June 19, 2001

JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the Court:

The taxpayers unsuccessfully appealed increases in theirproperty tax assessments to the Board of Review (Board) and theProperty Tax Appeal Board (PTAB). They sought administrativereview in the circuit court, but settled the case prior to trial.

Some of these taxpayers then filed petitions with PTAB seekingto reduce their assessments for later years. The Board filed amotion to dismiss, arguing that they had not exhausted theiradministrative remedies. PTAB denied the motion, and the Boardfiled a complaint for writ of mandamus in the trial court. Thetaxpayers filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted. The Boardappeals, and we affirm.

The Board increased the property tax assessments for 1994 andcertain subsequent years of several new homes built in the VilleLumiere subdivision in Tazewell County. The affected taxpayersunsuccessfully appealed these changes to the Board and PTAB. Theythen sought administrative review in the circuit court, but theparties entered into a settlement agreement prior to trial. In thesettlement, the parties agreed on new assessments for the years inquestion. The settlement specifically stated that the new valueswere "a compromise of disputed litigation, and [] not deemed to befair market value." The circuit court entered the settlement as anagreed order and remanded the cause to PTAB, ordering it to "renderdecisions lowering the assessments of the particular parcelspursuant to the settlement agreement of the parties to thoseassessments shown" on the agreement. The order also ordered PTABto remand the cases to the Board, as well as to the county clerkand treasurer with directions to lower the assessments and toprovide the taxpayers with the appropriate refunds.

Some of the taxpayers then filed new petitions directly toPTAB challenging their 1996 and 1997 assessments, which had notbeen included in the original settlement agreement. The Boardfiled a motion to dismiss these petitions, arguing that PTAB lackedjurisdiction because the taxpayers had not exhausted theiradministrative remedies by seeking relief from the Board and didnot fall within the exception to this requirement in section 16--185of the Property Tax Code (Code). PTAB denied the motion, and theBoard filed a complaint for writ of mandamus in the trial court,seeking to prevent PTAB from exercising jurisdiction over thepetitions. The taxpayers filed a motion to dismiss the Board'scomplaint, which was granted. The Board appeals the trial court'sdismissal order.

The Board argues that PTAB did not have jurisdiction over thetaxpayers' petitions because they failed to exhaust theiradministrative remedies and did not fall into one of the statutoryexceptions to this doctrine.

Paragraph 3 of section 16--185 of the Code permits taxpayers toappeal directly to PTAB when it "renders a decision lowering theassessment *** after the deadline for filing complaints with theboard of review." 35 ILCS 200/16--185 (West 1998). The Boardcontends that PTAB lacked jurisdiction because it did not render a"decision lowering the assessment" within the meaning of thisexception. It is undisputed that the assessments were reducedafter the applicable deadline.

In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint for mandamus, thiscourt must consider de novo whether the well-pleaded facts in theBoard's complaint allege a clear right to relief, a clear duty forPTAB to act, and PTAB's clear authority to comply with the writ. Noyola v. Board of Education, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 133, 688 N.E.2d 81,86 (1997). In this case, the only issue on appeal is the Board'sright to relief.

The Board first asserts that the order was not based on"equity and the weight of the evidence" as required by the Code andmerely adopted the assessment values in the parties' settlementagreement. However, this argument misses the point, since itaddresses the sufficiency of the evidence supporting PTAB'sdecision rather than the agency's jurisdiction. We note that PTAB"has jurisdiction to make a wrong as well as a right decision." One Way Liquors, Inc. v. Byrne, 105 Ill. App. 3d 856, 861, 435N.E.2d 144, 148 (1982).

The Board also contends that PTAB did not consider the meritsof the taxpayers' appeal and violated its statutory duty toconsider only the fair market value of the properties. The Boardsupports this argument by stating that PTAB previously rejected thetaxpayers' claim that their assessments were improperly based onrecent sale prices in the area while the assessments of comparableproperties in other subdivisions were not similarly adjusted.

In Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 181 Ill. 2d 228, 235,692 N.E.2d 260, 263 (1998), our supreme court held that assessingcertain properties based on their true fair cash value⁽¹⁾, asevidenced by recent sales, while assessing like properties under adifferent method is an impermissible violation of the uniformityclause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX,