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JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

After his insurance company refused to pay a fireclaim, plaintiff, Willie Broadnax, brought a negligence cause ofaction against insurance agent David Morrow, insurance agencyMorrow & Wells, Ltd., and Roush Insurance Services, Inc. (Roush). The trial court granted defendants' motions to dismiss becauseBroadnax failed to file the negligence claim within the two-yearstatute of limitations period. The trial court denied Broadnax'smotion to reconsider, and this appeal followed. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In April 1995, plaintiff, Willie Broadnax, applied foran insurance policy from Morrow & Wells, Ltd., to cover a building located in downtown Decatur. During Broadnax's initialconversations with his insurance agent, David Morrow, he toldMorrow he was in the process of purchasing the building and hehad plans to renovate it and open a package liquor business onthe premises. Morrow contacted Roush, an Indiana corporation,which in turn contacted Acceptance Indemnity Insurance Company(Acceptance), which ultimately issued the policy to Broadnax onApril, 14, 1995. The policy had a $70,000 limit of liability. On October 5, 1995, a fire occurred at the building,causing damage in excess of $70,000. Broadnax notified Morrow ofthe fire, and on October 23, 1995, Morrow helped Broadnax file aproof of loss claim with Acceptance. Sometime before May 10,1996, Acceptance denied Broadnax's claim. On May 10, Acceptancefiled a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration of nocoverage due to Broadnax's failure to comply with a vacancyprovision of the policy.

Broadnax filed a breach of contract action againstAcceptance on August 5, 1996, for failure to provide coverageunder the policy. On November 26, 1996, Acceptance filed itsanswer, asserting as an affirmative defense the policy provisionregarding vacancy. Acceptance filed a motion for summary judgment on July 17, 1997, and the trial court granted the motion onOctober 27, 1997. The trial court cited Broadnax's failure tocomply with the vacancy provision of the insurance policy. Thiscourt affirmed the trial court's judgment in Broadnax v. Acceptance Indemnity Insurance Co., No. 5-97-0957 (September 29,1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

On September 1, 1999, Broadnax filed a negligenceaction against David Morrow, Morrow & Wells, Ltd., and Roush. The negligence claim asserted defendants were negligent forobtaining an insurance policy containing an exclusionary endorsement which did not allow for vacancy or for the premises to beunoccupied, when the defendants allegedly knew or should haveknown the property would be vacant and unoccupied for a period inexcess of 30 days because Broadnax was in the process of renovating and remodeling.

Defendants filed motions to dismiss because Broadnaxfailed to file his negligence claim within the two-year statuteof limitations period. 735 ILCS 5/13-214.4 (West 1998). Broadnax did not file a response to defendants' motions todismiss; and on October 25, 1999, the trial court dismissedBroadnax's claim with prejudice, finding the two-year statute oflimitations period had expired. On November 23, 1999, Broadnaxfiled a motion to reconsider the dismissal of his claim. Thetrial court denied the motion and stated:

"Plaintiff did not respond to [d]efendants'[m]otion to [d]ismiss[,] which was filed onSeptember 28, 1999, and ruled on October 25,1999[,] pursuant to the [c]ourt's docketingorder. That [p]laintiff has failed to showwhy the matter set forth in his [m]otion to[r]econsider could not have been presented tothe [c]ourt or that such matters are new andpreviously unknown to the [p]laintiff orcould not have been timely discovered."

Broadnax appeals, contending (1) the trial court erredwhen it granted defendants' motions to dismiss based on therunning of the statute of limitations; and (2) the trial courtabused its discretion when it denied his motion to reconsider.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Statute of Limitations

Whether to grant a motion to dismiss is within thesound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb itsdecision absent an abuse of discretion. Dick v. Peoples Mid-Illinois Corp., 242 Ill. App. 3d 297, 303, 609 N.E.2d 997, 1002,(1993). The trial court's granting of defendants' motions todismiss on the grounds the claim is barred by other affirmativematter avoiding the legal effect or defeating the claim asprovided by section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 1998)) resembles the granting of a summary judgment motion. For this reason, we willconduct a de novo review and consider whether "'the existence ofa genuine issue of material fact should have precluded thedismissal or, absent such an issue of fact, whether dismissal isproper as a matter of law.'" Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 383, 687 N.E.2d 1042, 1049 (1997), quotingKedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112,116-17, 619 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1993); see 4 R. Michael, IllinoisPractice