August 3, 2001
BONNIE JEAN BURWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LLOYD C. BURWELL, Defendant-Appellee. | ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) | Appeal from Circuit Court of Champaign County No. 76C361 Honorable |
PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion ofthe court:
In January 2000, the trial court entered judgment infavor of plaintiff, Bonnie Jean Burwell, and against defendant,Lloyd C. Burwell, and awarded Bonnie $15,100 in unpaid childsupport. The court later denied Bonnie's request for prejudgmentinterest on the unpaid support.
Bonnie appeals, arguing that the trial court erred bynot awarding prejudgment interest in accordance with section 12-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/12-109(West 1998)). We reverse and remand.
In March 1977, the trial court entered an order dissolving the parties' marriage, granting custody of their onlychild, John (born November 3, 1976), to Bonnie, and orderingLloyd to pay $100 per month in temporary child support, beginningApril 1, 1977. In November 1977, the court entered an ordersetting permanent child support at $100 per month.
In September 1999, Bonnie filed a motion for entry ofjudgment, seeking $23,200 in unpaid child support that hadaccrued between April 1, 1977 (the date of the initial temporaryorder for child support), and November 3, 1994 (the date thatJohn reached 18 years of age). Bonnie also sought prejudgmentinterest on the child support arrearage and attorney fees.
In January 2000, the trial court entered an orderpursuant to the parties' agreement, awarding Bonnie $15,100 inunpaid child support. The court reserved ruling on the questionsof interest and attorney fees. Following a hearing later thatmonth, the court granted Bonnie's request for attorney fees butdenied her request for prejudgment interest "in the exercise ofits discretion." After pronouncing its ruling at the hearing,Bonnie's counsel asked the court to comment on the impact ofsection 505(d) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution ofMarriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/505(d) (West Supp.1999) (effective until June 1, 2000)) on the court's ruling. Thecourt responded that (1) section 505(d) was enacted after 1994and thus was not in effect while the child support order was ineffect (April 1977 through November 1994), and (2) during thetime that the child support order was in effect, the awarding ofinterest on child support judgments was a matter within the trialcourt's discretion.
In February 2000, Bonnie filed a motion to reconsider,in which she argued that pursuant to (1) section 505(d) of the Dissolution Act (then section 505(c) (Pub. Act 85-2,