No. 3-02-0826

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2004

     
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Bradley Tinder, is 29 years old. He has sufferedfrom cerebral palsy since birth, and although his IQ is low, hedoes not suffer from mental retardation. In 1995, he graduated fromthe Illinois Center for Rehabilitation and Education, a specialstate school serving the physically disabled and operated by theIllinois Department of Human Services (IDHS). After his graduation,plaintiff was placed in a CILA. CILA provides Medicaid-eligibledevelopmentally disabled persons an opportunity to live in acommunity setting, often in a single family residence with otherparticipants. The program provides "active treatment," or"habilitation" which may include training and education in cooking,home management, budgeting, and other day to day skills. Theprogram also provides counseling, physical and occupationaltherapy, and community outings and social events. The objective ofthe CILA program is to promote optimal independence for personswith developmental disabilities in daily living and economicself-sufficiency in small group settings.

Plaintiff voluntarily moved from the CILA in 1997, and tookresidence in an intermediate care facility for the developmentallydisabled. He stayed there for two years and then moved to asupervised apartment complex which serves disabled individuals. Plaintiff experienced serious problems while living at theapartment complex and was hospitalized in 1999 with a severe caseof bowel impaction. After being discharged from the hospital,plaintiff moved to a nursing home for convalescent care. Later, hetransferred to Sterling Pavilion, a general population nursing homewhere he currently resides.

In 1999, plaintiff began a long application process seekingplacement in a CILA program. The IDHS rejected plaintiff'sapplication finding that he was not "developmentally disabled" andwould not benefit from "active treatment." Plaintiff appealed tothe Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) and after anadministrative hearing, the IDPA upheld the IDHS' denial of theMedicaid waiver for CILA funding. In its administrative decision,the IDPA found that plaintiff was not developmentally disabled. Plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review in thecircuit court. The court upheld the IDPA's determination.

I. Standard of Review

In reviewing a final decision under administrative review law,we review the agency's finding, not the circuit court'sdetermination. Metropolitan Airport Authority v. Property TaxAppeal Board, 307 Ill. App. 3d 52, 55 (1999). An agency's findingsof fact will be disturbed only if they are against the manifestweight of the evidence. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department ofProfessional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992). Questions oflaw, however, are not entitled to deference and are reviewed denovo. Envirite Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,158 Ill. 2d 210, 214 (1994).

II. Developmental Disability

The IDPA argues that its regulation requires that adevelopmentally disabled individual exhibit significant cognitivedefects in order to be a candidate for active treatment. Further,since active treatment results in enhanced skills and self-reliantbehavior, and since plaintiff's limitations are totally physicaland cannot be overcome by learned behavior, he is not a candidatefor active treatment.

We disagree and find that neither the statute nor theregulations promulgated under it require an applicant to qualifyfor active treatment. The state statutory and regulatory schemedefines developmental disability, and explicitly includes, withoutqualification, those suffering from cerebral palsy.

A. The IDPA's Regulation

Under the IDPA's regulation, individuals qualify asdevelopmentally disabled if they have a disability that:

is attributable to a diagnosis of mental retardation(mild, moderate, severe, profound, unspecified), or arelated condition. A related condition means theindividual has been diagnosed as having infantile autism,infantile cerebral palsy or epilepsy, and this conditionis manifested before the age of 22; is likely to continueindefinitely; and results in substantial functionallimitations in three or more of the following areas ofmajor life activity:

i) self-care;

ii) understanding and use of language;

iii) learning;

iv) mobility;

v) self-direction;

vi) capacity for independent living. 89 Ill. Admin.Code Section 140.642 (2003).

The IDPA claims that under the regulation, plaintiff mustsuffer cognitive as well as physical limitations in the major lifeactivities, making him a candidate for active treatment. The IDPAconcedes that plaintiff has a "related condition" (cerebral palsy)and that he does suffer substantial physical and cognitivelimitations in two areas: self-direction and capacity forindependent living. The IDPA agreed that plaintiff sufferssubstantial physical limitations in two additional areas, self careand mobility, but denied him eligibility because those limitationswere not also cognitive.

The Administrative Code defines developmental disability as adisability attributable to mental retardation or a relatedcondition. The use of the disjunctive "or" indicates that thedisability can derive from either mental retardation or a relatedcondition. See People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 349 (1992)(holding that the ordinary use of the disjunctive "or" indicates achoice between alternatives). Cerebral palsy is specifically listedas a related condition. Thus, to qualify as developmentallydisabled, the plaintiff must have (1) a disability attributable tocerebral palsy, (2) the condition was manifest by age 22, (3) it islikely to continue indefinitely, and (4) results in substantiallimitations in at least three life activities. The AdministrativeCode includes no requirement that the limitations of an applicantwith a "related condition," such as cerebral palsy, be mental andphysical; it only mandates that an applicant suffer substantiallyin at least three of six life activities.

There is no dispute that plaintiff has a disabilityattributable to cerebral palsy which manifested itself before age22 and is likely to continue indefinitely. Both parties agree thatplaintiff suffers substantial limitations in four major lifeactivities. Under the Administrative Code's requirements, plaintiffis developmentally disabled. The regulation does not include arequirement that the applicant be a candidate for active treatment,and this court will not add such a requirement. See Nottage v.Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996) (holding that when interpretingstatutes, courts should not add requirements or impose limitationsthat are inconsistent with the plain meaning of the enactment).

B. The Statute and IDHS Regulations

Illinois law and IDHS regulations also define developmentaldisability:

a disability which is attributable to (a) mentalretardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy or autism; or to(b) any other condition which results in impairmentsimilar to that caused by mental retardation and whichrequires services similar to those required by mentallyretarded persons. 405 ILCS 5/1-106 (West 1997); see also59 Ill. Admin. Code 120.10.

The statute lists impairments that qualify as developmentaldisabilities: mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism,or any other condition similar to mental retardation. Again, thedisjunctive "or" between the two clauses creates separatecategories of eligible persons. If individuals suffer a disabilityattributable to cerebral palsy, they are developmentally disabled;there is no separate requirement that the person also becognitively impaired, and, thus, a candidate for active treatment.Under the plain language of the statute, a disability caused by thecondition of cerebral palsy qualifies as developmentally disabled.

All the parties agree that plaintiff has cerebral palsy andthat he suffers limitations in four major life activities. Heshould not have been denied admission into the CILA program. Weacknowledge that the goal of CILA is to provide participants withthe tools to eventually move toward a more independent lifestyleand that the participants' eligibility for active treatment iscrucial to that goal. Under the law and regulations as they arewritten, however, plaintiff need not be eligible for activetreatment to be admitted into CILA.

III. Active Treatment

Since we have found that plaintiff meets the eligibilityrequirements for CILA placement without the necessity for activetreatment, we need not address this issue.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the circuit court of Whiteside County isreversed.

Reversed.

MCDADE and SCHMIDT, JJ., concurring.