JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, the Calvary Baptist Church of Tilton (Calvary),appeals the circuit court's affirmance of a March 2002 decision ofthe Director of the Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois(Department) denying Calvary's application for a religious-use taxexemption for its property, arguing the property in question is usedprimarily for religious purposes and that denial of a tax exemptionviolates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (775 ILCS 35/1 through99 (West 2000)). We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 4, 2002, plaintiff filed an application forreligious-use property tax exemption with defendant, the Department. The property consists of 4.54 acres with two buildings: a 900-square-foot building containing a meeting room, small kitchen, and bathrooms; and a 200-square-foot utility shed used for storage. Theproperty is also improved with an 18-hole miniature golf course, asand volleyball court, playground equipment, and a pavilion consisting of a concrete floor and covered picnic tables. The property isfenced and has a parking area. Throughout 2000, the property wasused for Bible study classes, teen ministry events and meetings,fellowship events, and devotional activities. William Benzing,Calvary's administrator, also averred that six "occasional andincidental secular events" took place on the property in 2000,including family reunions, baby showers, birthday parties, and awedding reception. Income is derived from the property in thatwhenever a group or person not affiliated with Calvary uses theproperty for a religious or secular purpose, a $25 donation issuggested for daytime use and $50 for evening use to defray the powerbill for the property. However, the donation is strictly voluntary.

On February 16, 2001, the Department denied Calvary'sapplication for property tax exemption, finding the property is notin exempt use. On February 27, 2001, Calvary filed an applicationfor a hearing on the Department's February 16, 2001, decision. OnMay 8, 2001, the Department issued an order setting a hearing on theDepartment's decision for July 23, 2001. At the hearing, the attorney for the Department asked the administrative law judge (ALJ) totake notice that Calvary's application for an exemption as to thisproperty had been denied once before in September 1999 following ahearing and that it was the Department's position that nothing hadchanged since then.

Pastor Joe Humrichous testified for Calvary. The propertyin question is referred to as "the FARM," an acronym for Family AndRecreational Ministry. Calvary's mission is to bring in new followers of its faith through teaching, fellowship, the rite of communion,prayer, and evangelism. The FARM is used for those activities and asa location for regular Bible study. In 2000, a college-age group metthere for Bible study on Monday evenings, Pastor Humrichous taught aBible study class on the FARM on Tuesday nights, and a teenage Biblestudy activity occurred there on Wednesday nights. A Bible studytaught by one of the members and open to the public was held onThursday nights. The FARM was also used for fellowships by Sundayschool classes and young couples and young families. Calvary alsohas business and prayer meetings on the FARM. Calvary's ushers metto discuss improving their service and to have a meal there. Calvaryheld its missions conference planning on the FARM. A group ofteenage members planted a garden on the FARM and distributed thefood.

Pastor Humrichous testified regarding an August 19, 2000,all-church golf outing with a picnic and games following at the FARM. This outing was part of Calvary's strategy of evangelism in the hopethat those who were invited would become interested in the faith,which can then be shared at the picnic on the FARM. These types ofevents always involved prayer and sometimes a devotional, where amember shared how they joined the faith. Calvary gave one of itsmembers a baby shower on the FARM as part of its ministry to her. Calvary also gave another couple, who both attend Calvary, a weddingreception to encourage their marriage and encourage marriage in thefaith. On cross-examination, Pastor Humrichous testified he couldnot divide the property into areas used primarily for devotionals andthose used primarily for fellowship, stating the weather is theprimary determinant of where people do what they do.

Bill Benzing, Calvary's administrator, also testified. Benzing schedules events at the FARM. Benzing testified as tovarious uses of the FARM, including the following: (1) on April 24,2000, a Calvary member had her Crisis Care Bible Institute class atthe FARM for a fellowship-encouragement; (2) on July 22, 2000, theSouthside Church of the Nazarene (Southside Church), a neighboringchurch, used the FARM for its kickoff picnic for its Faith PromiseMissionary Project; (3) on July 25, 2000, Camp Assurance, a Biblecamp, used the FARM for a family camp picnic; (4) on July 27, 2000,Faith Evangelical Methodist Church in Fairmont, Illinois, used theFARM for a Sunday school get-together; (5) on July 29, 2000, theSouthside Church held a vacation Bible school parade and cookout atthe FARM; and (6) on August 2, 2000, the Southside Church had a teenactivity and devotion on the FARM. Benzing testified the use of theFARM by other churches was part of Calvary's fellowship with othersof the faith to evangelize the community. On April 26, 2000, theHome Fire Home School Association held an outing at the FARM to takepictures of their group and to play golf. Benzing testified a largenumber of families that belong to Calvary are members of the HomeFire Home School Association so that their use of the FARM wouldallow fellowship with other home school people in the area. On May13, and June 4, 2000, Calvary members had birthday parties at theFARM. The birthday parties allowed the Calvary members to sharetheir faith with their guests. On July 7, 2000, a family thatbelonged to Calvary used the FARM for a gathering to thank friendsand coworkers of a deceased family member for their support followingthe death. On July 9, 2000, one Calvary member threw a baby showerfor another member, and on July 18, 2000, one member threw a weddingshower for another member. On cross-examination, Benzing testifiedthat 30% of the FARM is occupied by the miniature golf course, 4% bythe volleyball court, and 30% is open space with no improvements.

On March 15, 2002, the ALJ issued a recommendation fordisposition denying the exemption. The ALJ found the facts substantially as they were given in the testimony. After noting that PastorHumrichous "believes that all activities performed on the [FARM]further the evangelism tenant and are therefore religious," the ALJfound that "for property tax exemptions the Illinois courts andstatutes have espoused a much more restrictive definition of what isa religious use of a piece of property." The ALJ then quoted Peopleex rel. McCullough v. Deutsche Evangelisch Lutherische JehovahGemeinde Ungeaenderter Augsburgischer Confession, 249 Ill. 132, 136-37, 94 N.E. 162, 164 (1911), in which the Supreme Court of Illinoisstated that "[a]s applied to the uses of property, a religiouspurpose means a use of such property by a religious society *** as astated place for public worship, Sunday schools[,] and religiousinstruction." The ALJ concluded that "the subject property is usedfor a number of purposes, including recreational and social activities unrelated to religious instruction or public worship." However,the ALJ found that had Calvary been able to identify which portionsof the FARM are used for Bible study, Sunday school, and devotionalpurposes, "those areas are used for religious purposes as defined bythe statutes and case law" and may have qualified for a partialexemption. The ALJ also found that because the meeting room was usedfor wedding and baby showers, family reunions, and other specialevents, Calvary failed to establish that the primary use of that areawas for religious purposes. Finally, the ALJ found that applicationof the religious-exemption statute in this case does not violate theReligious Freedom Restoration Act (775 ILCS 35/1 through 99 (West2000)) because the Department imposed no burden on Calvary's abilityto exercise its religious freedom.

On March 20, 2002, the Director accepted the ALJ's recommended decision and made it final. On April 19, 2002, Calvary fileda complaint for review of administrative decision in the circuitcourt. On February 25, 2002, the circuit court held the ALJ'sfinding that Calvary failed to establish that the primary use of theproperty is religious is not against the manifest weight of theevidence and the Department's denial of a property tax exemption wasnot arbitrary, capricious, or legally erroneous. The court affirmedthe final administrative decision denying Calvary's application foran exemption.

This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Calvary argues the Department and the circuitcourt erred by (1) concluding it does not use the property primarilyfor religious purposes, (2) failing to accept its own good-faithcharacterization of its own doctrines and activities as religious,(3) applying a standard for religious use that is not recognized inIllinois law, and (4) not finding it was entitled to at least apartial tax exemption. Calvary also argues the denial of its requested tax exemption violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Because we agree that Calvary is entitled to a religious-use exemption and reverse, we need not address Calvary's other arguments.

A. Standard and Scope of Review

On appeal from the circuit court's order affirming a finaladministrative decision, this court reviews the administrativeagency's decision and not the circuit court's determination. XLDisposal Corp. v. Zehnder, 304 Ill. App. 3d 202, 207, 709 N.E.2d 293,297 (1999). Where resolution of the case requires determining thelegal effect of a given set of facts, the agency's determinationshould be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. XL Disposal, 304 Ill.App. 3d at 207, 709 N.E.2d at 297. Here, although Calvary claimscertain uses are religious and the Department disagrees, the determinative facts, i.e., the actual uses to which the FARM was put, arenot in dispute. The only issue is whether, given those facts,Calvary is entitled to a religious-use property tax exemption for theFARM. That issue requires this court to determine the legal effectof the given facts. That is, we must determine whether the primaryuse of the FARM was a religious use under the law. Accordingly, wewill affirm the Department's determination that Calvary is notentitled to an exemption unless that determination is clearly erroneous. "'[A] finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there isevidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence isleft with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has beencommitted.'" AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of EmploymentSecurity, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 393, 763 N.E.2d 272, 280-81 (2001),quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395,92 L. Ed. 746, 766, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542 (1948).

B. Religious-Use Exemption Turns on Property's Primary Use

Section 15-40 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/15-40(West 2002)) provides as follows: "Property used exclusively for ***religious purposes *** qualifies for exemption as long as it is notused with a view to profit." The Supreme Court of Illinois "has longheld that property satisfies the exclusive-use requirement of theproperty tax exemption statutes if it is primarily used for theexempted purpose; 'if property is devoted, in a primary sense, to areligious purpose, the fact that it is incidentally used for secularpurposes will not destroy the exemption ***.'" (Emphasis in original.) McKenzie v. Johnson, 98 Ill. 2d 87, 98, 456 N.E.2d 73, 78(1983), quoting First Congregational Church v. Board of Review, 254Ill. 220, 224, 98 N.E. 275, 276 (1912). What constitutes use ofproperty for a religious purpose has been narrowly confined to "'ause of such property by a religious society or body of persons as astated place for public worship, Sunday schools[,] and religiousinstruction.'" Mount Calvary Baptist Church, Inc. v. Zehnder, 302Ill. App. 3d 661, 668, 706 N.E.2d 1008, 1013 (1998), quoting Deutsche, 249 Ill. at 136-37, 94 N.E. at 164. "However, generally,courts have employed a more liberal construction of the term 'religious purpose.'" Mount Calvary Baptist Church, 302 Ill. App. 3d at668, 706 N.E.2d at 1013. The supreme court has stated that theDeutsche definition of "religious use" was not inclusive of everything that might in the future be regarded as a use for religiouspurposes but was merely illustrative of the nature of such use. People ex rel. Carson v. Muldoon, 306 Ill. 234, 238, 137 N.E. 863,864 (1922), overruled on other grounds by McKenzie, 98 Ill. 2d at 99-100, 456 N.E.2d at 79; see also Evangelical Teacher Training Ass'n v.Novak, 118 Ill. App. 3d 21, 24, 454 N.E.2d 836, 838 (1983).

C. Primary-Use Analysis

In Fairview Haven v. Department of Revenue, 153 Ill. App.3d 763, 773, 506 N.E.2d 341, 348 (1987), this court stated that,"[i]n the tax context, the first amendment requires the court toaccept the entity's characterization of its activities and beliefs asreligious as long as the characterization is in good faith." Thiscourt quoted favorably from In re Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 55 N.Y.2d 512, 521, 435 N.E.2d 662, 665,450 N.Y.S.2d 292, 295 (1982), in which the New York Court of Appealsstated as follows:

"When, as here, particular purposes andactivities of a religious organization areclaimed to be other than religious, the civilauthorities may engage in but two inquiries:Does the religious organization assert that thechallenged purposes and activities arereligious, and is that assertion bona fide? Neither the courts nor the administrativeagencies *** may go behind the declared contentof religious beliefs any more than they mayexamine into their validity."

This court held the format set forth in Holy Spirit is persuasive andhas been followed. Fairview Haven, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 506N.E.2d at 348.

D. Error in the Department's Analysis

In the instant case, the ALJ applied the wrong standard todetermine whether Calvary put the FARM to use primarily for religiouspurposes. The ALJ stated as follows:

"The applicant's minister believes that allactivities performed on the subject parcelfurther the evangelism tenant [sic] and aretherefore religious. This is not what Illinoislaw requires. While all the tenants [sic] helpfurther the applicant's purpose, for propertytax exemptions the Illinois courts and statuteshave espoused a much more restrictivedefinition of what is a religious use of apiece of property."

The ALJ then quoted the Deutsche test in her recommendation fordisposition and stated: "The subject property is used for a number ofpurposes, including recreational and social activities unrelated toreligious instruction or public worship." (Emphasis added.) The"much more restrictive" standard applied by the ALJ has been rejectedby Illinois courts. See, e.g., People ex rel. Pearsall v. CatholicBishop, 311 Ill. 11, 17, 142 N.E. 520, 522 (1924); Mount CalvaryBaptist Church, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 668, 706 N.E.2d at 1013; Novak,118 Ill. App. 3d at 24, 454 N.E.2d at 838.

The Department argues the ALJ "did not state that theproperty could only be considered exempt if it was used for one ofthe three purposes listed in [Deutsche]" but merely found that theevidence failed to support Calvary's contention that the property wasused primarily for Bible study, Sunday school, and devotionalpurposes. We disagree. Although the ALJ impliedly recognized thatCalvary characterizes activities other than religious instruction orworship as religious ("all the tenants [(sic), including evangelism,]help further the applicant's [religious] purpose"), the ALJ failed tomake a finding whether the FARM was used primarily for Calvary'sstated religious purpose as a location to facilitate fellowship andevangelism. This, absent evidence suggesting Calvary'scharacterization was in bad faith, would have been a proper inquiry. See Lutheran Church of the Good Shepherd v. Department of Revenue,316 Ill. App. 3d 828, 832-33, 737 N.E.2d 1075, 1078-79 (2000) (wherechurch planned to use land as extension of existing yard, usepresumed religious and "issue [was] whether the property was actuallybeing used for exempt purposes" (emphasis in original)), citingCatholic Bishop, 311 Ill. 11, 142 N.E. 520 .

The dissent argues "[t]his court is substituting itsposition for that of the ALJ and the Department." Slip op. at 18(McCullough, J., dissenting). This is not the case. The ALJ appliedthe incorrect legal standard to the facts of the case. The plainlanguage of the recommendation indicates the ALJ considered onlywhether the property was used for religious instruction or publicworship. The ALJ's inquiry was consistent with the narrow Deutschestandard that has been rejected by our supreme court. Under FairviewHaven, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 506 N.E.2d at 348, "[f]irst, thecourt must accept the organization's characterization of the purposeof its activities and, second, determine whether the property is infact exclusively[, i.e., primarily (see McKenzie, 98 Ill. 2d at 98,456 N.E.2d at 78),] used for the religious purposes." The dissentmischaracterizes this statement as suggesting "that 'good faith'rather than 'exclusive use'" is the standard. Slip op. at 18-19(McCullough, J., dissenting). However, the "good faith" standardwould only be applied to the entity's characterization of itsactivities and beliefs as religious. If the entity'scharacterization that the use to which the land is being put is areligious use is in good faith, a determination is still requiredthat the land is put to that use exclusively (i.e., primarily). Moreover, we do not "assume the burden to be the fact finder" as thedissent states. Slip op. at 18 (McCullough, J., dissenting). Thedissent argues that the ALJ's findings of fact "clearly support" itsorder. Slip op. at 18 (McCullough, J., dissenting). However, weagain note those facts were analyzed under the wrong legal standard.

Based on those facts as found by the ALJ, we hold the FARMis used primarily for religious purposes, specifically those beingreligious instruction (Bible study), fellowship, and evangelism. Under Fairview Haven, this court must accept Calvary's contentionthat fellowship and evangelism are tenets of its faith. The FARM isclearly used to allow Calvary's members to pursue this aspect oftheir beliefs. That use of the FARM is limited to Calvary's members,their friends, and other churches is sufficient evidence to establishthat the FARM's primary use is religious. Even were this court tofind the occasional shower or birthday party to be purely secular,those activities do not destroy the religious-use nature of the FARMevidenced by multiple weekly Bible studies and regular churchactivities, including those "recreational" outings put on by Calvaryor its neighbor churches. See McKenzie, 98 Ill. 2d at 98, 456 N.E.2dat 78 (incidental use for secular purpose will not destroy theexemption); Catholic Bishop, 311 Ill. at 17, 142 N.E. at 522 (areason grounds of Catholic seminary "used exclusively for recreationalpurposes by the school" entitled to exemption); Lutheran Church ofthe Good Shepherd, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 832-33, 737 N.E.2d at 1078-79,citing Catholic Bishop, 311 Ill. 11, 142 N.E. 520 (use of land asplayground or picnic area or for other recreational activitiespresumed to qualify as a religious purpose where issue was whetherland was actually being used for exempt purpose).

III. CONCLUSION

Calvary is entitled to a religious-use exemption for thesubject property. Accordingly, we need not determine whether it isentitled to a partial exemption or whether denial of the requestedtax exemption violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Forthe reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court's judgment.

Reversed.

APPLETON, J., specially concurs.

McCULLOUGH, J., dissents.

I concur with the result reached by the majority but writeseparately to identify concerns with the application of the nearlycentury-old definition of religious purpose enunciated by the SupremeCourt of Illinois in People ex rel. McCullough v. DeutscheEvangelisch Lutherische Jehovah Gemeinde Ungeaenderter AugsburgischerConfession, 249 Ill. 132, 94 N.E. 162 (1911). This definition,relied upon by the Department to the exclusion of all other views,provided that religious purpose of property means use by a religiousbody as a stated place for public worship, Sunday schools, andreligious instruction.

That definition, enunciated at the dawn of the twentiethcentury, does not encompass all of the uses to which modern churchbuildings are put. How does one characterize the use of a churchbasement for a postfuneral luncheon? How does one accommodate theuse of a parish hall for a wedding reception following the ceremonyin the church? What is the effect of the inclusion of a "gymnasium"in many modern church buildings? I would argue that the Departmentcannot rest so heavily on the Deutsche formula without broadening itsview as to what constitutes a religious purpose.

Of even greater concern is the broadening definition ofreligion in the more evangelical of our churches where fellowship isas much a component of the religious experience afforded a church'scongregants as a formal service. Such experiences are not merely abyproduct or benefit of church membership. They are, instead,central to the everyday expression of faith in the community.

The Department is correct to be wary of many "non-traditional" uses of property in the guise of religion. However, itmust be very careful in drawing lines at the appropriate places. Thesupreme court has said:

"Governments have not always been tolerantof religious activity, and hostility towardreligion has taken many shapes and forms--economic, political, and sometimes harshlyoppressive. Grants of exemption historicallyreflect the concern of authors of constitutionsand statutes as to the latent dangers inherentin the imposition of property taxes; exemptionconstitutes a reasonable and balanced attemptto guard against those dangers." Walz v. TaxComm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664,673, 25 L. Ed. 2d 697, 704, 90 S. Ct. 1409,1413 (1970).

Our constitution provides that the General Assembly may exclude fromreal estate taxation property used for a religious purpose. Ill.Const. 1970, art. IX,