JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Bonita L. Welch, appeals the judgment of the circuit court ofLa Salle County granting the motion of defendants, the Illinois Supreme Court andJustice James D. Heiple, to dismiss Welch's two-count complaint. We affirm.

On May 5, 1998, Welch filed the present action against defendants. Thefollowing uncontroverted facts are taken from the complaint. Count I, directedsolely against defendant Illinois Supreme Court, alleged that on or aboutFebruary 10, 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court, through its agents, the justicesof the Appellate Court, Third District (Third District), offered Welch a positionwith the Third District to work as a research attorney at a salary of $39,464. Welch alleged that in consideration she agreed to transfer from her position asjudicial law clerk for Justice Tobias Barry to fill the position of researchattorney for the Third District, effective February 16, 1994. Welch alleged thatshe began work on February 16, 1994, pursuant to the oral agreement, and thesupreme court subsequently breached the agreement by reducing her salary to$32,571. Welch sought damages in excess of $100,000 for the alleged breach.

Count II, directed solely against defendant Justice Heiple, alleged thatJustice Heiple tortiously interfered with Welch's employment agreement bydirecting that her salary be reduced. Welch alleged that the justices of theIllinois Appellate Court were authorized by administrative rule to pay new-hireresearch attorneys up to $39,464 per year without requesting the approval of thesupreme court. Welch further alleged that Justice Heiple learned of Welch'sagreement for a transfer from Robert Davison, then director of the AdministrativeOffice of Illinois Courts, an agent of the supreme court. Welch alleged thatJustice Heiple intentionally interfered with the oral agreement for employmentby directing Davison to order the payroll department to reduce her salary to$32,571, the minimum starting salary for the position of research attorneys. Welch further alleged that, at the time Justice Heiple ordered the reduction ofher salary, he knew that Welch had 12 years' experience as Justice Barry'sjudicial law clerk. Welch alleged that Justice Heiple's action was not performedin furtherance of his position as justice of the supreme court, in furtheranceof any policy, or in furtherance of his administrative authority over the ThirdDistrict. Instead, she claimed that it was an unauthorized, arbitrary, and acapricious act taken with malice and in reckless disregard of Welch's rights, inderogation of administrative rules and the State's policy of not impairing Statecontracts, and in furtherance of his private or political bias against Welch asan older employee, a female, and as a former employee of his political rival,Justice Barry. Welch sought damages in count II in excess of $300,000.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2--619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(1) (West 1998)), arguingthat sovereign immunity barred both claims. Defendants supplemented the motionto dismiss count II on the ground that the Illinois Human Rights Act (HumanRights Act) (775 ILCS 5/8--111(C)(West 1998)) preempted the claim to the extentit purported to allege sex or age discrimination. Defendants further argued thatWelch's alleged political association with Justice Barry gave her no cognizableclaim against Justice Heiple for tortious interference with contract.

The trial court agreed with defendants. The court dismissed count I asbarred by sovereign immunity, noting that under section 8 of the Court of ClaimsAct (705 ILCS 505/8 (West 1998)), a state entity cannot be sued in a circuitcourt, particularly when the allegation involves monetary claims for a breach ofcontract with the State. The court also dismissed count II on the basis ofsovereign immunity. The court found that the crucial issue was whether JusticeHeiple's actions were "outside the scope of his authority." The court foundthat, when a request for more than the average authorized salary was made,Justice Heiple had the authority to become involved in the matter and that, tohold otherwise, would be to control the State's actions in personnel andemployment matters. The court further dismissed count II as preempted by theHuman Rights Act to the extent that it alleged age and sex discrimination claims. Concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction over Welch's action, the courtdismissed the complaint with prejudice.

Welch filed a motion to reconsider and sought leave to file a first amendedcomplaint. Welch sought declaratory relief under count I. The remainder of thepleadings essentially contained the same allegations but sought more damages. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and held that, althoughWelch purportedly sought "declaratory relief" in count I, the claim wasessentially one for monetary damages. Because sovereign immunity would still barboth counts, the court refused to allow Welch leave to amend. Welch timelyappeals from the order dismissing her complaint and from the denial of her motionto amend.

On appeal, Welch does not contest the trial court's dismissal of count Ias barred by sovereign immunity. Rather, her first argument centers on thesection 2--619 dismissal of count II (tortious interference by Justice Heiple)on the basis of sovereign immunity.

The granting of a section 2--619 motion to dismiss is proper only if itappears that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff torecover. Turner v. Fletcher, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1055 (1999). Where defectsdo not appear on the face of the pleadings, affidavits can be filed statingaffirmative matters that justify dismissal. In addressing a section 2--619motion, a court takes all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, and onlythe complaint's legal sufficiency is contested. Petty v. Crowell, 306 Ill. App.3d 774, 776 (1999). We review the granting of a section 2--619 motion de novo. Petty, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 776.

Sovereign immunity in Illinois exists pursuant to a statute and mandatesthat the State or a department of the State cannot be sued in its own court orany other court without its consent. The legislature enacted the State LawsuitImmunity Act (745 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 1998)), which provides that the Stateshall not be made a defendant or party in any court except as provided by section8 of the Court of Claims Act (Act) (705 ILCS 505/8 (West 1998)). The Actestablished the Court of Claims as the "exclusive" forum for resolving lawsuitsagainst the State. 705 ILCS 505/8 (West 1998). The Act gives exclusivejurisdiction to the Court of Claims in lawsuits against the State of Illinois,including contract actions, tort actions, and actions founded upon Illinois laws.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity has not been confined to actions thatname the State as a defendant. Sovereign immunity applies in an action naminga State employee as defendant where the impact on the State makes it, for allpractical purposes, a suit against the State. Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295,308 (1990). The determination of whether an action is an action against theState or is against only the individual depends on the issues involved and therelief sought, rather than the formal designation of the parties. Healy, 133Ill. 2d at 308.

Courts generally look to three criteria in determining whether an actionis really against the State: (1) whether the official allegedly acted beyond thescope of his authority; (2) whether the duty the official allegedly breached isowed solely by virtue of State employment; and (3) whether the action theofficial allegedly took involved matters within his normal and officialfunctions. Janes v. Albergo, 254 Ill. App. 3d 951, 958 (1993). Even when thesecriteria are not met, a court must consider the relief sought. Janes, 254 Ill.App. 3d at 958. Sovereign immunity will apply whenever a judgment for theplaintiff could operate either to control the actions of the State or subject itto liability. Griffin v. Fluellen, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1084-85 (1996). Theissue of when a State employee's on-the-job negligence is immunized turns on ananalysis of the source of the duty the employee is charged with breaching incommitting the allegedly negligent act. Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 159(1992).

"Where the charged act arose out of the State employee's breach of a dutythat is imposed on him solely by virtue of his State employment, sovereignimmunity will bar maintenance of the action in circuit court. [Citation.] Conversely, where the employee is charged with breaching a duty imposed onhim independently of his State employment, sovereign immunity will notattach and a negligence claim may be maintained against him in circuitcourt." (Emphasis in original.) Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 159.

Welch raises a number of contentions under her first argument. Shecontends that the trial court violated section 2--619(c)(735 ILCS 5/2--619(c)(West 1998)) by considering affidavits and other exhibits in ruling that countII was barred by sovereign immunity. Welch argues that the trial court'sdecision was founded upon improper factual determinations that (1) "a process wasproceeding in relation to the hire" when Justice Heiple reduced her salary; and(2) Justice Barry's letter "justifiably trigger[ed] Justice Heiple's subsequentactions." Welch argues that based on this finding the court wrongly inferredthat she had no binding contract when the complaint alleged that she did. Welchasserts that this improper inference allowed the court to conclude that JusticeHeiple was acting "within the scope of his authority," and so the court'ssovereign immunity decision, which she claims rested on that conclusion, was alsowrong. Welch further argues that rule 5(D)(1) of the Illinois Supreme Court JobClassification and Compensation Rules (rule 5(D)(1)) does not give defendants theauthority to interfere with salary decisions up to the midpoint of the scale and,therefore, Justice Heiple exceeded the scope of his authority by violating therule.

Defendants argue that rule 5(D)(1) does not restrict the authority of thesupreme court and its members. Defendants argue that, once Justice Barry soughtto obtain more than the midpoint salary for Welch, Justice Heiple had theauthority to reduce Welch's salary. Defendants further argue that JusticeHeiple's alleged violation of the rule is inconsequential because Welch's claimis barred by sovereign immunity as count II is, in effect, a tort action againstthe State that can be brought only in the Court of Claims.

Rule 5(D)(1) provides:

"Prospective employees will normally be offered the minimum point ofthe salary grade. Administrative Authorities may offer the prospectiveemployee a rate higher than the minimum point but within the NormalStarting Range providing the offer is close to the compensation paid tocurrent employees with similar experience and training. AdministrativeAuthorities may under unusual circumstances hire above midpoint but belowmaximum point only with the prior approval of the Supreme Court."

Welch confuses the jurisdictional question sovereign immunity presents withthe merits of her claim. Regardless of whether Justice Heiple had violated rule5(D)(1), it does not necessarily mean that he acted beyond the "scope of hisauthority" and does not, by itself, preclude the application of sovereignimmunity. A State employee's violation of policy, regulation, or even statutedoes not necessarily avert the application of sovereign immunity. Cf. WestshireRetirement and Healthcare Center v. Department of Public Aid, 276 Ill. App. 3d514, 520 (1995)(statutory violation); Campbell v. White, 207 Ill. App. 3d 541,551 (1991) ("[e]ven assuming plaintiff correctly alleges defendant's acts violatethe statute and regulations pertaining to the use of oscillating lights andsirens, defendant can act negligently or wilfully and wantonly without exceedingthe scope of his authority").

Moreover, Welch assumes that the application of sovereign immunity dependson whether she had a binding employment contract and whether Justice Heiple wasauthorized to reduce her salary as part of her contractual agreement. Therelevant question for sovereign immunity purposes, however, is not whetherJustice Heiple had the authority to interfere with Welch's contract. The correctinquiry is whether the charged acts of Justice Heiple arose out of his breach ofa duty that is imposed on him solely by virtue of his State employment or whetherhe is charged with breaching a duty that arose independently of his Stateemployment. See Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 159. We believe that Justice Heiple'sactions arose out of his alleged breach of a duty imposed on him by virtue of hisState employment.

The opinion of Wozniak v. Conry, 288 Ill. App. 3d 129 (1997), isinstructive. Wozniak, an associate professor at the University of Illinois, suedhis department head for tortious interference with Wozniak's employment contractwith the University after remarks the defendant made about Wozniak's performancecaused him to lose his job. Wozniak contended on appeal that his suit was notagainst the State because the statements made by the defendant did not arise outof a duty imposed solely by virtue of the defendant's employment; rather, thestatements arose out of a duty imposed on the general public not to interferewith others' contractual relationships. The court stated:

"Almost every aspect of every employment relationship with the statemanifests itself through the immediate working relationships between co-workers, supervisors, and fellow state agents. Therefore, limiting theactions of state employees acts to control the actions of the state." Wozniak, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 134.

The court found that if it allowed Wozniak's suit against the defendant inhis individual capacity it clearly would limit the defendant's ability to engagein lawful activity on behalf of the University, i.e., to communicate, allocatetasks, and make personnel and other employment decisions. The court found thata judgment for Wozniak would directly influence the defendant's ability as aState employee to handle departmental personnel issues. Therefore, the courtconcluded that the suit threatened to control the actions of the State and shouldhave been brought in the Court of Claims. Wozniak, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 134.

As in Wozniak, Justice Heiple's conduct affects the core of the State'sability to control its own affairs. It is undisputed that, as the supreme courtjustice elected from the Third District, Justice Heiple is considered to havesupervisory authority over personnel matters there. Welch alleged actions thatJustice Heiple took in his capacity as a supreme court justice to supervisepersonnel matters in the Third District. To allow Welch's suit against JusticeHeiple in his individual capacity would limit Justice Heiple's ability to makeadministrative decisions. Therefore, the suit threatens to control the actionsof the State, and the Court of Claims provides the only forum for such relief.

Welch argues that she alleged that Justice Heiple took deliberate actionby ordering a salary reduction for reasons totally unrelated to her professionalcompetence. However, in Wozniak, the complaint alleged that the defendant madefalse and disparaging statements related to Wozniak's professional competence. Welch argues that the remarks made in Wozniak were legal. Welch asserts that,by contrast, Justice Heiple was acting with malice in violating rule 5(D)(1). Welch argues that Justice Heiple's malicious conduct is outside the scope of aState employee's authority. We agree with the legal contention that malice, ifwell pleaded, is outside the scope of a State employee's authority and must bebrought in the circuit court and not the Court of Claims. Cf. Management Ass'nof Illinois, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 248 Ill. App. 3d 599, 616 (1993). However, Welch has failed to adequately plead malicious conduct by JusticeHeiple.

To plead malice, there must be specific facts supporting the allegations,which, if proved, would show malicious conduct. Management Ass'n, 248 Ill. App.3d at 617. Here, the facts alleged indicate intentional acts. However, Welch'sconclusory statements regarding Justice Heiple's actions that were "taken withmalice" against her "as an older employee, a female and/or as a former employeeof his political rival, Justice Tobias Barry" are not supported by specific factswhich, if proved, would show malicious conduct. Moreover, it is in keeping withthe Act to distinguish between malicious acts for one's own purposes and thosebelieved by the employee to be in furtherance of the State employer's purposes. Management Ass'n, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 617. The facts alleged are consistent withan intent to further the business of the Illinois Supreme Court and thus can beconsidered within the scope of employment. For these reasons, the tort claim isproperly viewed as a claim against the state for damages sounding in tort. Cf.Nikelly v. Stubing, 204 Ill. App. 3d 870, 876 (1990) (absence of specific factsshowing personal animosity or acts committed for any purpose other than whatdefendant perceived to be the best interests of the agency were, therefore,actions against the State). Accordingly, we find that the trial court correctlyheld that count II was barred by sovereign immunity.

Welch argues in her reply brief that Justice Heiple's administrativeauthority over the Third District is more narrowly drawn, and sovereign immunitydoes not insulate a judge from a civil suit where, as here, it is alleged thatadministrative action is taken arbitrarily and solely for reasons of personalbias or political retaliation. Welch asserts that the rules cannot bearbitrarily modified to suit Justice Heiple's political whimsy without exposinghim to liability. Welch cites Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 111 L. Ed.2d 52, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990), and Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 98 L. Ed.2d 555, 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988), in support of her argument. We are not persuadedby Welch's argument. First, neither Forrester nor Rutan is relevant. Rutaninvolved the unconstitutional practice of conditioning a hiring decision onpolitical belief and association. Forrester concerns the question of whether astate court judge had absolute judicial immunity after discriminating against anemployee. Public official immunity is directly aimed at protecting Stateemployees personally rather than directly protecting the interests of the Stateand is not jurisdictional in nature. Janes, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 957. Regardless, it appears that Welch again confuses the merits of her claim with theconcept of sovereign immunity. We cannot decide whether Welch does or does nothave a claim. We determine only whether the circuit court is the appropriateforum for bringing her claim.

Welch next contends that the trial court erred in granting defendants'motion to dismiss count II on the ground of preemption of the Human Rights Act(775 ILCS 5/8--111(C) (West 1998)) to the extent that age bias and gender biaswere pleaded as motivating factors. Welch asserts that the trial courterroneously applied Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill. 2d 511 (1997).

If a common-law action is in essence one that seeks redress for a "civilrights violation" as defined by the Human Rights Act and there is no basis forthe action other than the Human Rights Act, the circuit court lacks jurisdictionto adjudicate the claim. See Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d507, 516 (1994). Whether the circuit court may exercise jurisdiction over a tortclaim depends upon whether the tort claim is inextricably linked to a civilrights violation such that there is no independent basis for the action apartfrom the Human Rights Act itself. Maksimovic, 177 Ill. 2d at 517.

In Geise, the plaintiff alleged that her employer negligently hired andretained a manager who sexually harassed the plaintiff. Geise, 159 Ill. 2d at511-12. The court held that, but for the Human Rights Act's proscription againstsexual harassment, the plaintiff would have had no legally cognizable claimagainst her employer. Geise, 159 Ill. 2d at 517. Absent the Human Rights Act'sprohibition of sexual harassment, the employer's hiring and retention of anemployee whose conduct created a hostile work environment would not have been anactionable tort. The court held that such tort claims were in essence claims ofa "civil rights violation" and, accordingly, could be brought before the HumanRights Commission only. Geise, 159 Ill. 2d at 518.

Contrary to Geise, in Maksimovic the tort claims of assault, battery, andfalse imprisonment existed separately from a cause of action for sexualharassment under the Human Rights Act. In the assault count, the plaintiffalleged that her manager threatened to "give her a stiff one up the ass," orderedher to perform oral sex on him, commented on her breasts, and accused her ofbeing too friendly with the customers. Maksimovic, 177 Ill. 2d at 515. In thebattery count, the plaintiff alleged that the manager placed his hand under herskirt and grabbed her leg, grabbed her buttocks, and touched her while attemptingto kiss her. In the false imprisonment count, the plaintiff alleged that themanager confined her in a walk-in cooler where he made sexual advances towardher. The court found that the sexual harassment aspect of the case was merelyincidental to what were otherwise ordinary common-law tort claims. Maksimovic,177 Ill. 2d at 517. The court held that, to the extent that the plaintiffalleged the elements of each of the torts without reference to legal dutiescreated by the Human Rights Act, she had established a basis for imposingliability on the defendants independent of the Human Rights Act. Maksimovic, 177Ill. 2d at 517.

The issue in this case then is whether Welch's claim of tortiousinterference is inextricably linked to her claim of age and gender bias. Welchargues that she does not claim damages arising solely from the breach of a legalduty arising under the Human Rights Act but from the wrongful interference witha contract of employment and, to the extent that age and gender were alleged asimproper motivating factors, contends that these were merely incidental and notinextricably linked to the Human Rights Act. We disagree.

To establish intentional interference with a contract, the plaintiff mustshow (1) a valid contract; (2) that the defendant was aware of the contract; (3)the defendant's intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach; (4) asubsequent breach caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct; and (5) resultingdamages. HPI Health Care Services, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hospital, Inc., 131 Ill.2d 145, 154-55 (1989). As Welch's employer, Justice Heiple is protected by aqualified privilege. See Vajda v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 253 Ill. App. 3d 345,358-59 (1993). Welch must therefore show that Justice Heiple's actions wereunjustified or malicious. HPI, 131 Ill. 2d at 156. The purpose alleged in thecomplaint for Justice Heiple's actions is based on age and gender discrimination. Discriminations on the basis of age and gender are civil rights violations. 775ILCS 5/1--102, 2--102 (West 1998). Based on the allegations in the complaint,Justice Heiple's interference with Welch's contract amounted to wrongful andunjustified conduct prohibited by the Human Rights Act. See Anderson v. Pistner,148 Ill. App. 3d 616, 619-20 (1986)(tortious interference of contract allegingage discrimination preempted by Human Rights Act); Bowers v. Radiological Societyof North America, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 594, 600 (N.D. Ill. 1999)(tortiousinterference of contract against plaintiff's manager alleging sexual harassmentis inextricably linked to Human Rights Act). Because the tortious interferencecharge cannot stand alone without the improper motivation of conduct prohibitedby the Human Rights Act, the claim is inextricably linked to the Human RightsAct, which provides Welch with an exclusive remedy. We therefore affirm thecourt's order dismissing count II as preempted by the Human Rights Act.

Welch next appears to assert that Justice Heiple should be judiciallyestopped from claiming that the Human Rights Act preempts her claims based on ageand gender discrimination. Welch argues that Justice Heiple cannot claim thatpreemption applies here because he allegedly claimed in another proceeding thathe could not be sued individually under the Human Rights Act.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel is flexible and not reducible to aformula. However, the following five elements are generally necessary: (1) thetwo positions must be taken by the same party; (2) the positions must be takenin judicial proceedings; (3) the positions must be given under oath; (4) theparty must have successfully maintained the first position and received somebenefit; and (5) the two positions must be totally inconsistent. Bidani v.Lewis, 285 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550 (1996).

Apparently, Welch filed a motion to amend her complaint before the HumanRights Commission to add Justice Heiple as an individual party pursuant tosection 6--101(B) of the Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/6--101(B) (West 1996)). Defendants, the Illinois Supreme Court and the Third District, objected becauseJustice Heiple was not an employer as defined in the Human Rights Act (775 ILCS5/2--101(B)(1) (West 1996)) and Welch's charge of gender discrimination couldonly be brought against an employer (see 775 ILCS 5/2--102(A) (West 1996). Theadministrative law judge agreed and denied Welch's motion to amend her complaint.

We find no evidence of judicial estoppel. Justice Heiple's position in thepresent case is not totally inconsistent with the previous position taken by thesupreme court and the Third District before the Human Rights Commission. In thepresent case, Justice Heiple does not claim now that he can be sued under theHuman Rights Act on the basis of sexual harassment. He claims that the HumanRights Act preempts Welch's claims of discrimination based on age and gender.

Welch last contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denyingher motion to amend count I. We note again that Welch does not contend that thebreach of contract claim of count I as originally pleaded should be brought inthe circuit court. Welch asserts that the proposed amended claim in count Icured the jurisdictional deficiencies by seeking declaratory and equitable relieffor a continuing wrong and damages not solely for past conduct.

The right to amend is not absolute. Lake County Grading Co. ofLibertyville, Inc. v. Advance Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d452, 460 (1995). A trial court should consider several factors in determiningwhether to permit an amendment, including, inter alia, whether the amendmentwould cure a defect in the pleading. Lake County Grading, 275 Ill. App. 3d at460. The decision whether to grant leave to amend a pleading rests within thesound discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on reviewabsent an abuse of that discretion. Lake County Grading, 275 Ill. App. 3d at461.

It is well established that a breach of contract claim against the Stateis a present claim for relief barred by sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Smith v.Jones, 113 Ill. 2d 126, 132-33 (1986). Claims for prospective relief, such asan injunction to prevent a State official from taking action in excess of hisdelegated authority, are not barred by sovereign immunity. Senn Park NursingCenter v. Miller, 104 Ill. 2d 169, 189 (1984).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the proposed amended complaint. Welch alleged in her amended complaint that she was offered employment as aresearch attorney for the Third District at a salary of $39,464 per year; that,in consideration, she agreed to transfer from her position as law clerk; thatWelch began work as a research attorney; that Welch had a valid, binding,enforceable contract of employment; that the supreme court ratified an act oftortious interference with the employment agreement by reducing her salary to$32,571; that the supreme court has refused to correct her salary and reinstateher at the rate she is entitled to pursuant to the employment agreement; thatWelch has sustained mental suffering and damages in excess of $50,000, plus lossof use of salary at an annual rate in excess of $8,000, plus loss of pensionbenefits in excess of $50,000; and that the supreme court has claimed sovereignimmunity from her damages. Welch asks the court to enter judgment declaring theparties' rights and duties under the agreement, declaring that the supreme courtunlawfully withheld the difference between the salary contracted for, declaringthat Welch is entitled to cost-of-living raises granted to research attorneysstatewide, and further declaring that the supreme court is jointly and severallyliable for all damages sustained by Welch as a consequence of Justice Heiple'sact of tortious interference with contract.

The characterization of an action depends upon the factual underpinningsof the case and the law necessary to arrive at a conclusion. President LincolnHotel Venture v. Bank One, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1057 (1995). A review of bothcomplaints reveals that the thrust of the amended claim remained a claim fordamages for breach of contract. We agree with defendants that there is no realdifference between a declaration that Welch had a contractual right to be paidthe salary she was offered in 1994 and a damage award entitling her to thatamount. In substance, the factual allegations of Welch's complaint are that thesupreme court exceeded its authority by breaching the employment contract andWelch's action is one seeking to enforce the terms of the contract. Welch'sclaim, therefore, alleges a breach of contract. Such a claim is one against theState, barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and must be brought in theCourt of Claims.

Other courts have rejected the plaintiffs' efforts to cast breach ofcontract claims in equitable terms to avoid sovereign immunity. In Children'sMemorial Hospital v. Mueller, 141 Ill. App. 3d 951, 955-56 (1986), the courtfound that, although the plaintiffs' claims were stated in terms ofindemnification and framed as an action for declaratory judgment, both complaintsindicated that the principal relief sought against the Department of Children andFamily Services was a present claim for money damages, subjecting the State topossible liability, which was barred by sovereign immunity. Cf. PresidentLincoln Hotel, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 1053, 1057 (complaint seeking declaratoryjudgment, injunctive relief, and specific performance against State Treasurer isa contract action against State within recognized exception to bar of sovereignimmunity); Brucato v. Edgar, 128 Ill. App. 3d 260, 267 (1984)(although prayer forrelief framed in equitable terms, the relief sought is substantively a claim formonetary damages from the State arising from a contract with the State).

Welch argues that her proposed claim alleged a continuing wrong and thedamages are not solely for past conduct. Welch cites Rockford Memorial Hospitalv. Department of Human Rights, 272 Ill. App. 3d 751 (1995). However, in RockfordHospital, the Department of Human Rights was investigating a discriminationcharge over which it had no jurisdiction, and the plaintiff sought a declaratoryjudgment and injunction to bar the investigation. Unlike Welch's present claimfor relief, which arose from the original breach, the claim in Rockford Hospitalfits squarely within the prospective injunctive relief exception. See RockfordMemorial, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 757.

Welch cites E.H. Swenson & Son v. Lorenz, 36 Ill. 2d 382 (1967) in supportof her argument that a cause of action for declaratory judgment may be maintainedin the circuit court to determine a State agency's liability for unlawfullywithholding amounts due under a contract. Contrary to the allegations of thecomplaint in the present case, there the action was, in essence, a review of thelegality of the defendants' withholding of funds from plaintiffs and, as such,was not a suit against the State. E.H. Swenson, 36 Ill. 2d at 385.

Welch argues that the trial court erred in considering only whether theproposed amendment cured the jurisdictional problem. Welch asserts that thetrial court failed to consider whether (1) no other opportunity to amend couldbe identified; (2) no surprise or prejudice would be sustained by defendants bypermitting an amendment; and (3) Welch's requests to amend were timely. We findno abuse of discretion. Where it is apparent that even after amendment no causeof action can be stated, leave to amend should be denied. See City of Elgin v.County of Cook, 169 Ill. 2d 53, 71-72 (1995). Accordingly, because the proposedamendment would still have been barred by sovereign immunity, the trial court didnot abuse its discretion in denying Welch's motion to amend.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of LaSalle County.

Affirmed.

GEIGER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.