Illinois Secretary of State Jesse White (Secretary)appeals a Sangamon County circuit court order, reversing his June13, 2002, order that denied the petition for the rescission of anorder of suspension filed by plaintiff, Helen K. Bruce. Wereverse the circuit court's judgment and reinstate the Secretary's denial of plaintiff's petition.

Plaintiff was born in July 1967 and got her firstdriver's license at age 16 under the name Helen K. Chamberlin. On June 4, 1989, plaintiff received a suspension for failing toappear, which was cleared on August 12, 1998. In August 1990,plaintiff got married and changed her name to Helen K. Bruce. In1995, she obtained a driver's license in her married name.

Pursuant to section 6-206(a)(9) of the Illinois VehicleCode (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/6-206(a)(9) (West Supp. 1997)),the Secretary entered an order of suspension, effective June 10,1998, based on plaintiff's "having made a false statement orknowingly concealed a material fact or having used false information or identification in an application for a license, identification card[,] or permit." The suspension had a termination dateof June 10, 1999. The Secretary also entered an order, effectiveJune 15, 1998, cancelling plaintiff's driver's license becausesection 6-103(3) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-103(3) (WestSupp. 1997)) prohibited her from obtaining a license during aperiod of suspension.

In April 2002, pursuant to section 2-118 of the VehicleCode (625 ILCS 5/2-118 (West 2002)), plaintiff filed a requestfor a formal hearing, seeking to clear her record of the 1998suspension. On May 3, 2003, the hearing officer held a hearing. Plaintiff first testified she got a driver's license in hermarried name at the time of her August 1990 marriage. She latertestified she got a driver's license in her married name in 1995. She explained that she did not drive after she got marriedbecause she lived in Chicago, and her husband did all of thedriving.

When she got her driver's license in her married name,plaintiff recalled an employee filling out the application andasking her several questions, including whether her license hadever been suspended, to which she replied no. When presentedwith the application, plaintiff stated it was her signature onthe application. Plaintiff denied knowing at that time that herlicense was suspended.

In 1998, a police officer pulled plaintiff over andinformed her that her license was suspended. She called theSecretary's office and learned she had failed to pay a ticket. According to the certification of traffic violation disposition,on July 21, 1998, plaintiff paid the fine for a case disposed ofon March 22, 1989. She did not remember getting the 1989 ticket. Plaintiff testified she never got notice the Secretary suspendedher license and did not know of the suspension when she obtainedher driver's license in her married name. She also deniedknowingly making a false statement to the Secretary's office. Plaintiff admitted she had moved a lot and had not notified theSecretary's office of her address changes. However, she did haveher mail forwarded. Plaintiff also testified she did not recallmoving for a period of time when she did not have a driver'slicense.

After the hearing, the hearing officer entered anorder, finding, inter alia, the following: (1) plaintiff admitted she applied for a driver's license on February 21, 1995, inthe name of Helen K. Bruce; (2) plaintiff answered no to theapplication's question of whether her driver's license had "'ever been suspended, revoked, cancelled[,] or refused in anystate under this or any other name'"; (3) plaintiff also admittedshe previously held a license in the name Helen K. Chamberlain;(4) that license was suspended on June 4, 1989, pursuant tosection 6-306.3 of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 6-306.3), when plaintiff failed to appear in court on atraffic citation where she had posted her driver's license inlieu of bail; (5) plaintiff did not deny the suspension wasentered but did deny she was aware of the suspension when sheapplied for a license in February 1995; (6) plaintiff's demeanorwas indignant; and (7) plaintiff's testimony was not credible.

The hearing officer concluded plaintiff failed to meether burden of proof, noting that, if plaintiff did not receivethe notice of the 1989 suspension, it was because she failed tofulfill her obligation of informing the Secretary of her changein address. He also noted plaintiff did not have a license inher possession for nearly six years.

On June 13, 2002, the Secretary adopted the hearingofficer's findings of fact and conclusions of law and thus deniedplaintiff's petition.

On June 26, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint in thecircuit court pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS5/3-101 through 3-113 (West 2002)), seeking review of the Secretary's decision. After a January 2003 hearing, the circuit courtreversed the Secretary's June 13, 2002, decision; reversed theJune 1998 order suspending plaintiff's driver's license; andordered the June 1998 suspension stricken from plaintiff'srecord. This appeal followed.

A reviewing court may not overturn an administrativeagency's decision unless the administrative agency exercised itsauthority in an arbitrary and capricious manner or its decisionwas against the manifest weight of the evidence. An administrative agency's findings and conclusions on questions of fact areprima facie true and correct. If anything in the record fairlysupports the agency's decision, that decision is not against themanifest weight of the evidence. Mohr v. White, 324 Ill. App. 3d643, 647, 756 N.E.2d 434, 437 (2001). Additionally, we reviewthe administrative agency's decision and not the circuit court'sdecision. Mefford v. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d 167, 173, 770N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (2002).

Initially, we begin by setting forth who had the burdenof proof at the hearing and what the standard of proof was. Inthis case, plaintiff had the burden of proof to demonstrate shewas entitled to rescission of the suspension order. See 92 Ill.Adm. Code