Defendant, Donald Pehlman, appeals the Sangamon Countycircuit court's judgment requiring him to account to his sister,plaintiff Janice Arlene Bollman, for half of the assets of atrust he administered. We reverse.

The facts of this case are undisputed, and we take thefollowing background information from the stipulation Donald andJanice filed with the circuit court. Gordon Pehlman, the parties' father, died on July 7, 1995. He and Donald had been co-owners (along with Janice's husband) of a business called thePool Center, Inc. When Gordon died, the Pool Center owed himapproximately $254,426.24.

Gordon's will established a trust for the care of hiswife, Florence Pehlman, who was also Janice and Donald's mother. Gordon left the majority of his estate to the trust, includingthe debt owed to him by the Pool Center. He named Donald as thetrustee. On April 9, 1996, the Pool Center paid $255,404.50 tothe trust in settlement of its debt to Gordon, and this money wasdeposited into the trust's Merrill Lynch investment account. ThePool Center was liquidated and ceased to exist by July 1, 1996.

Donald administered the trust uneventfully untilFlorence died on June 2, 2001. Gordon's will directed that onher death, the trust should terminate. Section III(2) of thewill required the trustee to distribute the trust assets inrelevant part as follows:

"(c) Third, give to my son, Donald LeePehlman, all shares of stock in the PoolCenter, Inc., and any and all obligationsowed to me by the Pool Center, Inc.; and

(d) Finally, *** divide the assets thenin the corpus of the Trust into ten (10)[sic] equal shares to be distributed to eachof my then living children, Donald LeePehlman and Janice Arlene Bollman."

The trust corpus at Florence's death consisted of the MerrillLynch investment account containing approximately $245,156.00 incash, government bonds, and securities. Donald, acting astrustee, made certain distributions that Janice does not dispute. He then distributed the remaining $235,843 in trust assets tohimself, over Janice's objection.

Janice filed a motion to open Gordon's estate, whichthe circuit court denied as untimely. She then filed this actionfor an accounting. The circuit court ruled that the remainingassets should be distributed equally between Janice and Donaldunder clause III(2)(d) because the Pool Center stock andobligations referred to in the will's clause III(2)(c) no longerexisted.

A court interpreting a trust must attempt to effectuatethe settlor's intent, and the first guide to that intent is theplain and ordinary meaning of the words used in creating thetrust. Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Donovan, 145 Ill. 2d 166,172, 582 N.E.2d 120, 123 (1991). In addition to the trust'slanguage, the court may consider the circumstances surroundingthe trust's execution to determine the settlor's intent. Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v.Phillips, 114 Ill. 2d 85, 93, 500 N.E.2d 29, 33 (1986).

Gordon's will clearly stated that the trust terminatedwhen Florence died and directed the trustee to distribute thePool Center "stock" and "obligations" to Donald. Gordonapparently did not consider that the Pool Center might go out ofbusiness, and nothing in the will's language indicates whether heintended to leave to Donald the proceeds of the Pool Centerassets if the company was dissolved. The fact that Gordon andDonald were co-owners of the business at the time Gordon executedthe will is likewise inconclusive. It may indicate that Gordonwanted Donald to have the ability to carry on the businessunencumbered by debt, or it may be that Gordon wanted to leavethe bulk of his assets (then represented by the business) toDonald.

Donald contends on appeal that the circuit courterroneously applied the doctrine of ademption. The rule has beendescribed as "the extinction, alienation, withdrawal[,] orsatisfaction of the legacy or devise by some act of the testatorby which an intention to revoke is indicated." Brady v. Paine,391 Ill. 596, 600-01, 63 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1945). In other words,when a testator bequeaths a specific item of property to someonebut then disposes of the item before dying, the bequest is saidto be "adeemed," and the devisee cannot inherit either that itemor its value. The rule typically operates on direct bequestsfrom an estate and has never been applied in Illinois to a finaldistribution from a testamentary trust. The circuit courtimplicitly extended the ademption rule to this context by rulingas it did. We conclude that this extension of the ademption ruleto a testamentary trust was improper.

Courts have traditionally offered one of two rationalesfor the ademption rule. The first, called the "identity theory,"is concerned solely with whether the property at issue is presentin the estate at the testator's death. In re Estate ofKolbinger, 175 Ill. App. 3d 315, 324, 529 N.E.2d 823, 829 (1988). Under this view, the reasons for the presence or absence of theproperty are irrelevant. But the theory of the Illinois courtshas been that a bequest is adeemed because the testator acted ina way indicating her intent to revoke the bequest. Kolbinger,175 Ill. App. 3d at 324, 529 N.E.2d at 829. When thespecifically devised property is absent from the estate, Illinoiscourts have been willing to inquire into why, in search ofevidence of the testator's intent.

The Kolbinger case illustrates how the intent theory ofademption operates where the specific property is destroyedinvoluntarily. In Kolbinger, the testator left real property totwo of her children. After she became incapacitated to the pointwhere she could not manage her own affairs, a fire destroyed theimprovements on the property and the insurance proceeds wereplaced in a certificate of deposit. The court held that thedevise of real property with improvements was not adeemed. Thiswas not a case where the testator chose to sell the real estateafter executing the will. The testator lacked capacity to changeher will; thus, the fact that she did not do so after the firedid not indicate an intention to revoke the bequest of theimproved property. The sons thus inherited the insuranceproceeds. Kolbinger, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 325-26, 529 N.E.2d at829-30.

Where the devised property is conveyed away by someoneother than the testator, no ademption occurs under the intenttheory. In Hobin v. O'Donnell, 115 Ill. App. 3d 940, 451 N.E.2d30 (1983), the plaintiff's aunt made him a specific bequest ofstock in her will, but when she died the stock was no longer partof her estate. She had been incapacitated toward the end of herlife, and the plaintiff alleged that someone other than his aunthad sold the stock without her knowledge. The appellate courtheld that if someone other than the testator had sold the stock,then there could be no ademption of the bequest because thetestator had not demonstrated her intent to revoke the gift tothe plaintiff. Hobin, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 943, 451 N.E.2d at 32;see also Lewis v. Hill, 387 Ill. 542, 548, 56 N.E.2d 619, 623(1944) (conveyance by incompetent testator's conservator does notadeem a specific devise).

If a testator's intentional act is required to revoke aspecific bequest by ademption, we see no reason there should be adifferent rule when the property first passes to a testamentarytrust. Where the testator has provided for a specific bequest ontermination of the trust, and the trust no longer possesses theproperty because of the trustee's actions, it cannot be becausethe testator intended to revoke the bequest. In such a case,there can be no ademption. See In re Will of Weiler, 149 Misc.2d 371, ___, 565 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412 (Sur. Ct. 1990) (reaching thesame result).

In this case, Gordon left to Donald his stock in thePool Center and the debts the corporation owed him. Donald'sactions as trustee cannot cause an ademption of Gordon's bequest,so under the trust's provisions Donald should receive thoseassets. The stock and debt have been converted in form into theholdings in the trust's Merill Lynch account, and Donald musttherefore receive the residue of this account. See Kolbinger,175 Ill. App. 3d at 325-26, 529 N.E.2d at 829-30 (awardinginsurance proceeds to specific devisee sons). Donald actedproperly when, acting as trustee, he made a final distribution of$235,843 to himself as an individual.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court'sjudgment.

Reversed.

KNECHT, P.J., and APPLETON, J., concur.