., 927 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. App.1996); Lafleur v. Fidelity & Casual Co. of New York, 385 So.2d 1241(La. App. 1980). A minority of states have found that the statuteplainly requires such coverage. See Sexton v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co., 433 N.E.2d 555, 558-59 (Ohio 1982);Hinners v. Pekin Insurance Co., 431 N.W.2d 345, 347 (Iowa 1988). We agree with those states that have denied uninsured motoristcoverage under these circumstances.

In Illinois, the Act applies to, "insured persons *** entitledto recover damages *** because of bodily injury ***." (215 ILCS5/143a (1) (West 2000)). We believe that this language isambiguous; it can be reasonably read either to mandate coverage forloss of society or to allow for its exclusion. The disagreementamong state courts in their reading of identical languagehighlights this ambiguity. Because the plain language is unclear,we may look to the purpose behind the law and the evils it wasdesigned to remedy. Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 533-34, 689N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (1997).

The public policy underlying the Act is to place insuredparties injured by an uninsured driver in substantially the sameposition they would have been in if the driver had been insured. Hoglund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 148 Ill. 2d272, 279, 592 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (1992). The Act protects insuredparties; obviously, it does not extend its protection to those whoare uninsured. Further, collateral claims based on physical injuryto another are derived only from the underlying claim of thephysically injured person; they are not separate and distinctclaims. See, e.g., Schweighart v. Standard Mutual Insurance Co.,227 Ill. App. 3d 249, 591 N.E.2d 121 (1992)(loss of consortiumclaim is derivative of a claim for bodily injury); Cross v. CountryCompanies, 188 Ill. App. 3d 847, 544 N.E.2d 1246 (1989)(same). Thus, we believe that loss of society cannot be recovered under apolicy where the injured party could not recover.

In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Chacon, 939 P.2d 517, a casewith similar facts, the Colorado appellate court reasoned that,

"[T]he statute does not compel coverage for a personwho is not an insured under the terms of a policy. See12 M. Rhodes, Couch on Insurance