JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Martin L. Bale, d/b/a Bale Excavating andFarm Drainage, filed suit against defendants, William F.Barnhart, Maridel L. Barnhart, and Huntington Mortgage Company(Huntington), seeking to foreclose a mechanic's lien. Defendantsseparately moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2-619 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West2002)). The circuit court held the claim for lien improperlydescribed the claimant as Carla Bale and granted the defendants'motions.

Bale appeals and argues (1) the claim for lien wasproper; and (2) the complaint nevertheless perfected the lien. In a combined appellee brief, defendants contend the appeal ispremature and this court lacks jurisdiction. We agree in part. We dismiss as untimely the appeal of the order granting theBarnharts' motion to dismiss, and we affirm the order grantingHuntington's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Bale filed his complaint on September 19, 2001. According to the complaint, Bale and the Barnharts verballycontracted for Bale to create a one-acre pond on the Barnharts'property. Bale completed his contractual obligations and services on September 30, 2000. The fair market value of theservices and the building materials provided by Bale to theBarnharts was at least $8,540.82.

The complaint further alleges Huntington held a mortgage lien on the Barnharts' property, where Bale performed hisservices. Bale asserts his lien has priority over this mortgagelien.

Attached to the complaint is a copy of the claim oflien, pursuant to section 7 of the Mechanics Lien Act (Act) (770ILCS 60/7 (West 2000)), filed in the McLean County recorder'soffice on October 13, 2000.

On March 13, 2002, the Barnharts moved to dismiss thecomplaint under section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 2-619 (West2002)). The Barnharts argued, in part, the complaint is deficient because the claim for lien failed to comply with therequirements of the Act and the lien was thus not perfected.Following a hearing on April 22, 2002, the circuit court agreedwith the Barnharts and granted the motion to dismiss. On May 21,2002, Bale moved for reconsideration and rehearing. The court,on August 7, 2002, denied Bale's motion to reconsider. On August12, 2002, Bale moved for specific findings and clarification.

On June 24, 2002, Huntington moved to dismiss thecomplaint. Later, on August 19, 2002, Huntington moved forimmediate dismissal. The circuit court agreed with Huntingtonand granted the motion on August 29, 2002. On that same date,the circuit court denied Bale's motion to clarify. In its ordergranting Huntington's motion to dismiss and denying the motionfor clarification, the circuit court found "no just cause todelay either enforcement or appeal or both of this [o]rder."

Bale filed notice of appeal on September 6, 2002. OnSeptember 23, 2002, the Barnharts moved to recover attorney feesunder section 17 of the Act. 770 ILCS 60/17 (West 2002).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

Bale appeals the orders dismissing his complaint anddenying his motion to reconsider the dismissal of the complaintagainst the Barnharts.

In their jurisdictional statement, defendants disputeBale's contention this court has jurisdiction under IllinoisSupreme Court Rule 303 (155 Ill. 2d R. 303). Defendants contendjurisdiction, if any, exists under Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R.304(a)). In their brief, however, defendants cite no case law ormake any additional argument. Bale did not respond.

Despite counsels' failure to brief the issue, we "havean independent duty to ensure that appellate jurisdiction isproper." Department of Central Management Services v. AmericanFederation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 182 Ill. 2d234, 238, 695 N.E.2d 444, 446 (1998). Here, two orders dismissthe motions to dismiss. The first dismissed the complaintagainst the Barnharts; the latter dismissed against Huntingtonand found "there is no just cause to delay either enforcement orappeal or both of this [o]rder."

Under Rule 304(a), "an appeal may be taken from a finaljudgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties orclaims only if the trial court has made an express writtenfinding that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both." 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).Here, thecircuit court made a Rule 304(a) finding on the order dismissingthe complaint as to Huntington. Regardless of whether Rule 303provides jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction under Rule 304(a) onthe order dismissing the claim against Huntington. The circuitcourt, however, made no Rule 304(a) finding on the order dismissing the claim against the Barnharts or on the order denyingBale's motion to reconsider. Absent an explicit Rule 304(a)finding, we have no jurisdiction under Rule 304(a) over the orderdismissing Barnharts from the complaint. See Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 464, 563 N.E.2d 459, 463(1990).

We now consider whether we have jurisdiction over theorder dismissing the claim against the Barnharts under Rule 303. The Barnharts contend their timely motion for attorney fees undersection 17 of the Act (770 ILCS 60/17 (West 2000)) renders theappeal premature. The Barnharts first requested attorney fees intheir March 13, 2002, motion to dismiss. On April 22, 2002, thecircuit court granted the motion to dismiss, but it made nofindings regarding the Barnharts' request for attorney fees. After the order dismissing Bale's claim against Huntington, onSeptember 23, 2002, the Barnharts filed a motion to recoverattorney fees.

Under Rule 303, notice of appeal must be filed within30 days of the date of final judgment or of a ruling on a timelypostjudgment motion. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a). A judgment, however, is not final unless it "resolve[s] every right, liabilityor matter raised." See Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at 465, 563 N.E.2d at463. Here, there was no final judgment because the order on theBarnharts' motion to dismiss left unresolved the issue of attorney fees--an issue raised in the pleadings. See generally Hisev. Hull, 116 Ill. App. 3d 681, 452 N.E.2d 372 (1983) (supercededby statute on other grounds). Absent a final judgment, we lackjurisdiction over Bale's appeal under Rule 303.

Having no jurisdiction over the order dismissing thecomplaint against the Barnharts or over the denial of the motionfor reconsideration, we dismiss the appeal of these orders.

B. Propriety of Granting Dismissal as to Huntington

Huntington's motion to dismiss failed to cite thespecific subparagraph of section 2-619 upon which it relied. Based on the substance of the motions, however, we find Huntington's motion relied on subparagraph (a)(9), which authorizesdismissal on the pleadings when "the claim asserted *** is barredby other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of ordefeating the claim." 735 ILCS 2-619(a)(9) (West 2002).

In a section 2-619(a)(9) motion, the "affirmativematter" must appear on the face of the complaint or be supportedby evidentiary materials. Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education,178 Ill. 2d 370, 383, 687 N.E.2d 1042, 1049 (1997). After adefendant satisfies his burden of establishing an affirmativematter, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who may defeat themotion by establishing the asserted defense is unfounded. SeeKedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112,116, 619 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1993). Because dismissals undersection 2-619(a)(9) resemble summary judgment, we review them denovo and decide whether a genuine issue of material fact precludes the dismissal or whether dismissal is proper as a matterof law. See Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d at 383, 687 N.E.2d at 1049.

Bale argues the circuit court improperly found hefailed to comply with section 7 of the Act (770 ILCS 60/7 (West2000)). Bale maintains he filed a timely claim for lien undersection 7 in the McLean County recorder's office. Bale argues theclaim for lien identified him as a claimant and was completed andsigned by his agent, Carla S. Bale.

Huntington argues, however, the complaint was properlydismissed because the claim for lien did not strictly comply withthe requirements of the Act. Huntington relies primarily on twocases in support: Candice Co. v. Ricketts, 281 Ill. App. 3d 359,666 N.E.2d 722 (1996), and Ronning Engineering Co. v. Adams PrideAlfalfa Corp., 181 Ill. App. 3d 753, 537 N.E.2d 1032 (1989). Huntington admits the caption identifies Bale as the claimant,but contends the text, which identifies Carla Bale as the claimant, controls.

The Act is "in derogation of common law and must bestrictly construed." Rothers Construction, Inc. v. CenturionIndustries, Inc., 337 Ill. App. 3d 629, 635-36, 786 N.E.2d 644,648 (2003). "[T]he party seeking to enforce the lien" bears"[t]he burden of proving that each requisite has been satisfied." Ronning Engineering, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 759, 537 N.E.2d at 1035.

Section 7 of the Act sets forth the prerequisites thatmust be satisfied before a contract may enforce a lien against acreditor. See 770 ILCS 60/7 (West 2000). Under the terms ofsection 7, a plaintiff may enforce a lien against a creditor byfiling a claim for lien or a complaint within four months of thecompletion of the work. 770 ILCS 60/7 (West 2000); see alsoNorman A. Koglin Associates v. Valenz Oro, Inc., 176 Ill. 2d 385,391, 680 N.E.2d 283 (1997). Here, the complaint was filed onSeptember 19, 2001, after the four-month filing period expired. Therefore, the complaint, at least to Huntington, cannot be thebasis for enforcing the lien. To enforce his lien then, Balemust establish his claim for lien was proper and timely. If theclaim of lien is insufficient, Bale's claim against Huntington isbarred by section 7.

According to the language of section 7, a claim forlien, to be enforceable against a creditor must (1) be filedwithin four months after the completion of work; (2) be verifiedby the claimant or an agent or employee; (3) contain "a briefstatement of the contract"; (4) set forth "the balance due"; and(5) provide a "sufficiently correct description of the lot, lotsor tracts of land to identify the same." 770 ILCS 60/7 (West2000)). Here, the claim for lien was completed by Carla S. Bale. At the top of the preprinted claim-for-lien form are lines toenter the name of the individual who prepared the form and thename of the claimant. The name Carla S. Bale is hand-writtenafter "Prepared by" and plaintiff's name is hand-written as"claimant." In the body of the claim for lien, however, the nameCarla S. Bale was entered as claimant in two places. In addition, at the end of the claim for lien, Carla Bale signed theverification as "the claimant, agent[,] or employee of claimant." The text describes the contract as one between "claimant" and the Barnharts.

Huntington has identified two cases that have decidedthe improper identification of a party to a contract fails toprovide the requisite "brief statement of the contract." SeeRonning Engineering, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 759, 537 N.E.2d at 1036;see also Candice Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d at 363, 666 N.E.2d at 725.

In Ronning Engineering, this court held the plaintiff'sclaim for lien, which misstated the property owner's name asAdams Pride and not Adams County, did not satisfy section 7 ofthe Act. This court reasoned the incorrect name resulted in amisstatement of the contract, in violation of section 7. RonningEngineering, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 759, 537 N.E.2d at 1036.

In Candice Co., the "lien claim name[d] Candice as the'claimant' and state[d] that 'on August 6, 1992, the claimantmade a contract with said owner La Von L. Ricketts & Trina AnnMalone and any other unknown owners to [r]emodel basement.'"Candice Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d at 363, 666 N.E.2d at 725. Thecontract, however, "indicate[d] that Candice was not a party tothe August 6 contract to remodel the basement," but "[i]nstead,Father and Sons, Ricketts and Malone were the parties to thiscontract." Candice Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d at 363, 666 N.E.2d at725. The court, citing Ronning Engineering, held "the lien doesnot contain an accurate description of the contract" and "[did]not meet the requirements of section 7." Candice Co., 281 Ill.App. 3d at 364, 666 N.E.2d at 725.

Ronning Engineering controls. We find the claim forlien, by failing to accurately describe the contract, did notsatisfy section 7.

Bale argues, however, the claim for lien properlyidentifies him as claimant at the top. Huntington emphasizes,however, this is the caption and the claimant is improperlyidentified throughout the text. Huntington maintains when thecaption and text conflict, the text controls. See People v.Sirinsky, 47 Ill. 2d 183, 187, 265 N.E.2d 505, 507 (1970).

At a minimum, the conflict creates an ambiguity thatresults in an inaccurate description of the contract. Strictlyconstruing the Act, we find the claim for lien fails section 7. Because the complaint was not filed within four months and thetimely claim for lien is fatally flawed, Bale's claim againstHuntington is barred by section 7.

III. CONCLUSION

We dismiss the appeal of the order granting theBarnharts' motion to dismiss. We affirm the order dismissing thecomplaint under section 2-619 against Huntington.

Appeal dismissed in part and affirmed in part.

STEIGMANN, J., concurs.

COOK, J., dissents.

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand thetrial court's judgment.

The purpose of the Mechanics Lien Act is to protectthose who in good faith furnish material or labor for construction. Petroline Co. v. Advanced Environmental Contractors, Inc.,305 Ill. App. 3d 234, 237, 711 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (1999). "Thisact is and shall be liberally construed as a remedial act." 770ILCS 60/39 (West 2000). Once a plaintiff has complied with theprocedural requirements upon which a right to a lien is based,the Act should be liberally construed in order to accomplish itsremedial purpose. Westcon/Dillingham Microtunneling v. WalshConstruction Co. of Illinois, 319 Ill. App. 3d 870, 877, 747N.E.2d 410, 416 (2001); Petroline, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 239, 711N.E.2d at 1149 (courts have thus attempted to reconcile section39 with the precept that the Act is in derogation of the commonlaw and must be strictly construed).

The claim for lien in this case complied with all theprocedural requirements of section 7. It (1) was filed withinfour months after the completion of the work; (2) was verified bythe claimant or an agent or employee; (3) contained a briefstatement of the contract; (4) set forth the balance due; and (5)provided a sufficiently correct description of the lot, lots, ortracts of land to identify the same. 770 ILCS 60/7 (West 2000).

The claim for lien in this case is absolutely clear. The claim was "prepared by: Name: Carla S. Bale." The claimidentifies the claimant, "Bale Excavating & Farm Drainage, MartinL. Bale, Claimant(s)." The notary acknowledgment explains how itis signed, "Carla Bale on oath duly sworn says that he [sic] isthe claimant, agent[,] or employee of claimant." The notaryacknowledgment is then signed "Carla Bale," with the word "claimant" printed under the line. The notary acknowledgment had to besigned by a person; it could not be signed by Bale Excavating &Farm Drainage. Businesses can only act through individuals. Consistent with her notary acknowledgment, Carla Bale signed thesignature line of the claim for lien, "Carla Bale," again withthe word "claimant" printed under the line, and she filled in hername in the preceding blank, "Now comes Carla Bale the Claimantand claims a lien ***."

Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court must give it effect as written, without reading intoit exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature didnot express. Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d181, 184-85, 710 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1999). Section 7 allows theclaim for lien to be verified by an "agent or employee." 770ILCS 60/7 (West 2000). The section does not require that everytime the agent's or employee's name appears, it must be followedby the word "agent" or the word "employee." The majority'sattempt to read that requirement into the statute reads in alimitation or condition that the legislature did not express.

The cases relied upon by the majority are very different from this case. In Ronning, plaintiff's claim for liendescribed the wrong contract, a written contract entered into onSeptember 20, 1985, between the plaintiff and Adams County jointventure, when the correct contract was a verbal contract enteredinto on July 1, 1986, between the plaintiff and Adams Pride. Ronning, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 759, 537 N.E.2d at 1036. In CandiceCo., the claim of lien asserted that the claimant, CandiceCompany, Inc., entered into a contract to remodel a basement. Candice Company, Inc., however, was not a party to the contract;the contract in fact was entered into by Father and Sons, Inc. Candice Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d at 363, 666 N.E.2d at 725. Ronningand Candice Co. involved separate entities, not an agent who wasclearly identified as such in the claim for lien.

Under the rule of strict construction the statute isstrictly construed. It is illogical to apply a rule of strictconstruction to a claim for lien. It is possible for a statuteto be in derogation of common law, but not a claim for lien.

According to the majority, if it is possible to twist aclaim for lien to say something it was not intended to say, therule of strict construction prevents us from reading the claim correctly. The majority is mistaken.

"The doctrine of strict construction was never meant to be applied as a pitfall to the unwary, in good faith pursuing the path marked by the statute, nor as an ambuscade from which an adversary can overwhelm him for an immaterial misstep. Its function is to preserve the substantial rights of those against whom the remedy offered by the statute is directed, and it is never employedotherwise." United Cork Cos. v. Volland, 365 Ill. 564, 572, 7 N.E.2d 301, 305 (1937)(distinguishing cases where "a material requirement of the statute had been omitted"). Cirrincione v. Johnson, 184 Ill. 2d 109, 113-14, 703 N.E.2d 67,69 (1998).

The strict construction rule applies only to theprovisions of the Act that specify the substantive requirementsupon which the right to a lien is based. It does not apply, forexample, to technical objections to pleadings. Koglin Associates, 176 Ill. 2d at 396, 680 N.E.2d at 289. The claimant herecomplied with the substantive requirements of section 7. This isnot a case where claimant attempts to extend the Act to cases notprovided for by its language. Luise, Inc. v. Village of Skokie,335 Ill. App. 3d 672, 680-81, 781 N.E.2d 353, 360 (2002).