Thede v. Kapsas

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Thede v. Kapsas

State: Illinois

Court: 3rd District Appellate

Docket No: 3-07-0757 Rel

Case Date: 10/21/2008

Preview:No. 3--07--0757 Filed October 21, 2008 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2008 REBECCA THEDE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HELEN KAPSAS, Defendant-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 14th Judicial Circuit, Whiteside County, Illinois No. 03--AR--16

Honorable Stanley B. Steines, Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Rebecca Thede sued defendant Dr. Helen Kapsas for medical malpractice. The trial court granted Kapsas summary

judgment on her affirmative defense that the suit was untimely. Thede appeals. We affirm. BACKGROUND Rebecca Thede engaged the services of Dr. Helen Kapsas to remove a mole from her shoulder. She became a patient of

Kapsas's, at the CGH Prophetstown Family Medical Center, after the only previous doctor in Prophetstown and a second doctor in

Sterling left private practice.

Thede had been to see Kapsas at She was aware

least five times before scheduling this surgery.

that the clinic was operated by Community General Hospital of Sterling and that Kapsas had not independently billed her for services on previous occasions. Thede and Kapsas intended this particular procedure to be an outpatient surgery conducted at the clinic. Kapsas gave Thede

the choice of having the surgery seated or lying down; Thede chose to have the mole removed while seated. Kapsas administered During the

a local anesthetic and proceeded to operate on Thede.

surgery, Thede fainted and fell off the examination table, striking her face on a chair, breaking her front teeth and injuring her jaw and nose. Thede was then admitted to Community

General Hospital for treatment of her injuries. One year and eleven months after Thede was injured, she sued the hospital and Kapsas for malpractice. The complaint against Kapsas

Kapsas alleged that she was a hospital employee.1

1

We recognize that this original complaint was nullified

and withdrawn when Thede later filed her amended complaints against Kapsas. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, However, the statements made in 2

384, 665 N.E.2d 808, 811 (1996).

admitted this allegation.

Within two months, Thede amended her She again

complaint for reasons unrelated to this appeal.

alleged Kapsas was an employee of Community General Hospital. The hospital moved for dismissal, establishing that it is a municipal corporation and personal injury suits against it were, at the time, subject to a one-year limitations period. 10/8--101 (West 1998). granted. 745 ILCS

The hospital's motion for dismissal was

Thede amended her complaint against Kapsas again, this

time alleging that Kapsas was a physician in private practice and the applicable limitations period was two years. Kapsas moved for summary judgment on the affirmative defense that she was a hospital employee, the applicable limitations period for her was also one year, and it had expired. The trial

court first denied summary judgment because the limitations period for public employees accused of medical malpractice had recently been changed from one year to two years, and there was doubt about whether the old rule or the new rule applied. It was

the original and first amended complaints are relevant to our analysis of Thede's prayer for equitable relief. Texas Eastern

Transmission Corp. v. McCrate, 76 Ill. App. 3d 828, 833, 395 N.E.2d 624, 628 (1979). 3

later determined that the one-year rule would apply if Kapsas was a hospital employee. summary judgment. Kapsas then asked the court to reconsider

The trial court refused a second time, this

time believing there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Kapsas was an independent contractor and not protected by the one-year limitations period. ordered. Discovery was

At the close of discovery, Kapsas made a second motion The court granted summary

to reconsider summary judgment.

judgment, finding there was no genuine question of material fact with respect to Kapsas's status as an employee of Community General Hospital. ANALYSIS Thede makes two claims on appeal. First, that the trial

court erred in granting summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact still exists regarding Dr. Kaspas's employment relationship with the hospital. Second, that the trial court

erred by not giving Thede equitable relief from the statute of limitations. We review trial court's decision to grant Kapsas's motion for summary judgment de novo. Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., We review

199 Ill. 2d 179, 185, 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1123 (2002).

the trial court's decision to refuse equitable relief for the 4

abuse of discretion.

Babcock v. Martinez, 368 Ill. App. 3d 130,

142-43, 857 N.E.2d 911, 921 (2006). I. Employment Relationship Between Defendant and Community General Hospital The trial court found that Thede offered no evidence inconsistent with Kapsas's evidence establishing that she was an employee of Community General Hospital. Thede contends that both

Kapsas's employment agreement and the universal consent form Thede signed create a genuine issue of material fact as to Thede's status as a hospital employee. We disagree.

Summary judgment is available to a defendant "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 2006).

Pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits must be construed strictly against the movant and in favor of the opponent. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32,

43, 809 N.E.2d 1248, 1257 (2004). In February 2001, when Thede was injured, personal injury suits against municipal employees were subject to a one-year limitations period. 745 ILCS 10/8--101 (West 2002).

5

Accordingly, if Kapsas was an employee of Community General Hospital, Thede's suit is time-barred. Tosado v. Miller, 188 If Kapsas was an

Ill. 2d 186, 196, 720 N.E.2d 1075, 1081 (1999).

independent contractor, the one-year limitations period does not apply. 745 ILCS 10/1--202 (West 2006).

The nature of the relationship between a principal and an agent is a question of fact. Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal

Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d 511, 524, 622 N.E.2d 788, 795 (1993). Therefore, summary judgment would be inappropriate unless the evidence documenting the relationship between Kapsas and Community General Hospital is so clear as to be undisputed. Scardina v. Alexian Brothers Medical Center, 308 Ill. App. 3d 359, 363, 719 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (1999). See Adams v. Northern Thede

Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d at 43, 809 N.E.2d at 1257. could only rely upon her pleadings to create a question of

material fact until Kapsas supplied facts that clearly entitled her to judgment as a matter of law. Williams v. Covenant Medical

Center, 316 Ill. App. 3d 682, 737 N.E.2d 662 (2000). Kapsas produced a copy of her employment agreement with Community General Hospital, as well as deposition testimony from herself and representatives of the hospital. Thede claims a

genuine issue of material fact is created by a clause in Kapsas's 6

employment agreement and language in a consent form Thede signed. Thede asserts these items controvert Kapsas's evidence that Community General Hospital had a right to control Kapsas's work as a physician. See Wheaton v. Suwana, 355 Ill. App. 3d 506,

511-12, 823 N.E.2d 993, 997 (2005). Whether a principal has a right to control the manner in which an agent works is the most important of eight factors in determining whether the agent is an employee or an independent contractor. 512 (2000). Warren v. Williams, 313 Ill. App. 3d 450, 730 N.E.2d Wheaton, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 511, 823 N.E.2d at 997 At issue is not whether the principal

(all eight factors).

exerts actual control, but whether the principal reserves the right to control the agent. Gunterburg v. B & M Transportation

Co., 27 Ill. App. 3d 732, 738, 327 N.E.2d 528, 533 (1975). First, Thede argues Community General Hospital has no right to control Kapsas's work because the hospital bargained for the following language assigning it any income Kapsas earned for medically-related activities outside the scope of her employment at the hospital: "6. CGH Physician [Kaspas] shall not enter into any contract 7 Outside Contract - Fees and Revenue belong to

utilizing or altering any of CHG's assets, nor shall she enter into any contract for the rendering of medical services to any third party. All fees, billing and revenue generated or

attributable to Physician's services in any way related to the practice of medicine and/or surgery, whether within or without CGH shall belong to CHG. This includes any renumeration [sic] received by Physician for outside medically-related activities. CGH may, at its sole

discretion, grant exceptions to the outside income rule." Thede asserts that this provision anticipates and approves of Kapsas practicing medicine without the hospital's supervision, and the portion of paragraph 6 appearing in Thede's brief could be read that way. But when the paragraph is taken as a whole, it

restates Kapsas's fiduciary duties to the hospital and generally prohibits Kapsas from outside medical employment. See ABC Trans

National Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 62 Ill. App. 3d 671, 683, 379 N.E.2d 1228, 1237 (1978); Restatement (Third) of Agency

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