In July 2003, plaintiffs, Mark Cargill and RebeccaRenee Cargill, refiled a complaint against defendants, ThomasCzelatdko, E. David Jones, and Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center,alleging healing art malpractice. In September 2003, defendantsfiled a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. InMarch 2004, the court granted defendants' motion to certify thefollowing questions for interlocutory review pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)):

"1. Did P.A. 90-579 resurrect theamendments to [s]ection 2-622 of the Code ofCivil Procedure (inserted by P.A. 89-7) whichhad been found unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Best v.Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367?

2. If the response to the first question listed above is in the affirmative, thenin a refiled healing art malpractice casedoes the [c]ircuit [c]ourt have discretionpursuant to [s]ection 2-622(a)(2) to 'waive'the requirement found at 735 ILCS 5/2-622(a)(2) that a plaintiff's attorney certifythat he 'has not previously voluntarily dismissed an action based on the same or substantially the same acts, omissions, oroccurrences?'

3. Assuming an answer in the affirmative to question [N]o. 1 above, and assumingthat the [c]ircuit [c]ourt does not havediscretion to waive this certification requirement mandated by [s]ection 2-622(a)(2),does the [p]laintiff's attorney's failure toprovide the certification mandate dismissalof an action with prejudice under [s]ection2-622(g)?"

We answer yes to the first and third questions, no to the secondquestion, and remand this case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2000, plaintiff Mark Cargill became a patientof defendants at the Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center in Mattoon,Illinois. In March 2002, plaintiff filed a healing art malpractice action in Coles County case No. 02-L-29. Plaintiffs'attorney attached to the complaint an affidavit, indicating nophysician's certificate was filed to support the complaint asrequired by section 2-622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-622 (West 2002)) as counsel was unableto procure a certificate before the statute of limitations wouldotherwise impair the action. After a 90-day extension, plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss the action. In July 2002, thetrial court granted the dismissal motion.

In July 2003, plaintiffs refiled their complaint incase No. 03-L-44, alleging healing art malpractice. Plaintiffs'counsel again filed an affidavit, stating he had been unable toobtain a consultation as required by section 2-622 of the Procedure Code because such a consultation could not be obtainedbefore the expiration date of the statute of limitations.

In September 2003, defendants filed a motion to dismisspursuant to section 2-619 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(West 2002)), claiming section 2-622 does not allow for thefiling of an action without a physician's certificate of merit tobe followed by a voluntary dismissal and the subsequent refilingof the action without a certificate.

In December 2003, the trial court denied defendants'motion to dismiss. Thereafter, defendants filed an answer toplaintiffs' complaint. In March 2004, the court granted defendants' motion to certify questions for interlocutory appealpursuant to Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)). This appealfollowed.
 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

This appeal requires us to interpret section 2-622 ofthe Procedure Code. Statutory construction is a matter of law,and appellate review is de novo. People v. Slover, 323 Ill. App.3d 620, 623, 753 N.E.2d 554, 557 (2001). The cardinal rule ofstatutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to theintent of the legislature. People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260,269, 703 N.E.2d 901, 906 (1998). The words of a statute are tobe given their plain and commonly understood meanings. Krohe v.City of Bloomington, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1133, 1135-36, 769 N.E.2d551, 553 (2002). When the language of a statute is clear andunambiguous, it will be given effect without resort to the othertools of statutory construction. Segers v. Industrial Comm'n,191 Ill. 2d 421, 431, 732 N.E.2d 488, 494 (2000).
  

B. Section 2-622 of the Procedure Code

Prior to 1995, section 2-622(a) provided, in part, asfollows:

"In any action *** in which the plaintiff seeks damages for injuries or death byreason of medical, hospital, or other healingart malpractice, the plaintiff's attorney ***shall file an affidavit, attached to theoriginal and all copies of the complaint,declaring one of the following:

1. That the affiant has consulted andreviewed the facts of the case with a healthprofessional who *** has determined in awritten report, after a review of the medicalrecord and other relevant material involvedin the particular action that there is areasonable and meritorious cause for thefiling of such action ***. *** A copy of thewritten report, clearly identifying theplaintiff and the reasons for the reviewinghealth professional's determination that areasonable and meritorious cause for thefiling of the action exists, must be attachedto the affidavit, but information which wouldidentify the reviewing health professionalmay be deleted from the copy so attached.

2. That the affiant was unable toobtain a consultation required by paragraph 1because a statute of limitations would impairthe action and the consultation requiredcould not be obtained before the expirationof the statute of limitations." 735 ILCS5/2-622(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1994).

Prior to 1995, section 2-622 did not include a restriction on aplaintiff's right to voluntarily dismiss an action and refile thesuit if the plaintiff was unable to obtain the required consultation at the time of filing. Further, the name and address ofthe reviewing health professional was not required in the writtenreport.

With the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, theGeneral Assembly amended section 2-622 through the enactment ofPublic Act 89-7 (Act) (Pub. Act 89-7,