Plaintiff Castle Concrete, Inc. (Castle Concrete),appeals from the Champaign County circuit court's dismissal ofits negligence claim against defendant, Rebecca Grace Williams. This appeal presents the issue of whether an employer can maintain a cause of action against a third-party tortfeasor for lossof service or profits resulting from an employee's injuries wherethe injuries resulted from the tortfeasor's negligence. Weanswer this question in the negative and affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

In March 2001, plaintiff John Castle filed a negligencecomplaint against defendant, seeking damages for his injuriesresulting from an April 6, 2000, automobile accident. In February 2002, plaintiff filed a first-amended complaint, adding (1)as plaintiffs, John's wife, Angela Castle, and his employer,Castle Concrete, and (2) two additional counts. Count I wasJohn's original negligence claim, and count III containedAngela's consortium claim. In count II, Castle Concrete soughtto recover damages for loss of John's services as chief operatingofficer, resulting from defendant's negligence. We note thatCastle Concrete did not seek to recover damages to the Chevrolettruck involved in the accident.

In May 2002, defendant filed a motion to dismiss countII of the complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)), asserting MoormanManufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d443 (1982), barred Castle Concrete from recovering pure economicdamages. In June 2002, Castle Concrete filed a response, asserting Moorman only applied to actions involving a defective product. Defendant replied, citing several cases of the SupremeCourt of Illinois that applied the Moorman doctrine to actionsother than defective product cases.

In July 2002, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion. The trial court granted the motion, finding thelaw did not recognize a duty to Castle Concrete as the injuredparty's employer. The trial court then made a Supreme Court Rule304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) finding. This appeal followed.

A section 2-615 motion to dismiss presents the questionof whether the complaint sets forth sufficient facts that, ifestablished, could entitle the plaintiff to relief. In decidingsuch a motion, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts in thecomplaint as true and draw reasonable inferences from those factsin favor of the pleader. The court should grant the motion onlyif no set of facts can be proved that will entitle the plaintiffto recover. This court reviews de novo the granting of a section2-615 motion. Ashley v. Snyder, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1252, 1255, 739N.E.2d 897, 900 (2000).

With a negligence action, a plaintiff's complaint mustset forth facts establishing the existence of (1) a duty owed bythe defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, and(3) an injury proximately caused by that breach. Stutz v. Kamm,204 Ill. App. 3d 898, 903, 562 N.E.2d 399, 403 (1990). Defendantasserts Castle Concrete failed to state a cause of action becausethe facts alleged do not establish that defendant owed CastleConcrete a duty. In determining whether a defendant owes aparticular plaintiff a duty, a court should consider the following factors: (1) the reasonable foreseeability of injury, (2)the reasonable likelihood of injury, (3) the magnitude of theburden that guarding against injury places on the defendant, and(4) the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant. True v. Greenwood Manor West, Inc., 316 Ill. App. 3d 676, 679,737 N.E.2d 673, 676 (2000). Additionally, a court's determination of duty reflects the policy and social requirements of thetime and community. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & MedicalCenter, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 526-27, 513 N.E.2d 387, 396 (1987).

At common law, a master had a right to recover fortortious injury to his servants because the master would suffer aloss of services in addition to the loss of the servant himself. See Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61, 76, 529 N.E.2d 209, 216(1988) (Clark, J., specially concurring). However, severalcourts from other states have declined to find such a cause ofaction, holding the common-law right is outdated. See Morton v.Merrillville Toyota, Inc., 562 N.E.2d 781, 786 (Ind. App. 1990);Hartridge v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 86 Wis.2d 1, 12, 271 N.W.2d 598, 603 (1978). An essential function of acourt is to reevaluate common-law concepts in the light ofpresent-day realities. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 429,170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (1960). Whether the common-law rule is stillapplicable in Illinois is a question of first impression forIllinois courts. See Zawadzki v. Checker Taxi Co., 539 F. Supp.207, 208 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (no Illinois case on point).

The common-law right of a master to recover for loss ofservices due to a servant's injury by a negligent third party isrooted in feudalism, where the servant was considered a member ofthe master's household. Hartridge, 86 Wis. 2d at 7-8, 271 N.W.2dat 601; Restatement (Second) of Agency