Alpha Gamma Rho Alumni v. People ex rel. Boylan

SUPREME COURT CASES

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State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-00-0744 Rel

Case Date: 05/21/2001

May 21, 2001

NO. 4-00-0744

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

ALPHA GAMMA RHO ALUMNI; MARK E. ANDER-
SON; WILLIE ANDERSON; APARTMENT MART,
INC.; VICTOR ARMSTRONG; STEPHANIE ANN
BAKER; CHARLES G. BEELER; BLOOMINGTON
FARM MANAGEMENT; BRIDGESTONE/FIRE-
STONE; BROCK OIL; C. EUGENE BURWELL;
JOHN B. BUSCHER; KENNETH BUSH; DANVERS
FARMERS ELEVATOR; JOHN DEFFNER; ROBERT
DENNISON; EUREKA COMPANY; F.F.G. AGRI-
VEST; JAMES L. FANNIN; FIRST OF AMER-
ICA; DONALD R. FRANKE; FUNKS GROVE
GRAIN COMPANY; GROWMARK, INC.; DANIEL
HARMS; ROSE HARMS; DARRELL HARTWEG;
HERITAGE ENTERPRISES, INC.; MARK
HICKS; HICKSATOMIC STATIONS, INC.;
HICKSGAS BLOOMINGTON, INC.; HICKSGAS
COLFAX, INC.; KURT HOEFERLE; MARTIN L.
HOGAN; R. MICHAEL HUNDMAN; LESA
HUNDMAN; JEFFERY HUNT; JOHN KAUFFMAN;
ANNA BLANCHE BUSEY KUNTZ; LAESCH DAIRY
COMPANY; TIM LEMAN; JOHN R. LUEDTKE;
MAGIRL SUPPLY COMPANY; MICHAEL MC-
CLAIN; MCKEY and ROEGGE, INC.; DAVID
H. MILLER; NAPA; O.K. APPLIANCE; DAN-
IEL O'BRIEN; RICHARD OWEN; PARKWAY
MITSUBISHI; CURT PIERCY; JOSEPH L.
POIRIEZ; PONTIAC HICKSGAS, INC.; RED-
BIRD APARTMENT MANAGEMENT, INC.; DEL-
BERT RENGEL; VIRGINIA RENGEL; GORDON
J. SCHERBER; DAVID SEVERINO; SHIRLEY
OIL and SUPPLY COMPANY; ARLEN P. SIEG;
CLEVELAND SMITH; JACK O. SNYDER;
SPRINGWOOD ASSOCIATES, LP; ALICE
STRUBHAR; J. MICHAEL STRUBHAR; JEAN R.
STUBBLEFIELD; GIAN C. SUD; SUNRAY
PORK, LTD.; DON SUTTON; RALPH T.
TURNER; UNION AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE;
DAVID WEAVER; STEPHEN G. WHITE;
CHARLES WILLIAMS; WALLACE L. YODER;
YOUNG AMERICA REALTY,
                         Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                         v.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex
rel. JAMES BOYLAN, County Treasurer
and ex Officio County Collector of
Taxes for McLean County, Illinois;
BLOOMINGTON/NORMAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY;
BLOOMINGTON/NORMAL WATER RECLAMATION
DISTRICT; THE TOWN OF THE CITY OF
BLOOMINGTON; RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP; RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; HEYWORTH PUBLIC LIBRARY DISTRICT; BLOOMINGTON CEMETERY DISTRICT;
THE TOWN OF RANDOLPH; OLYMPIA COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT #16; LEXINGTON
COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT #7; COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT #5 OF McLEAN and WOODFORD COUNTIES; GIBSON CITY-MELVIN-SIBLEY COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT #5E; HEARTLAND COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT #540; THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON; MT. HOPE-FUNKS GROVE LIBRARY DISTRICT; HUDSON COMMUNITY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE TOWN OF NORMAL; THE NORMAL PUBLIC LIBRARY; LAWNDALE TOWNSHIP; McLEAN COUNTY; ALLIN TOWNSHIP; ANCHOR TOWNSHIP;
ARROWSMITH TOWNSHIP; BLOOMINGTON
TOWNSHIP; BLUE MOUND TOWNSHIP;
CHENEY'S GROVE TOWNSHIP; CHENOA TOWN-
SHIP; CROOPSEY TOWNSHIP; DALE TOWNSHIP; DANVERS TOWNSHIP; DAWSON TOWNSHIP; DOWNS TOWNSHIP; DRY GROVE TOWNSHIP; FUNKS GROVE TOWNSHIP; GRIDLEY TOWNSHIP; HUDSON TOWNSHIP; LAWNDALE TOWNSHIP; LEXINGTON TOWNSHIP; MONEY CREEK TOWNSHIP; MARTIN TOWNSHIP; OLD TOWN TOWNSHIP; TOWANDA TOWNSHIP; WEST TOWNSHIP; WHITE OAK TOWNSHIP; YATES TOWNSHIP; ALLIN-DALE MULTI TOWNSHIP; ARROWSMITH-DAWSON MULTI TOWNSHIP; BELLFLOWER-CHENEY'S GROVE-WEST MULTI TOWNSHIP; BLUE MOUND-MARTIN MULTI TOWNSHIP; DOWNS-OLD TOWN MULTI TOWNSHIP; FUNKS GROVE-MOUNT HOPE MULTI TOWNSHIP; LEXINGTON-MONEY CREEK MULTI
TOWNSHIP; ALLIN ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; ANCHOR ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; ARROWSMITH ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; BELLFLOWER ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; BLOOMINGTON ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; BLUE MOUND ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; CHENEY'S GROVE ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; CHENOA ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; CROPSEY ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; DALE ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; DANVERS ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; DAWSON ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; DOWNS ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; DRY GROVE ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; EMPIRE ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; FUNKS GROVE ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; GRIDLEY ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; HUDSON ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; LAWNDALE ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; LEXINGTON
ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; MARTIN ROAD
and BRIDGE DISTRICT; MONEY CREEK ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; MOUNT HOPE ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; OLD TOWN ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; TOWANDA ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; WEST ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; WHITE OAK ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; YATES ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; THE VILLAGE OF ANCHOR; THE VILLAGE OF BELLFLOWER; THE VILLAGE OF CARLOCK; THE CITY OF CHENOA; THE VILLAGE OF COLFAX; THE VILLAGE OF DANVERS; THE VILLAGE OF GRIDLEY; THE CITY OF LEXINGTON; THE VILLAGE OF Mc LEAN; THE ALLIN FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE BLOOMINGTON FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE CARLOCK FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE CHENOA FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE DALE FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE DANVERS FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE DOWNS FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE EL PASO FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE FARMER CITY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE GRIDLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE LEROY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE LEXINGTON FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE NORTHERN PIATT FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE OCTAVIA FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE TOWANDA FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE GOLDEN PRAIRIE LIBRARY DISTRICT; THE GRIDLEY LIBRARY DISTRICT; THE HUDSON AREA LIBRARY DISTRICT; THE LEXINGTON LIBRARY DISTRICT; THE TOWANDA LIBRARY DISTRICT; THE WHITE OAK LIBRARY DISTRICT; THE MOUNT HOPE COMMUNITY BUILDING; THE ALLIN CEMETERY DISTRICT; THE ALLIN TOWNSHIP PARK DISTRICT; THE CHENOA PARK DISTRICT; THE LEROY COMUNITY PARK DISTRICT; THE LEXINGTON PARK DISTRICT; THE OCTAVIA PARK DISTRICT; and THE DANVERS TOWNSHIP WATER AUTHORITY,
                         Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from
Circuit Court of
McLean County
No. 95TX1(30)

Honorable
Ronald C. Dozier,
Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs paid 1994 real-estate taxes under protestand filed objections to the levies of several units of localgovernment in McLean County. Part of plaintiffs' complaintalleged that 73 taxing districts accumulated improper surpluses,invalidating their property-tax levies.

Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the trialcourt granted at an April 24, 1996, hearing. The trial court ruled that plaintiffs had to follow the formula in CentralIllinois Public Service Co. v. Miller, 42 Ill. 2d 542, 248 N.E.2d89 (1969), and that formula needed to be applied on a fund-by-fund basis. The trial court granted leave for plaintiffs toamend their complaint. After plaintiffs filed amended objections, both plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for summaryjudgment on the issue of excess accumulation. At an October 31,1996, hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment todefendants as to funds with an accumulated surplus below theMiller guidelines and as to other funds when defendants filedaffidavits justifying the surplus.

On July 28, 2000, the trial court approved the parties'stipulation setting forth the amount of tax to be refunded byeach taxing entity. The trial court then ordered the countycollector to refund $21,913.86 plus interest. On August 25,2000, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, stating that plaintiffs were appealing:

"from portions of the [f]inal [o]rder entered*** July 28, 2000, in the following particulars:

1. The trial court's order on April 24,1996, granting the dismissal of all of[plaintiffs'] allegations of unlawful accumulation of surplus funds in [f]iremen's[p]ension [f]unds, [p]olicemen's [p]ension[f]unds, the Illinois Retirement Fund, SocialSecurity, and Medicare;

2. The trial court's order on April 24,1996, granting the dismissal of [plaintiffs']allegations of unlawful accumulation of surplus funds in the levies of the home-rulemunicipalities of the Town of Normal and theCity of Bloomington;

3. The trial court's order on October31, 1996, granting summary judgment in favorof the following taxing districts on theissue of illegal accumulation of surplusfunds:

Funks Grove Township (Town Fund)

Lexington Township (Town Fund)

Money Creek Township (Town Fund)

White Oak Township (General Assistance Fund)

Lexington Community Fire Protection District (Operation Fund)

City of Chenoa (General Assistance Fund)."

On November 2, 2000, plaintiffs' attorney made a motion in thiscourt to amend the notice of appeal "to include a couple ofadditional issues to be appealed." We allowed the motion, andplaintiffs filed an amended notice of appeal, substituting thefollowing for the third issue stated in the original notice ofappeal:

"1. The trial court's order on April 24,1996, that the issue of surplus funds available to a taxing district was subject to thestrict guidelines of Miller [(citation)].

2. The trial court's order on April 24, 1996,that a fund-by-fund approach must be usedwhen computing the amounts of surplus fundsavailable to a taxing district, as opposed toa multiple[-]fund approach."

Taken with the case are defendants' motions to reconsider and for leave to file a motion to dismiss the motion forleave to file an amended notice of appeal. Upon reconsideration,we conclude that leave to file the amended notice was improvidently granted because plaintiffs' November 2, 2000, motion wasuntimely.

Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(4) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(b)(4))allows this court to grant plaintiffs' motion to amend notice ofappeal only if made within the time specified in Rule 303(d) (155Ill. 2d R. 303(d) (within 30 days after expiration of the timefor filing the notice of appeal). Heller Financial, Inc. v.Johns-Byrne Co., 264 Ill. App. 3d 681, 688, 637 N.E.2d 1085, 1090(1994). In this case, that time period expired on September 26,2000. Accordingly, we shall restrict our consideration to theissues raised in plaintiffs' August 25 notice of appeal.

A threshold question involves the sufficiency of theAugust 25 notice of appeal. Plaintiffs ask us to reverse thetrial court's order and remand "[t]he entire case" for an evidentiary hearing. Certain defendants object to the scope of ourreview, contending that plaintiffs failed to perfect an appeal ofany issue involving them and that they would be prejudiced ifforced to respond.

Rule 303(b)(2) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(b)(2)) requires anotice of appeal to "specify the judgment or part thereof orother orders appealed from and the relief sought from the reviewing court." When an appeal is taken from a part of a specifiedjudgment, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to reviewother judgments or parts thereof not so specified or not fairlyinferred from the notice as intended to be presented for review. Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 434, 394N.E.2d 380, 383 (1979). Appellate jurisdiction may still beconferred if the notice fairly and accurately advises the successful party of the nature of the appeal. In re Marriage ofBetts, 159 Ill. App. 3d 327, 330, 511 N.E.2d 732, 734 (1987). This court liberally construes a notice of appeal absent prejudice to the litigants. Dowell v. Bitner, 273 Ill. App. 3d 681,689, 652 N.E.2d 1372, 1378 (1995).

We have no jurisdiction to reverse and remand "theentire case" as plaintiffs request. Plaintiffs' August 25 noticeof appeal specifies that they were appealing from "[t]he trialcourt's order *** granting summary judgment in favor of thefollowing taxing districts on the issue of illegal accumulationof surplus funds" (emphasis added). Plaintiffs designated onlysix funds. Plaintiffs' notice does not fairly and accuratelyadvise defendants that plaintiffs sought relief in this courtagainst all 73 defendants with alleged improper surpluses, norcan it be fairly inferred from the notice, even when liberallyconstrued. Therefore, we review the trial court's October 31,1996, order granting summary judgment in favor of the six statedtaxing districts.

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred instrictly following Miller and granting summary judgment todefendants for funds with available assets not exceeding 2.84times the prior year's expenses and 3.24 times the three-yearaverage of annual expenses. We conduct a de novo review of anaward of summary judgment. People v. Select Specialties, Ltd.,317 Ill. App. 3d 538, 542, 740 N.E.2d 543, 547 (2000).

A levy that results in an unnecessary accumulation ofpublic money is illegal. People ex rel. Toynton v. CommonwealthEdison Co., 285 Ill. App. 3d 357, 361, 674 N.E.2d 809, 812(1996). A taxing body retains broad discretion in estimating theamounts necessary to carry out its lawful objectives. In reApplication of Rosewell, 159 Ill. 2d 393, 401, 639 N.E.2d 559,562 (1994). Thus, tax objectors bear a substantial burden ofproof in establishing that a taxing body has illegally accumulated taxes in a given year. Rosewell, 159 Ill. 2d at 404, 639N.E.2d at 564. The Miller court set only a framework for analyzing unnecessary accumulations; it did not determine a precisethreshold at 2.84 times the average annual expenditure and 3.24times the amount expended in the last previous fiscal year. Inre Application of O'Connor, 80 Ill. App. 3d 354, 356, 399 N.E.2d683, 685 (1980).

The following chart summarizes the Miller ratios foreach of the six funds that plaintiffs appealed:

Fund Available Assets Average Expenses Ratio

Funks Grove Town Fund $28,919 $15,416 1.88

Lexington Town Fund $109,952 $58,517 1.88

Money Creek Town Fund $48,699 $21,011 2.32

White Oak General
Assistance Fund $75,022 $57,109 1.31

Lexington Community Fire
Protection District
Operation Fund $141,774 $102,965 1.38

City of Chenoa
General Assistance Fund $777,775 $325,482 2.39

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendants as to these six funds because plaintiffsfailed to overcome the presumption that defendants did not abusetheir discretion in making the levies. Each of these funds had aratio of available assets to three-year-average expenses wellbelow the 2.84 ratio that the supreme court found to be anunnecessary accumulation in Miller.

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by requiring plaintiffs to analyze defendants' accumulated surpluses on afund-by-fund basis. We disagree. A fund-by-fund analysis ispreferable even if the monies in various funds are to some extenttransferable. O'Connor, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 357, 399 N.E.2d at686. Plaintiffs contend that this approach allows a taxingdistrict to accumulate the same amount of surplus in each fund. We disagree because the district's expenditures would also bedivided among funds. Actually, the multiple-fund approachsuggested by plaintiffs would allow a district to accumulate agreater surplus by averaging out one fund's unreasonably largesurplus relative to that fund's expenditures. Therefore, a fund-by-fund approach more greatly restricts defendants' ability toaccumulate a surplus, and the trial court did not err in adoptingit.

The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs'claims of unlawful accumulation of surplus funds in the Town ofNormal's Police Pension Fund and Firefighters' Pension Fund. General rules prohibiting unnecessary accumulation do not applywhen a statute authorizes accumulation. People ex rel. Brenza v.Morrison Hotel Corp., 4 Ill. 2d 542, 548, 123 N.E.2d 488, 492(1954). The uncontradicted facts show that the accumulations arejustified to account for unfunded accrued liability as requiredstate law. See 40 ILCS 5/3-125 (West 1994) (police pensionfund); 40 ILCS 5/4-118 (West 1994) (firefighters' pension fund).

The trial court also did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' claims of unlawful accumulation by the home-rule municipalities of the Town of Normal and the City of Bloomington. Theissue of whether a home-rule unit's tax levy is subject tojudicial review for abuse of discretion is one of first impression.

The courts cannot control a legislature's exercise ofdiscretion in setting tax rates. Mathews v. City of Chicago, 342Ill. 120, 141, 174 N.E. 35, 43 (1930). A home-rule unit mayexercise any power, including the power to tax, and perform anyfunction pertaining to its government and affairs. Ill. Const.1970, art. VII,