THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE,COUNTY, AND | ) | Appeal from |
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31; DON TODD; LARRY | ) | Circuit Court of |
BOMKE; and NORLAN and ELEANOR NEWMISTER, | ) | Logan County |
) | No. 02CH1 | |
Plaintiffs-Appellees, | ) | |
v. | ) | |
GEORGE RYAN, in His Capacity as Governor of the | ) | |
State of Illinois, and LINDA RENEE BAKER, in Her | ) | |
Capacity asSecretary of the Illinois Department | ) | |
of Human Services, | ) | |
Defendants-Appellants, | ) | |
and | ) | |
JUDY BAAR TOPINKA, in Her Capacity asTreasurer | ) | |
of the State of Illinois,and DANIEL HYNES, in | ) | |
His Capacity asComptroller of the State of | ) | Honorable |
Illinois, | ) | Donald A. Behle, |
Defendants. | ) | Judge Presiding. |
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In January 2002, the American Federation of State,County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME), Don Todd,Larry Bomke, and Norlan and Eleanor Newmister (plaintiffs), fileda complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against GeorgeRyan, Governor of the State of Illinois, and Linda Renee Baker,Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services (defendants), as well as Judy Baar Topinka, Treasurer of the State ofIllinois, and Daniel Hynes, Comptroller of the State of Illinois,to stop defendants' plans to close the Lincoln DevelopmentalCenter (Center).
In July 2002, the trial court issued a temporaryrestraining order prohibiting defendants from involuntarilytransferring residents out of the Center until the Health Facilities Planning Board (Planning Board) has acted upon defendants'application for a permit to close the Center. Defendants filed apetition for interlocutory review, arguing that the temporaryrestraining order should be reversed on the following grounds: (1) the trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a judgment onappeal; (2) the temporary restraining order violates separationof powers; (3) the temporary restraining order violates sovereignimmunity; (4) no verified complaint pleads facts demonstrating aright to injunctive relief; (5) the Illinois Health FacilitiesPlanning Act (Planning Act) (20 ILCS 3960/1 through 19.6 (West2000)) was not intended to control the day-to-day operations of ahealth-care facility; (6) plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (7) plaintiffs lack standing to sue; (8) thePlanning Act does not expressly or impliedly create a privateright of action; and (9) private persons are not authorized toseek injunctive relief to enforce the permit requirements of thePlanning Act. Because we agree with the last argument, wereverse the temporary restraining order and remand.
The Center is 1 of 11 State-operated facilities for thedevelopmentally disabled in Illinois. These facilities generallyserve as a placement of "last resort" for developmentally disabled individuals whose needs are unmet by private providers. The Office of Developmental Disabilities manages the Center aspart of the Illinois Department of Human Services.
In September 2001, the Illinois Department of PublicHealth completed a survey of the Center and found it to be out ofcompliance with several conditions of participation in theMedicaid program, jeopardizing federal financial participation. The survey identified deficiencies in client protections (failureto insure the health, safety, and well-being of residents),active treatment (failure to provide a continuous, aggressiveseries of services), governing body (failure to follow ownpolicies and procedures), and staffing. At that time, the Centerhad 372 residents.
In October 2001, Governor Ryan's office issued a pressrelease describing a plan to improve the Center's operations, inpart by transferring 90 residents to other placements. InNovember 2001, the Illinois Department of Public Aid and theIllinois Department of Public Health issued a notice of intent todecertify the Center from participation in Medicaid. In December2001, Governor Ryan visited the Center and ordered the Center toclose its Coty building and transfer 42 more residents. InJanuary 2002, the Governor Ryan's office directed Secretary Bakerto develop two alternative plans to either close or downsize theCenter.
In February 2002, Governor Ryan decided to downsize theCenter to 100 residents. At that time, the Center had 259residents. The Center would transfer the residents either toother State-operated facilities or to State-funded privateproviders. Funding existed to build four group homes at theCenter within the next year to accommodate a total of 40 residents. Six more cottages were planned to accommodate the remaining 60 residents so that the existing buildings at the Centercould be closed.
In March 2002, after consultation with federal regulators, the Illinois Department of Human Services, the IllinoisDepartment of Public Aid, and the Illinois Department of PublicHealth agreed to voluntarily reduce the Center's population to100 residents. The administrative proceedings to decertify theCenter would be terminated, and after June 30, 2002, a single,full certification survey would be conducted with no furtherright to hearing, administrative review, or appeal.
In June 2002, Governor Ryan announced a decision toclose the Center, and Secretary Baker filed an application withthe Planning Board to obtain a permit to close the Center. Thefirst stage of the closure plan involved transferring 51 residents from the Center during the first week of July.
In January 2002, plaintiffs filed a two-count complaintagainst defendants to prevent them from closing the Center.AFSCME is a labor organization that represents a majority of theCenter's staff. Todd is president of AFSCME Local 425 and anemployee of the Center. State Senator Bomke represents the 55thSenatorial District. The Newmisters are legal guardians of theirson, Melvin, who has resided at the Center for 30 years. Count Iof the complaint sought a declaratory judgment and a writ ofmandamus to require defendants to honor the fiscal year 2002appropriations law and spend money to keep the Center open. Count II sought an injunction restraining defendants from closingthe Center until they have received a permit from the PlanningBoard. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restrainingorder, which the trial court denied. In February 2002, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed countI and granted plaintiffs leave to refile.
In March 2002, plaintiffs filed a two-count amendedcomplaint setting forth the same causes of action as the originalcomplaint. Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. In April 2002, the trial court entered a preliminary injunction,requiring defendants to apply for a permit from the PlanningBoard prior to proceeding with any plans to downsize the Center. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, which we docketed asNo. 4-02-0390. Following Secretary Baker's application for apermit from the Planning Board, we dismissed the appeal as moot. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees,Council 31 v. Ryan, No. 4-02-0390 (July 2, 2002) (unpublishedsummary order under Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(3)).
In June 2002, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporaryrestraining order. In July 2002, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion and prohibited defendants from involuntarilytransferring any residents from the Center until the PlanningBoard has approved the application for a permit to close theCenter. This appeal followed.
Review of a temporary restraining order is limited todetermining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 254 Ill. App.3d 472, 476, 627 N.E.2d 71, 74 (1993). Ordinarily, substantiveissues in the case can be considered only to the extent necessaryto determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Northwestern Steel, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 476, 627 N.E.2d at 74. However, when a trial court grants temporary injunctive relief,the reviewing court may also examine whether the plaintiff'scomplaint is sufficient to sustain an injunction (Strata Marketing, Inc. v. Murphy, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1062, 740 N.E.2d1166, 1172 (2000)), as the right to injunctive relief necessarilybrings into question the sufficiency of the complaint (OlympicFederal v. Witney Development Co., 113 Ill. App. 3d 981, 984, 447N.E.2d 1371, 1373 (1983)).
The Center qualifies as a "hospital" under the PlanningBoard's regulations (77 Ill. Adm. Code