JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:

In these consolidated appeals, defendants Goodyear Tire &Rubber Company, Titan Wheel Corporation, Titan International,Inc., T.D. Wheel Company of Virginia, Inc., Caterpillar, Inc.,Caterpillar Tractor Company, and third-party defendants LeslieSorenson, Kay Sorenson, Virgil Sorenson and Sorenson's Tire Storesought leave to appeal under Supreme Court Rules 306 (166 Ill. 2dR. 306) and 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308) from rulings of the circuitcourt denying defendants' motions to dismiss based on forum nonconveniens. Appeal No. 3--03--0910 presents an issue of firstimpression regarding a plaintiff's ability to refile a case inIllinois after a dismissal under the interstate branch of forumnon conveniens. Appeal No. 3--03--0884 involves application offamiliar forum non conveniens principles to plaintiff's choice offorum.

On February 6, 1997, Gary D. Wakehouse was killed in BurtCounty, Nebraska, while changing a tire on a Caterpillar roadgrader. According to plaintiff's complaint, the wheel rim of theroad grader separated, causing the side ring to strike Wakehouse. Plaintiff filed a complaint on August 15, 1997, in St. ClairCounty, Illinois, alleging product liability and negligenceclaims. The defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismissbased on improper venue and on the grounds of interstate forumnon conveniens. The circuit court denied the motion and, aftergranting defendants' Rule 306 petition for leave to appeal, theFifth District Appellate Court affirmed in a Rule 23 orderentered on July 19, 2001. Defendants then filed a petition forleave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court under Rule 315. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. The supreme court entered a supervisoryorder vacating the appellate court's order and remanding forreconsideration in light of Vinson v. Allstate, 144 Ill. 2d 306,579 N.E.2d 857 (1991). The appellate court, in a second Rule 23order issued on November 27, 2001, ruled that the trial court hadabused its discretion in denying defendants' motion to dismiss. Wakehouse v. Titan Wheel Corp., No. 5--99--0749 (2001)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The court foundthat either Burt County, Nebraska, or Onawa, Iowa, where thedecedent resided and was employed, would be a more convenientforum. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the case onFebruary 13, 2002, in an agreed order which provided, pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 187, that defendants would accept service ofprocess if plaintiff refiled in another forum within six months. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 187(c)(2)(i). Defendants also agreed to waiveany statute of limitations defense. See 134 Ill. 2d R.187(c)(2)(ii).

On July 30, 2002, plaintiff refiled her case in PeoriaCounty, Illinois. Peoria is the world headquarters and principalplace of business of defendant Caterpillar. Its research anddesign facilities are located nearby. In addition, the principalplaces of business of two of the Titan defendants are located inQuincy, Illinois, about 130 miles from Peoria. The defendantsfiled motions to dismiss, asserting that the previous dismissalon the grounds of interstate forum non conveniens precludedplaintiff from refiling in any Illinois county. These motionswere denied by the Peoria County circuit court, which certifiedthe following question for interlocutory appeal under Rule 308:

"Is the trial court correct in itsruling that dismissal pursuant to SupremeCourt rule 187 (c)(2) -- on the grounds ofinterstate forum non conveniens -- of a suit,then pending in one county in the State ofIllinois, does not preclude the filing of thesuit in another county in the State ofIllinois?"

Thereafter, the circuit court ruled on an additional groundsfor dismissal which defendants had asserted in their motions. Defendants contended, as they had in the circuit court of St.Clair County, that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed onthe basis of interstate forum non conveniens, again citingNebraska and Iowa as more convenient forums. The Peoria circuitcourt denied defendants' motions on October 8, 2003, anddefendants filed a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule306(a)(2). 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(2). This court subsequentlygranted leave to appeal under Rule 308 but denied the Rule 306petition. Defendants then petitioned the Illinois Supreme Courtfor leave to appeal. In a supervisory order, the supreme courtordered this court to grant the Rule 306 petition and address theforum non conveniens issue on the merits, if appropriate, onlyafter ruling on the Rule 308 issue. Thus, after numerous rulingsby two different circuit courts, two districts of the appellatecourt, and the Illinois Supreme Court, it has yet to bedetermined, more than seven years after it was initially filed,where this case will be tried. We find that it should be inNebraska or Iowa, not in Peoria County, Illinois.

We first consider the question certified by the circuitcourt, whether a dismissal on the grounds of interstate forum nonconveniens bars plaintiff from refiling her suit in anotherIllinois county. As this concerns a question of law, we reviewthe circuit court's decision de novo. Feltmeier v. Feltmeier,207 Ill. 2d 263, 798 N.E.2d 75 (2003).

Defendants maintain that a dismissal on the basis ofinterstate forum non conveniens constitutes a finding that theentire State of Illinois is an inconvenient forum, not just St.Clair County. Therefore, argue defendants, plaintiff isprohibited from relitigating that issue by filing her lawsuit inanother Illinois county.

It is true, of course, that forum non conveniens has twopotential applications: interstate and intrastate. "Theinterstate branch of forum non conveniens considers whetherIllinois is an appropriate state in which to litigate thecontroversy, and the intrastate branch of the doctrine considerswhether the case is being litigated in the most convenient countywithin Illinois." Bird v. Luhr Brothers, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 3d1088, 1091, 779 N.E.2d 907, 911 (2002); see also Lambert v.Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 332 Ill. App. 3d 373, 773 N.E.2d133 (2002). In deciding an interstate forum non conveniensmotion, a plaintiff's home forum is the state in which she lives,not the specific county of residence. Bird, 334 Ill. App. 3d1088, 779 N.E.2d 907. Nevertheless, a circuit court ruling on aninterstate forum non conveniens motion does not generallyconsider and weigh any connections the litigation may have toevery county in Illinois in which venue may be proper. Instead,the court compares the county in which suit has been filed to thespecific courts in other states suggested as alternative forumsby the defendants.

For example, the analysis employed by the appellate court inits second Rule 23 order emphasizes the strength of theconnections to Iowa and Nebraska versus the lack of connection toSt. Clair County:

"Here, plaintiff and decedent wereresidents of Onawa, Iowa. Decedent's placeof employment was located in Onawa, Iowa, sorecords concerning his employment andtraining would be in Iowa. Similarly, hiscoemployees were residents of Iowa. Anydamage evidence would be located in Iowa. Illinois has limited subpoena power overresidents of Iowa.

Additionally, the accident occurred inBurt County, Nebraska. The investigation ofthe occurrence was conducted by personslocated in or near Burt County, Nebraska. The records of the road graders and theirmaintenance would be in Burt County,Nebraska. The witnesses to the accident arein Burt County, Nebraska. If a jury view wasfound to be necessary, the jury would have togo to Burt County, Nebraska. This would bedifficult if the trial were held in St. ClairCounty, Illinois. It is also likely thateither Iowa or Nebraska law, rather thanIllinois law, will apply to this case. Illinois likewise has limited subpoena powerover the residents of Nebraska.

Even though two of the defendantbusinesses have principal places of businessin Illinois, although not in St. ClairCounty, the supreme court's directive toreview Vinson suggests that this factor playslittle or no role in a consideration of amotion to dismiss under the doctrine of forumnon conveniens. The supreme court directs usto Vinson and thereby indicates that theresidents of St. Clair County should not beburdened with jury duty since none of theevents surrounding this case took place inSt. Clair County. Further, this case hassome admitted connections to either Onawa,Iowa, or Burt County, Nebraska, and theresidents of either Nebraska or Iowa have alocal interest in having this controversyheard at home. Therefore, we must find thatthe private-interest and the public-interestfactors weigh strongly in defendants' favorand outweigh plaintiff's choice of forum andthe trial court abused its discretion when itdenied defendants' motion to dismiss underthe doctrine of forum non conveniens." Wakehouse, No. 5--99--0749, at 6-7.

Other than a passing reference to two of defendants'principal places of business being located outside of St. ClairCounty, there is no indication that the court considered whetherother Illinois counties, such as Peoria County, where Caterpillaris headquartered, or Adams County, which contains theheadquarters and principal place of business of two of the Titandefendants, would be convenient. While an analysis which focuseson the public and private interest factors on a statewide basiscould be employed, we do not believe that its use is typical. More importantly, we do not believe it was done in this case.

Thus a finding that another state provides a more convenientforum does not, as a matter of fact, mean that a comparison withsome other Illinois county would yield the same result. Thiscase, in which Peoria County has a markedly stronger connectionto the litigation than St. Clair County, illustrates that point. The more significant question is whether, as a matter of law, adismissal on the basis of interstate forum non conveniens barsplaintiff from refiling in another county in Illinois.

Defendants assert that under principles of res judicata andcollateral estoppel, plaintiff is precluded from relitigating theissue of whether Nebraska or Iowa are more convenient forums thanIllinois. We disagree.

The principle of res judicata, also referred to as claimpreclusion (see A.W. Wendell & Sons, Inc., v. Qazi, 254 Ill. App.3d 97, 626 N.E.2d 280 (1993); Morris v. Union Oil Co.. 96 Ill.App. 3d 148, 421 N.E.2d 278 (1981)), provides that a finaljudgment on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of theparties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to asubsequent action involving the same cause of action. The threerequirements for res judicata to apply are: (1) a final judgmenton the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) anidentity of cause of action; and (3) an identity of the partiesor their privies. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d381, 757 N.E.2d 471 (2001). Res judicata is not applicable inthis case because there has been no final adjudication on themerits. See A.W. Wendell, 254 Ill. App. 3d 97, 626 N.E.2d 280(dismissal based on forum non conveniens is not adjudication onmerits).

Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, isoften recognized as a branch of res judicata. Cirro Wrecking Co.v. Roppolo, 153 Ill. 2d 6, 19-20, 605 N.E.2d 544, 552 (1992). Itbars relitigation of issues decided in a prior action between thesame parties, and requires: (1) that the issue decided in theprior proceeding is identical to the one in the suit in question;(2) that the prior adjudication was a final judgment on themerits; and (3) that the party against whom the estoppel isasserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prioradjudication. Herzog v. Lexington Township, 167 Ill. 2d 288, 657N.E.2d 926 (1995). Application of collateral estoppel in thiscase is not appropriate for the same reason that res judicata wasnot -- lack of a final judgment on the merits. In addition, theissue decided previously is arguably not identical to thatpresented here, in the sense that although the facts weighing infavor of Nebraska or Iowa as more convenient forums are the same,Peoria County has decidedly stronger connections to thelitigation than St. Clair County. We find therefore thatplaintiff is not collaterally estopped from relitigating theforum non conveniens issue.⁽¹⁾

Defendants also contend that plaintiff is prohibited fromrefiling in Peoria County under the doctrine of law of the case. Again we disagree.

"Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, generally, a ruleestablished as controlling in a particular case will continue tobe the law of the case, as long as the facts remain the same." (Emphasis added.) People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 468, 610N.E.2d 16, 41 (1992). As we already have noted, after plaintiffrefiled in Peoria County the facts of the case were no longer thesame. In addition, although questions which were decided in aprevious appeal are binding, matters which were not decided donot become law of the case. Aguilar v. Safeway Insurance Co.,221 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 582 N.E.2d 1362 (1991). Theappropriateness of Peoria County as a forum was not considered inthe prior litigation. Finally, similar to res judicata andestoppel, application of the law of the case doctrine requires afinal judgment. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 610 N.E.2d 16. Thelaw of the case doctrine is therefore not applicable.

Although res judicata, estoppel and law of the case do notprohibit a plaintiff who has been dismissed on the basis ofinterstate forum non conveniens from refiling in another Illinoiscounty, we believe that the doctrine itself precludes such anevent. Forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine that "isbased on considerations of fundamental fairness and sensible andeffective judicial administration." Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R.Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 171, 797 N.E.2d 687, 693 (2003). It allowsa court to decline jurisdiction and direct the litigation to aforum that can better serve the convenience of the parties andthe ends of justice. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 171-72, 797 N.E.2d at693. The purposes underlying the doctrine would be ill-served byallowing plaintiffs who have fully litigated and lost aninterstate forum non conveniens motion to avoid its effects bythe simple expedient of choosing a different Illinois county. Permitting such a practice would, in defendants' words, "make thefirst 4 1/2 years of this litigation all for nothing, and wouldrequire the defendants to prove the non-existence of a convenientforum in all 102 counties in the State of Illinois." It wouldalso promote forum shopping, a practice that is contrary to thepurposes behind the venue rules. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 174,797 N.E.2d at 694, quoting Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, Londonv. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 329 Ill. App. 3d 189, 196, 768N.E.2d 779, 785 (2002). Indeed, allowing a plaintiff to havemultiple "bites of the apple" until he finds a county or a courtthat suits him creates an incentive to forum shop. We furthernote the potential for substantial delay, as evidenced by thetime elapsed in this case, with its concomitant inconvenience toboth plaintiff and defendants.

The battle over a forum has been described as a "'battleover minutiae.'" Peile v. Skelgas, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 323, 335,645 N.E.2d 184, 190, quoting Peile v. Skelgas, Inc., 242 Ill.App. 3d 500, 522, 610 N.E.2d 813, 829 (1993) (Lewis, J.,specially concurring). Those battles are fought to promote theinterests of justice by endeavoring to ensure that a case istried where both plaintiffs and defendants can receive a trialthat is as convenient, expeditious and fair as possible. We willnot turn that battle into an endless war of attrition byproviding multiple battlefields. We hold that a dismissal on thebasis of interstate forum non conveniens precludes plaintiff fromrefiling in another county in Illinois.

Finally, plaintiff's citation to Haring v. Chicago and NorthWestern Transportation Co., 103 Ill. 2d 530, 470 N.E.2d 288(1984), merits comment. In Haring the plaintiff filed suit inMadison County, Illinois, despite the fact that the onlyconnections to the case were that defendant's railroad tracks ranthrough that county and it was the site of plaintiff's lawyers'office. The defendant filed a forum non conveniens motion todismiss or to transfer the case, suggesting Clinton County, Iowa,or Whiteside County, Illinois, as alternative forums. The trialcourt denied the motion and the supreme court reversed andremanded with directions to grant the motion to dismiss. Thecourt also, however, instructed the trial court that it couldtransfer the case to Whiteside County, Illinois, if it found thatit was more convenient to have the case tried there. Haring, 103Ill. 2d at 534, 470 N.E.2d at 290.

Plaintiff argues that the result reached by the supremecourt in Haring would not have been possible if dismissal basedon interstate forum non conveniens precludes plaintiff fromrefiling in another Illinois county. We disagree. Thedistinguishing factor in Haring was that defendant had filed amotion to dismiss or transfer the case. In such a case, adefendant is in no position to complain if he is granted the veryrelief which he sought. In addition, the potential problemsassociated with permitting refilings in another Illinois countyare minimized when that county is identified and the trial courthas the opportunity to assess its suitability prior to ruling onthe forum non conveniens motion. Accordingly, we find that aplaintiff is precluded for refiling a lawsuit in another Illinoiscounty following dismissal based on interstate forum nonconveniens unless a motion to transfer to another county withinIllinois has previously been filed. In that situation the trialcourt may, if it is appropriate, transfer the case rather thandismiss it.
 

Our answer to the question certified by the trial court isno, it's ruling was not correct. A dismissal on the grounds ofinterstate forum non conveniens does preclude refiling of thesuit in another county in Illinois. Accordingly, we reverse andremand with directions to grant the defendants' motions todismiss pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 187(c)(2). 134 Ill. 2d R.187(c)(2).
 

Given our ruling above, there is no need to consider whetherthe trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants'motions to dismiss the Peoria County case on the basis ofinterstate forum non conveniens. We therefore dismiss thoseappeals.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuitcourt in appeal No. 3--03--0910 is reversed and remanded withdirections. Appeal No. 3--03--0884 is dismissed.

No. 3--03--0910 -- certified question answered; reversed andremanded with directions.

No. 3--03--0884 -- appeal dismissed.

HOLDRIDGE, P.J., and BARRY, J., concur.

1. Technically, this issue is more appropriately characterizedas one of direct estoppel rather than collateral estoppel. Direct estoppel arises where the proceeding in which the estoppelis asserted is a continuation of the prior proceeding. SeePeople v. Daniels, 187 Ill. 2d 301, 320 n.3, 718 N.E.2d 149, 161n.3 (1999); see also Alcantara v. Boeing Co., 41 Wash. App. 675,705 P. 2d 1222 (1985) (issue preclusion in second action on sameclaim is direct estoppel and on different claim is collateralestoppel.) However, the analysis is the same, as claims ofcollateral and direct estoppel are decided by applying the samerules. Daniels, 187 Ill. 2d at 320 n.3, 718 N.E.2d at 161 n.3.