JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs Lisa Wren and Cathy Foiles, volunteerfirefighters, filed suit after the fire truck they were riding onwas involved in an accident. The trial court granted summaryjudgment in favor of defendants Reddick Community Fire ProtectionDistrict (the District) and William Mikeska. Plaintiffs' appealswere consolidated by this court. We reverse and remand.

On September 27, 1998, a brush fire was reported inLivingston County, Illinois. The District, along with other areafire departments, responded to the fire. Soon after arriving,one of the District's fire trucks left due to the apparentlymistaken belief that the truck needed more water to fight thefire. Defendant Mikeska drove the truck while Wren and Foilesstood on the running boards along the side of the truck. Thefire truck was subsequently involved in a collision at anintersection with a car driven by defendant Lucretia Moulton. Wren and Foiles filed suit against the District, Mikeska andMoulton seeking damages for their injuries sustained in theaccident.

Soon after the accident, plaintiffs' medical bills began tobe paid by the District's workers' compensation insurancecarrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Liberty eventuallypaid $33,974.37 to 15 medical providers on behalf of Wren, and$49,344.18 to 22 medical providers on behalf of Foiles. Foilesalso received temporary total disability (TTD) payments for 645/7 weeks, totaling $9,568.68.

Wren filed her initial complaint against defendants,alleging negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct, in Februaryof 1999; Foiles filed her complaint in March of 1999. Bothplaintiffs also filed claims for workers' compensation benefitsshortly before the statute of limitations for such claims wasabout to expire: Wren filed on August 30, 2001; Foiles filed onSeptember 25, 2001.

Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on the basis,inter alia, that plaintiffs' complaints were barred by theexclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (theAct) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Following a hearing,the trial court granted defendants' motions, stating:

"THE COURT: Now as to Miss Foiles sheacknowledges applying for and has receivedbenefits under the [workers' compensation]act. And since she gets no alternativerelief by virtue of willful and wanton on theparties defendant, she has no standing topursue a common law claim. And the motionfor summary judgment entered by theDefendants involving Miss Foiles is allowed.

Now we take a look at Miss Wren. Therehas been suggested that there is a genuineissue of material fact in the Wren case as towhether or not she's employed. That's notreally the issue here. Did Miss Wren applyfor and receive Workers' Comp Act benefits? If she applied and it's suggested that sheapplied only to protect her potential rights,well maybe so, maybe not. But she did acceptapproximately $34,000 in medical benefitsfrom the employer's insurer. Did she give itback? I don't think so. She acceptedbenefits, albeit not TTD, but she did get hermeds, 34 thousand in change worth. Shedidn't give it back. Maybe she didn't applyuntil sometime during or after havingreceived these meds, but I don't think thatthat's really critical in this particularinstance. Because she, too, has filed for,chronology notwithstanding, and acceptedmedical benefits. And having done so, Isuggest that her employee status is not atissue. She took the money." (Emphasisadded.)

Immediately thereafter, counsel for Wren asked the courtwhether the court was making a finding that Wren and Foiles were"employees" under the Workers' Compensation Act. The courtresponded:

"THE COURT: The Court would rule thatby virtue of both of them having acceptedbenefits under the Workers' Comp Act that Iwould classify both of them without furtherado as employees.

MR. YURGINE [Wren's counsel]: Okay. because of the fact that they acceptedbenefits.

THE COURT: Exactly.

THE COURT: They both accepted benefitsand they both applied for benefits. And thewillful and wanton issue doesn't have to bedealt with. The exclusivity clause bars anycommon law claim even for willful and wantonconduct. That's my ruling and I would askthe movant's to prepare the appropriateorders."

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings,depositions, admission, affidavits and exhibits on file, viewedin the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show thatthere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that themoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 1998): Petrovich v. Share Health Plan ofIllinois, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 17, 719 N.E.2d 756 (1999). Becauseit is a drastic means of disposing of litigation, summaryjudgment should not be allowed unless the moving party's right tojudgment is clear and free from doubt. Busch v. Graphic ColorCorp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 662 N.E.2d 397 (1996). A trial court'sruling granting summary judgment is subject to de novo review. Petrovich, 188 Ill. 2d 17, 719 N.E.2d 756; Busch, 169 Ill. 2d325, 662 N.E.2d 397.

We initially note that, perhaps because of the trial court'scomment that it would "classify both [plaintiffs] without furtherado as employees," most of the parties' efforts and arguments onappeal have been misdirected. The issue is not whetherplaintiffs, as volunteer firefighters, are employees of theDistrict for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. Thedetermination of whether there is an employer-employeerelationship is ordinarily a question of fact (Saldana v. WirtzCartage Co., 74 Ill. 2d 379, 385 N.E.2d 664 (1978); Pearson v.Industrial Comm'n, 318 Ill. App. 3d 932, 743 N.E.2d 685 (2001)),unless there is no conflict in the evidence and only oneconclusion can reasonably be drawn (Pearson, 318 Ill. App. 3d932, 743 N.E.2d 685). Although the fact that plaintiffs areunpaid volunteers weighs heavily toward a finding that plaintiffsare not employees (see Board of Education of City of Chicago v.Industrial Comm'n, 53 Ill. 2d 167, 290 N.E.2d 247 (1972)(employer-employee relationship generally does not exist in theabsence of payment or consideration in some form)), "[t]he courtshave repeatedly held that there is no single fact that controlsthe existence or nonexistence of an employment relationship"(Village of Creve Coeur v. Industrial Comm'n, 32 Ill. 2d 430,432, 206 N.E.2d 706, 708 (1965)). A proper determination ofemployee status requires consideration of such additional factorsas the right to control the manner in which the work is done, theright to discharge, the skill required to do the work, and thefurnishing of tools, material and equipment. Creve Coeur, 32Ill. 2d 430, 206 N.E.2d 706.

Accordingly, a ruling by the trial court that plaintiffswere employees simply because they accepted workers' compensationbenefits would be erroneous as a matter of law. Of course, sucha ruling would also be inconsistent with the court's earliercomments that employee status was "not at issue." Nevertheless,it is the correctness of the court's decision, not its rationale,that is at issue on appeal. In re Marriage of Lange, 307 Ill.App. 3d 303, 717 N.E.2d 507 (1999). Here, that decision was togrant summary judgment to the defendants on the basis thatplaintiffs had applied for and accepted workers' compensationbenefits. A substantial body of case law exists supporting sucha ruling. See Fregeau v. Gillespie, 96 Ill. 2d 479, 451 N.E.2d870 (1983); Rhodes v. Industrial Comm'n, 92 Ill. 2d 467, 442N.E.2d 509 (1982); Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 81 Ill. 2d229, 408 N.E.2d 198 (1980); Wells v. Enloe, 282 Ill. App. 3d 586,669 N.E.2d 368 (1996); Zurowska v. Berlin Industries, Inc., 282Ill. App. 3d 540, 667 N.E.2d 588 (1996); Vance v. Wentling, 249Ill. App. 3d 867, 619 N.E.2d 902 (1993); Miller v. Miller, 167Ill. App. 3d 176, 521 N.E.2d 229 (1988). As explained in Wells:

"Our supreme court has clearly ruledthat an injured employee who applies for andaccepts workers' compensation benefits,whether through a settlement or an award,cannot thereafter also recover civil damagesfrom the employer for the same injury. Wherean injured employee collects benefits on thebasis that his injures are compensable underthe Workers' Compensation Act, that employeecannot thereafter properly allege that thosesame injuries fall outside the provisions ofthe Workers' Compensation Act. [Citation.]The rationale behind the rule is to preventdouble recovery and the proliferation oflitigation. [Citation.]

However, there is nothing to prevent thecautious employee from filing a common lawaction at the same time the claim forworkers' compensation benefits is pending. [Citation.] Nevertheless, if the employeereceives payment from the employer for hisinjuries, whether through settlement,judgment, or award and whether in the commonlaw action or in the workers' compensationaction, he is thereafter precluded from alsoreceiving an award from the employer for thesame injury in the alternative forum." Wells, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 596-97, 669 N.E.2dat 375-76.

Plaintiffs argue that they are not precluded from filingsuit, despite having accepted workers' compensation benefits,because they are not employees of the District. In plaintiffs'view, the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' CompensationAct does not apply to one not subject to the Act.

We believe that plaintiffs construe the above cited casestoo narrowly. In Miller the plaintiff contended that hisacceptance of workers' compensation benefits should not precludehim from filing a lawsuit because he was an independentcontractor, not an employee. The court rejected plaintiff'sargument, finding that his employment status had beenconclusively determined by his actions in the workers'compensation action. Miller, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 179-80, 521N.E.2d at 231. In Collier the court stated that "where anemployee *** has collected compensation on the basis that hisinjuries were compensable under the act, the injured employeecannot then allege that those injuries fall outside the act'sprovisions. We base this conclusion not only upon a fear ofdouble recovery [citation], but also upon our desire to preventthe proliferation of litigation." Collier, 81 Ill. 2d at 241,408 N.E.2d at 204.

In other words, applying for and accepting benefits underthe Act does not transform a nonemployee into an employee. Instead it acts as a form of estoppel, denying a plaintiff whohas availed herself of the benefits of the Act from thereafterasserting that she falls outside its reach. See Esposito v. DiorBuilders, 274 Ill. App. 3d 338, 653 N.E.2d 921 (1995); Paluch v.Dever, 243 Ill. App. 3d 334, 612 N.E.2d 36 (1993). Nevertheless,"the voluntary acceptance of workers' compensation payments,without any affirmative act to seek those benefits, does notnecessarily operate to bar the recovery of civil damages againstthe employer or coemployee." Wells, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 597, 669N.E.2d at 376, citing Copass v. Illinois Power Co., 211 Ill. App.3d 205, 569 N.E.2d 1211 (1991).

In Copass plaintiff's husband was killed while working on agas pipeline. Plaintiff was subsequently informed by herhusband's employer that she was eligible for workers'compensation benefits. Plaintiff thereafter received weeklydeath benefits and payment for funeral expenses totaling morethan $21,000. Although plaintiff never filed a claim forbenefits, her attorney contacted the claim supervisor,questioning how he had calculated the average weekly wage underthe Act. The Copass court held that plaintiff's receipt ofbenefits did not bar her wrongful death action, stating:

"We hold the uninitiated paymentsplaintiff accepted from Illinois Power arenot sufficient to constitute her election tothe benefits provided by the Act. Simplyaccepting voluntary payments from IllinoisPower, without taking any affirmative actionbefore the Commission, is not a clear andunequivocal act evidencing an assertion thatthe death is compensable under the Act. Tohold otherwise would allow employers to sendpayments to injured parties or bereavedfamilies, characterize the payments asworkers' compensation benefits, and terminateany option the employee or family might haveto avoid the exclusivity-of-remedy rule underthe Act." Copass, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 211-12, 569 N.E.2d at 1215.

Similarly in this case, the benefits received by theplaintiffs in the form of payment of medical bills and TTDpayments were made voluntarily by the District's insurancecarrier. Foiles filed an affidavit averring that neither she norher attorney had solicited or requested the benefits shereceived. Wrenn likewise testified at her deposition that shehad not requested payment of her medical bills. Under suchcircumstances, we believe that mere acceptance of the unsolicitedbenefits offered by the District was insufficient to barplaintiffs' common law claims.

Moreover, we do not believe that plaintiffs have foregonetheir right to sue by filing workers' compensation claims in2001. In Rhodes our supreme court stated that while a person maynot recover payment from an employer by means of both a workers'compensation claim and a common law action, "there is nothing toprevent a cautious employee who has a pending workmen'scompensation claim from also filing a common law action, if he isuncertain of his grounds for recovery, so as to toll the statuteof limitations." Rhodes, 92 Ill. 2d at 471, 442 N.E.2d at 511. Conversely, we believe that nothing should prohibit a cautiousplaintiff with a pending lawsuit from also filing a workers'compensation claim to avoid the bar of the statute oflimitations. That is precisely what plaintiffs did in this case.

In summary, a party who seeks and accepts workers'compensation benefits is prohibited from subsequently filing suitagainst the provider of those benefits. This rule applies evenwhere the party receiving benefits is not an employee. One maynot reap the benefits of the Act and then deny its applicability. However, a party may accept benefits voluntarily offered, and mayeven file a claim for benefits to protect her rights. It is onlywhen one actively seeks benefits and obtains them as a result ofthose efforts that she is barred from pursuing a common lawclaim. Therefore the trial court erred in granting summaryjudgment to the defendants.

For the reasons stated above, the judgments of the circuitcourt are reversed and these causes are remanded for furtherproceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

McDADE, P.J., concurs.

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring:

I agree that the trial court's judgment should be reversed. I write separately, however, because I believe the majority'sanalysis is overly convoluted.

When granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, thetrial judge made comments supporting two bases for barringplaintiffs' common law actions: (1) that plaintiffs wereemployees for workers' compensation purposes, and thus subject tothe exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act,merely because they accepted workers' compensation benefits; and(2) that plaintiffs elected a workers' compensation remedyregardless of whether an employment relationship existed. Neither of these bases is valid.

First, merely accepting workers' compensation benefits doesnot render someone an employee for purposes of the Workers'Compensation Act. Employment status depends on various factorslike remuneration, the right to control, the right to discharge,the skills required, and who furnished the equipment. Village ofCreve Coeur v. Industrial Comm'n, 32 Ill. 2d 430 (1965). Second,the election of remedies doctrine does not bar a common lawaction if the plaintiff merely accepted unsolicited workerscompensation benefits. See Copass v. Illinois Power Co., 211Ill. App. 3d 205 (1991). That is all the instant plaintiffs did. As the majority aptly notes, plaintiffs cannot be faulted fortheir subsequent caution in filing workers' compensation claimsas the limitations deadline approached.

For these simple reasons, the trial judge's bases forgranting summary judgment were invalid.