| LONNELL BREWER, | ) | Appeal from |
| Plaintiff-Appellant, | ) | Circuit Court of |
| v. | ) | Champaign County |
| THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY | ) | No. 02L128 |
| OF ILLINOIS; and KERRIN THOMPSON, L. | ) | |
| DENISE HENDRICKS, WALLACE HENDRICKS, | ) | |
| and PETER FEUILLE, in Their Official | ) | Honorable |
| and Individual Capacities, | ) | John R. DeLaMar, |
| Defendants-Appellees. | ) | Judge Presiding. |
JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Lonnell Brewer, filed a complaint allegingviolations of federal antidiscrimination statutes. He named, asdefendants, the Board of Trustees (Board) of the University ofIllinois and four employees of the Board, in their official andindividual capacities.
Pursuant to section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2000)), defendants movedto dismiss the complaint on the grounds of sovereign immunity anda lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The circuit court grantedthe motion. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that (1) Illinois hasconsented to being sued in circuit court for disability discrimination; (2) section 8-111(C) of the Illinois Human Rights Act(Human Rights Act) (775 ILCS 5/8-111(C) (West 2000)) allows acircuit court to exercise original jurisdiction over claims ofdiscrimination that arise from federal statutes; and (3) thecircuit court, rather than the Court of Claims, had subject-matter jurisdiction over his claims.
We disagree with all three of those contentions. Wehold that the Board, as an arm of the State of Illinois, hassovereign immunity to claims for damages in circuit court,including claims arising out of federal antidiscriminationstatutes. We further hold that the circuit court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims, because the claimswere essentially "subjects" of alleged "civil rights violations"within the meaning of section 8-111(C)--claims over which theIllinois Human Rights Commission (Commission) had exclusivesubject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, we affirm the trialcourt's judgment.
In his five-count complaint, plaintiff alleged he wasan African-American with a learning disability that "substantially impair[ed] one or more [of his] major life activities[,]including, but not limited to, reading and other tasks relatingto cognitive processing." From August 29, 1997, through April22, 1998, he was employed as a research assistant in the university's personnel services office. Also, from the fall semesterof 1997 through June 18, 1998, he was enrolled in the university's master's-degree program in its Institute of Labor andIndustrial Relations (Institute). The individual defendants wereKerrin Thompson, special assistant to the director of the personnel services office; L. Denise Hendricks, assistant vice president of human resources, associate vice chancellor for administrative affairs, and director of the personnel services office;Wallace Hendricks, a professor in the Institute; and PeterFeuille, a professor and the Institute's director.
In count I, directed against all the defendants,plaintiff alleged they had violated Title VII of the Civil RightsAct of 1964 (Title VII) (42 U.S.C.