JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, David and Christine Albers, individually andon behalf of their son Shea Albers, filed a two-count complaintagainst defendants Melissa Breen, the Rural Champaign Special Education Cooperative (Cooperative), Steven Fink, and the Board of Education of Gifford Community Consolidated Grade School District No. 188(Board) for alleged violations of the Mental Health and DevelopmentalDisabilities Confidentiality Act (Confidentiality Act) (740 ILCS110/1 through 17 (West 2002)). Defendants filed motions to dismiss,and the circuit court dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice. We affirm.

According to the complaint, in early 2002 Shea Albers wasin the seventh grade at Gifford Grade School. Sometime beforeFebruary 25, 2002, three male students bullied him (the complaintdoes not say how). On February 25, Christine, Shea's mother, complained about the bullying to defendant Steven Fink, who was theprincipal of the school and superintendent of the school district. Christine did not tell Fink the names of the three bullies.

Because the bullying made Shea reluctant to go to school,Christine called the school on February 27, seeking the assistance ofa social worker to counsel her son. Melissa Breen, an employee ofdefendant Cooperative, worked as a social worker providing servicesto the students at Gifford Grade School. Responding to Christine'scall, Breen contacted her and made arrangements to counsel Shea. Christine told Breen that Fink wanted to know the names of the threebullies but that Shea did not wish to reveal them. Based on Breen'srepresentation that she would not share their names with Fink,Christine told Breen who the three boys were.

Later that day, Breen met with Shea. She promised himthat nobody would find out that he had revealed the names of theboys. Nevertheless, without authorization, Breen later told Finktheir names. On or about March 6, 2002, Fink revealed to one of thethree bullies that Shea had complained about him. Because of thesedisclosures by Breen and then Fink, the complaint alleges, Sheasuffered emotional distress. This in turn required private counseling, and Shea was also forced to attend a different school thefollowing year.

Count I of the complaint alleged that Breen's disclosureof the bullies' names to Fink and his subsequent disclosure to one ofthe bullies violated the Confidentiality Act. Count II soughtdamages under the Rights of Married Persons Act, sometimes referredto as the Family Expense Act (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2002)), for theexpenses of private counseling, tuition, and travel, allegedlyresulting from Breen's and Fink's disclosures. The alleged liabilities of the Cooperative and the Board derive respectively fromBreen's and Fink's disclosures.

Breen and the Cooperative filed a motion to dismiss undersections 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2002)) and 2-619 (735 ILCS5/2-619 (West 2002)) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Procedure Code). They argued that they were protected from suit under the Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/11(ii) (West 2002)), the Local Governmentaland Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2002)), and the School Code (105 ILCS 5/24-24(West 2002)).

Along with the section 2-619 motion, they submitted anaffidavit from Breen. In the affidavit, Breen stated that she was alicensed school social worker and the only social worker at theschool district. She reported to assistant principal Linda Hicks andto Fink. On or about February 27, 2002, Christine told her that Sheawas being bullied and was depressed, and she asked Breen to speak tohim. Breen told Christine that she would not tell the boys that Sheahad identified them. She met with Shea that day for approximately 10minutes. The affidavit stated further that Breen ordinarily does notcounsel a student on the first meeting and did not consider this tobe counseling. At this meeting, Shea told her he had been shoved andkicked.

Based on speaking with Christine and with Shea, Breen"assessed that Shea was at risk of further immediate, serious, andongoing harm." She therefore told Fink about the bullying. She alsotold him that she had promised Shea that she would not tell the boysthat Shea had identified them. She never did tell the boys thisinformation.

Fink and the Board also filed a section 2-619 motion todismiss, raising defenses under the Confidentiality Act, the TortImmunity Act, and the School Code. These defendants submitted anaffidavit from Fink, in which he stated that when he spoke toChristine on February 25, she did not know the names of the bulliesbut said she would get them. When he and Breen later met with two ofthe bullies on March 6 and one of them denied the bullyingallegations, Fink told them that it involved Shea Albers. Both boyswere given detentions, and on March 12, Fink gave the third boy adetention. Fink also stated in the affidavit that when he mentionedShea to the boys, he believed it was necessary to protect Shea fromphysical and mental injury.

Plaintiffs responded by moving to strike several parts ofBreen's and Fink's affidavits, largely on the ground that theaffidavits were an attempt to negate essential allegations of thecomplaint. In support, they included an affidavit from Christine, inwhich she stated that she had attempted to get private counseling forShea, but because she could not get an appointment for several weeksshe had arranged to have Breen counsel him in the interim. She alsostated that when she picked up Shea from school on March 6, he wasupset because two of the bullies had been given detention. Christineimmediately talked to Fink, who admitted he had disclosed Shea'sidentity to the boys. On March 8, she talked to Breen about why sheand Fink had handled the situation as they had; Breen responded thatshe had attended a February 28 workshop on bullying, where she hadlearned that schools should take aggressive action when dealing withbullying. Christine's affidavit further stated that Fink was onvacation from February 27 to March 5 and that Breen told him aboutthe bullying as soon as he returned.

The trial court heard arguments concerning the motions todismiss and dismissed both counts of the complaint with prejudice. In doing so, the court also denied plaintiffs' motions to strikeportions of the affidavits. The court ruled that Breen and theCooperative were immune from suit under the Confidentiality Act (740ILCS 110/11(ii) (West 2002)) and Fink and the Board under the TortImmunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2002)). It did not reachwhether the School Code applied and did not explicitly rule onwhether Breen was also protected by the Tort Immunity Act. The courtdenied Breen's motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the ProcedureCode. Plaintiffs now appeal the dismissal of the complaint as toboth sets of defendants.

We review de novo the granting of a motion for involuntarydismissal under section 2-619 of the Procedure Code. Kedzie & 103rdCurrency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116, 619 N.E.2d732, 735 (1993). In considering such a motion, the court takes allwell-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draws all reasonableinferences from those facts in favor of plaintiff. Calloway v.Kinkelaar, 168 Ill. 2d 312, 325, 659 N.E.2d 1322, 1329 (1995).

Under section 2-619, a defendant may raise "affirmativematter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim." 735ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2002). This affirmative matter may notnegate the essential allegations of the plaintiff's cause of action(Rogalla v. Christie Clinic, P.C., 341 Ill. App. 3d 410, 422, 794N.E.2d 384, 395 (2003)) but may include defenses such as immunity(Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15, 198 Ill.2d 475, 479, 763 N.E.2d 756, 759 (2002)).

The Confidentiality Act is implicated whenever a"communication" is made to a "therapist," as those words are definedin the Confidentiality Act. A "therapist" includes a "social worker*** providing mental health or developmental disabilities services,"which "includes but is not limited to examination, diagnosis,evaluation," and other services. 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2002). Theperson receiving these services is termed a "recipient," and thecommunications protected by the Confidentiality Act are those made byeither the recipient or by another person if made in connection withthe provision of services. 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2002).

When a recipient or other person communicates something toa therapist, that communication must thereafter be kept confidential,except where the Confidentiality Act specifically allows disclosure. 740 ILCS 110/3(a) (West 2002). The specific exception at issue inthis case is found in section 11, which reads in part as follows:

"Records and communications may bedisclosed:

*** (ii) when, and to the extent, a therapist,in his or her sole discretion, determines thatdisclosure is necessary to *** protect therecipient or other person against a clear,imminent risk of serious physical or mentalinjury or disease or death being inflicted uponthe recipient or by the recipient on himself oranother[.]" 740 ILCS 110/11 (West 2002).

Under section 11, the good faith of a therapist who disclosesinformation "shall be presumed." 740 ILCS 110/11 (West 2002).

Before considering whether Breen was protected by thisprovision, we address what plaintiffs perceive as a defect in hermotion to dismiss. In the circuit court, Breen argued that theConfidentiality Act should not apply to her because she is not atherapist as the Confidentiality Act uses that term. In her motionto dismiss, however, she simply asserted that even if she does fitthe Confidentiality Act's definition, she is protected by section 11. Plaintiffs insist that Breen may not claim this protection while atthe same time stating in her affidavit that she did not believe hermeeting with Shea should be called counseling. Plaintiffs cite Smithv. Ashley, 29 Ill. App. 3d 932, 935, 332 N.E.2d 32, 34 (1975), forthe proposition that a party may not use an affidavit to contradictunequivocal statements made in a deposition.

While we have no objection to that rule, we disagree thatit applies to this case. Breen's affidavit contains allegations thatare arguably inconsistent with the factual basis for plaintiffs'case, but Breen certainly has not directly contradicted herself underoath. In any case, Breen's motion to dismiss does not argue that sheis not a therapist; rather, it properly assumes for the purpose ofthe motion that she is a therapist and asserts that she is entitledto an exemption from liability applicable to therapists. Plaintiffshave not convinced us that this is anything but an ordinary use of amotion to dismiss.

Turning to the substance of Breen's defense, we concludethat the trial court correctly found that she was protected undersection 11. The statute leaves it in the therapist's "solediscretion" to decide whether disclosing otherwise-protectedinformation is necessary to protect the recipient of services fromharm and requires us to presume that she made the determination ingood faith. 740 ILCS 110/11 (West 2002). According to Breen'saffidavit, Shea told her he was being "shoved and kicked" by theother boys; and as a result, she believed he was at risk of furtherharm. She therefore informed Fink about the bullying. Nothing inthe record contradicts these assertions, and they place Breen'sconduct within the protection of section 11. Christine's ownaffidavit actually reinforces Breen's conclusion; in it, she statedthat Shea told her "he would rather be dead than go to school"because of the bullying. Although inconclusive, this statementsuggests that Shea thought he might suffer harm from returning toschool.

Plaintiffs argue that they have at least raised a questionof material fact as to whether section 11 applies. Such a questionwould preclude dismissal. See Cunningham v. Huffman, 223 Ill. App.3d 878, 886, 585 N.E.2d 1140, 1145 (1992) (motion may be granted onlyif there is no issue of material fact). Plaintiffs argue that therecord does not establish the details of who bullied Shea, when theydid it, how, or to what extent. Unfortunately, this argument isaddressed to the wrong question: the precise nature of the clear,imminent risk of serious harm to Shea or another person. Althoughsuch detail is no doubt useful to a therapist in deciding whether sheshould disclose confidential information, we are aware of norequirement that she know every detail before making that decision.

Plaintiffs also argue that there is a question of fact asto whether Breen disclosed the bullies' names in good faith. Although good faith is presumed under the statute (740 ILCS 110/11(West 2002)), that presumption may in some instances be overcome. Poulos v. Lutheran Social Services of Illinois, Inc., 312 Ill. App.3d 731, 744, 728 N.E.2d 547, 559 (2000). Plaintiffs assert thatbecause Breen told Christine she would not disclose the names of thebullies, her later disclosure was made in bad faith. We disagree. Even if Breen misled Christine, as we must assume in evaluating themotion to dismiss, this has little bearing on whether she believedthat reporting to Fink was necessary for Shea's protection. The goodfaith presumed by the statute must refer not to plaintiffs' generalnotions of fairness but to the reasons underlying a therapist'sdisclosure of information.

We conclude that the trial court correctly granted Breenand the Cooperative's motion to dismiss based on section 11 of theConfidentiality Act. We therefore do not address argumentsconcerning the Tort Immunity Act or the School Code as they pertainto these two defendants.

We now turn to the Tort Immunity Act, however, because itwas the basis on which the trial court granted Fink and the Board'smotion to dismiss. Section 2-201 provides as follows:

"Except as otherwise provided by[s]tatute, a public employee serving in aposition involving the determination of policyor the exercise of discretion is not liable foran injury resulting from his act or omission indetermining policy when acting in the exerciseof such discretion even though abused." 745ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2002).

This section immunizes public employees from liability where theinjury claimed is the result of a "discretionary policydetermination." Courson v. Danville School District No. 118, 333Ill. App. 3d 86, 88, 775 N.E.2d 1022, 1024 (2002). Becausegovernmental immunity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bearsthe burden of properly proving that the immunity applies to defeatthe plaintiff's claim. Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill.2d 359, 370, 799 N.E.2d 273, 280 (2003). The defense must beapparent on the face of the complaint or else supported by affidavitsor other evidentiary materials. Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 377, 799N.E.2d at 284.

Before proceeding further, we must address plaintiffs'argument that this immunity provision does not apply to our casebecause it is trumped by the Confidentiality Act. Quoting the words"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by [s]tatute," plaintiffs contendthat Fink is not protected by the Tort Immunity Act because theConfidentiality Act has "otherwise provided." See 745 ILCS 10/2-201(West 2002). Accepting this argument would mean that publicemployees could never be immune under section 2-201 from a statutorycause of action, unless the statute specifically stated that it didnot override section 2-201. That cannot be right. Plaintiffs'reading would turn section 2-201 from a generally applicable immunityprovision into one that applied only if the General Assemblyremembered to reincorporate it into each new statute establishing acause of action. We decline to adopt plaintiffs' interpretation ofsection 2-201.

Plaintiffs also argue that the Tort Immunity Act is notapplicable because the Confidentiality Act has its own more specificimmunity provisions. They cite Brock v. Anderson Road Ass'n, 287Ill. App. 3d 16, 22, 677 N.E.2d 985, 990 (1997) (Second District),which held that the most specific and recently enacted of threedifferent immunity provisions applied to emergency medicaltechnicians who had treated a patient. Plaintiffs believe thatbecause section 11 of the Confidentiality Act provides a form ofimmunity to that Act's liability provisions, it should displace theTort Immunity Act in this case.

We are not persuaded by this argument. The court in Brockapparently believed that two different immunity provisions could notapply to the same defendants and that it was forced to choose. Brock, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 677 N.E.2d at 990. The supremecourt's decision in Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d 475, 763 N.E.2d 756, makesclear that this was incorrect. In Arteman, the court held thatsection 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act gave immunity to a schooldistrict even though it may have breached a duty to the plaintiffunder the School Code. Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 487, 763 N.E.2d at764. This was so even though the School Code itself providesimmunity to educators for negligence in situations involvingdiscipline. 105 ILCS 5/24-24 (West 2002); Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at480, 763 N.E.2d at 760. In other words, the immunity provision inthe School Code did not displace the immunity provided by the TortImmunity Act. We conclude that the Tort Immunity Act is similarlyavailable in this case, despite the existence of an immunityprovision in the Confidentiality Act.

Arteman made another point that is relevant in our case byemphasizing that the existence of a duty and the existence of animmunity are separate questions. Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 487, 763N.E.2d at 764. This means that it is entirely possible for a publicdefendant to owe a plaintiff a duty and yet be immune from suit. Whereas plaintiffs here believe that if the Confidentiality Actapplies to Fink he cannot be immune, they are conflating two verydifferent questions. Whether or not he violated the ConfidentialityAct, it is possible that the Tort Immunity Act prevents plaintiffsfrom suing him.

Having established that the Confidentiality Act does notshove aside section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act, we must decidewhether section 2-201 applies to Fink. The provision requires aninquiry into both the public employee's position and the nature ofthe action challenged in a lawsuit. Harinek v. 161 North ClarkStreet Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 341, 692 N.E.2d 1177, 1181(1998). For section 2-201 to apply, the employee's position mayinvolve either formulating policy or exercising discretion; theparticular act or omission challenged must be both a determination ofpolicy and an exercise of discretion. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 341,692 N.E.2d at 1181.

Policy decisions are those that require the public entityor employee to "'balance competing interests and to make a judgmentcall as to what solution will best serve each of those interests.'" Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 342, 692 N.E.2d at 1181, quoting West v.Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11, 588 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (1992). We havelittle doubt that Fink's actions here constituted a policydetermination as the cases have defined it. A school principaldealing with a disciplinary matter must balance competing interests--the confidentiality of his information source, the appropriate levelof punishment, the concerns of all the children's parents, the impactof his decision on the student body generally--and make a judgment asto what balance to strike among them. See Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at342, 692 N.E.2d at 1182; see also Harrison v. Hardin CountyCommunity Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 474, 758N.E.2d 848, 852 (2001) (principal's decision not to allow a studentto leave early to avoid oncoming storm is a policy decision). Fink'saction was therefore a policy decision, but was it discretionary?

An act or omission is discretionary when it is "unique toa particular public office." Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d466, 474, 657 N.E.2d 988, 993 (1995). Discretionary acts are definedpartly by their contrast with ministerial acts, "which a personperforms on a given state of facts in a prescribed manner, inobedience to the mandate of legal authority, and without reference tothe official's discretion as to the propriety of the act." Snyder,167 Ill. 2d at 474, 657 N.E.2d at 993. While the outer limits of thedefinition of "discretionary" are murky, it encompasses a wide rangeof governmental behavior. See, e.g., Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 487,763 N.E.2d 764 (holding that school district decision not to provideroller-blade safety equipment was discretionary and acknowledgingthat a decision not to provide helmets to a school football teamwould be as well); Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d at 474, 758 N.E.2d at 852(principal's refusal to let student leave school early). Certainlythe way that a principal handles an instance of bullying in hisschool falls within the definition; any student who has been sent tothe principal's office could attest that he has broad discretion inhow to handle such situations. Plaintiff Christine recognized theuniqueness of the principal's function when her first response toShea's bullying problem was to report it to Fink. Breen, too,reported the allegations to Fink when she decided that somethingneeded to be done to protect Shea.

We conclude that Fink's decision about how best to handleShea's allegations of bullying constituted a discretionary policydecision. Fink is thus immune under section 2-201 of the TortImmunity Act and would be even if his disclosure of Shea's name tothe other children constituted an abuse of his discretion. 745 ILCS10/2-201 (West 2002). Because Fink is immune, the Board is as well. 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 2002).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

KNECHT, P.J., and TURNER, J., concur.