The parties in this case include the City of Champaign(City) as well as two townships with similar names: the CityTownship of Champaign (east township) and Champaign Township(west township). The City and the east township formerly werecoterminous, but now their boundaries diverge. In November 2000,the west township sought a judicial declaration that after theCity and the east township ceased being coterminous, any territory that the City annexed from the west township did not becomepart of the east township but instead remained in the westtownship. The west township also sought an injunction consistentwith the proposed declaratory judgment. In September 2001, thecircuit court entered summary judgment against the west townshipand in defendants' favor. The west township appeals, arguingthat the circuit court misinterpreted section 15-20 of theTownship Code (60 ILCS 1/15-20 (West 2000)). We affirm.

Before December 7, 1999, the City and the east townshiphad identical boundaries. On December 7, 1999, the City annexedBaytowne Apartments in the west township. During the 12 monthspreceding December 7, 1999, the City had annexed other territoryin the west township. The combined equalized assessed value ofBaytowne Apartments and other territory that the City annexedduring this 12-month period exceeded 1% of the total equalizedassessed value of the west township. Therefore, the west township had a right to determine, by referendum, whether BaytowneApartments would remain a part of the west township or becomepart of the east township. See 60 ILCS 1/15-25 (West 1998).

On December 21, 1999, the board of trustees of the westtownship adopted a resolution stating that disconnecting BaytowneApartments would be contrary to the best interest of the westtownship. See 60 ILCS 1/15-15(a) (West 1998). The board requested a referendum, and in the primary election on March 21,2000, voters in the west township voted against disconnectingBaytowne Apartments from the west township. See 60 ILCS 1/15-15(a) through (c) (West 1998). As a result, Baytowne Apartmentsremained a part of the west township and did not become part ofthe east township. See 60 ILCS 1/15-15(e) (West 1998). The Cityand the east township no longer were coterminous; the City nowhad territory, Baytowne Apartments, that was outside the easttownship.

After December 7, 1999, when the City and the easttownship no longer were coterminous, the City annexed additionalterritory (disputed territory) in the west township. No onealleges that the City's annexation of the disputed territorytriggered the 1% rule in section 15-25 (60 ILCS 1/15-25 (West1998)) or that the west township ever requested a referendum onthat annexation.

On November 27, 2000, the west township filed a complaint, asking the circuit court to enjoin the City, the easttownship, and their officials from asserting jurisdiction overthe disputed territory. The west township also asked the courtto enter a declaratory judgment that after December 7, 1999, whenthe City and the east township ceased being coterminous, any"territory annexed by the City, including the disputed territory,*** was not disconnected from *** [the west township] and incorporated into the [east township] by operation of [s]ection 15-5(a) of the Township Code" (60 ILCS 1/15-5(a) (West 1998)). Thewest township named as defendants the City, east township, boardof trustees of Champaign County, county clerk, and county treasurer. Later, the parties added the county as a defendant. TheChampaign-Urbana Public Health District intervened as a defendantbecause the case would affect its boundaries.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On September 20, 2001, the circuit court denied the west township's motion for summary judgment, granted defendants' motionsfor summary judgment, and entered the following declaratoryjudgment:

"[T]he [east township] continues to be acoterminous township with the [City][,] andannexation to the City results in disconnection of property from the adjacent townshipsand connection to the [east township], exceptfor that land for which a referend[um] isrequested and held pursuant to [s]ection 15-15 of the Township Code (60 ILCS 1[/]15-15[(West 1998)]), and such referend[um] resultsin the failure of a proposition to disconnect."

This appeal followed.

The material facts are undisputed. This case turns onthe meaning of the final sentence in section 15-20 of the Township Code (60 ILCS 1/15-20 (West 1998)). We interpret statutesde novo. Milnes v. Hunt, 311 Ill. App. 3d 977, 980, 725 N.E.2d779, 781 (2000).

To understand section 15-20, one must read it in thecontext of other sections of article 15 of the Township Code. A"coterminous city"--that is to say, a city coterminous with atownship (60 ILCS 1/15-5(a) (West 1998))--has the power, byannexing territory, to change the boundaries of townships. See60 ILCS 1/15-15, 15-25 (West 1998). Any city, coterminous ornot, can change its own boundaries by annexing territory. Nameoki Township v. Granite City Township, 242 Ill. App. 3d 141,146-47, 610 N.E.2d 111, 114 (1993). A coterminous city, however,when it annexes territory, can thereby change not only its ownboundaries but also those of the adjacent and coterminous townships. By annexing territory in an adjacent township, thecoterminous city automatically disconnects that territory fromthe adjacent township and annexes it to the coterminous township. 60 ILCS 1/15-15, 15-25 (West 1998). There are limits, however,to this power of automatic annexation. If the equalized assessedvalue of territory that the city annexed from an adjacent township during a 12-month period equals 1% or more of the township'stotal equalized assessed value, the township may determine, byreferendum, whether the parcel will be disconnected. See 60 ILCS1/15-15, 15-25 (West 1998). Until the city reaches that statutory limit, the disconnection from the adjacent township andincorporation into the coterminous township are automatic whenever the city annexes a parcel of land. 60 ILCS 1/15-25 (West1998).

The west township interprets article 15 of the TownshipCode to provide that only a coterminous city can change theboundaries of townships by annexing property. See 60 ILCS 1/15-15, 15-25 (West 1998). It argues that because the City no longerwas coterminous when annexing the disputed territory, the disputed territory did not become part of the east township.

Section 15-20 of the Township Code reads as follows:

"Where the proposition to disconnect theterritory fails and it remains with the adjacent township, the status quo and operationof a township and the officers of a townshipcoterminous with a city at the time providedfor in this [a]rticle is not to be affected. Where the proposition to disconnect fails,the status quo of a council of a city that iscoterminous with a township at the time provided for in this [a]rticle and that alreadyis vested with the authority to exercise allpowers vested in that township is not affected. Where a city coterminous at the timeprovided for in this [a]rticle has providedby operation of law that certain offices ofthe city and the coterminous township shallbe united in the same person, or that theoffice and election of highway commissionersshall be discontinued, that provision shallcontinue to be the case after the propositionto disconnect the territory fails. Where theproposition to disconnect fails, vacancies inany of the township offices in a townshipcoterminous at the time provided for in this[s]ection may continue to be filled by thecity council. Where the proposition to disconnect fails or the city, its coterminoustownship, and the adjacent township agree byintergovernmental cooperation agreement thatthe territory shall remain part of the adjacent township, the city may annex the territory and[,] by doing so[,] does not relinquish its status as a city with a coterminoustownship." (Emphases added.) 60 ILCS 1/15-20 (West 1998).

When interpreting a statute, we strive to ascertainthe legislature's intent and to give effect to that intent. SeePeople v. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d 203, 212, 756 N.E.2d 804, 810(2001). The surest indicator of legislative intent is thelanguage in the statute, and thus our inquiry begins with thestatutory text. See Savory, 197 Ill. 2d at 212-13, 756 N.E.2d at810. If the language in the statute is clear and unambiguous,our inquiry ends there. See Savory, 197 Ill. 2d at 213, 756N.E.2d at 810. We will give the words in the statute their plainand ordinary meaning, and if the meaning is clear, we need notresort to other aids of construction. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d at213, 756 N.E.2d at 810.

The final sentence of section 15-20 says: "Where theproposition to disconnect fails ***, the city may annex theterritory and[,] by doing so[,] does not relinquish its status asa city with a coterminous township." 60 ILCS 1/15-20 (West1998). The west township argues that the word "coterminous" is"inherently ambiguous" because one can interpret the word assignifying either (1) the governance of the city and township,(2) automatic annexation, or (3) both. Because the word "coterminous" is ambiguous, the final sentence of section 15-20 also isambiguous, the west township reasons. We should resolve thispurported ambiguity, the west township says, by choosing option(1)--by holding that "coterminous" signifies only governance andnot automatic annexation. In other words, when the city's andtownship's boundaries diverge as a result of the failed referendum, city officials still may occupy the positions of townshipofficials, but the city otherwise relinquishes its status as acoterminous city and cannot automatically annex territory to theformerly coterminous township.

We find no ambiguity in the word "coterminous" or inthe final sentence of section 15-20. "In construing statutes[,]the ordinary, usual[,] and commonly accepted definitions of thewords employed therein are to be taken as the correct definitionsof such words, unless the statute gives special definitions tothe contrary ***." Wahlman v. C. Becker Milling Co., 279 Ill.612, 622, 117 N.E. 140, 144 (1917). The Township Code does notspecially define "coterminous," and therefore we assume that thelegislature used the word in its plain and ordinary sense. "Coterminous" means "having the same or coincident boundaries." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 262 (10th ed. 2000). Farfrom ambiguous, "coterminous" has a clear, singular meaning. Itmeans neither governance nor automatic annexation but, quitesimply, identical boundaries. The final sentence of section 15-20 also is straightforward. If the proposition to disconnectfails, the city may annex the territory, and although the city nolonger will have the same boundaries as the township, the citywill nevertheless retain its status as a city having the sameboundaries as a township.

Under the west township's interpretation, the lastsentence of section 15-20 preserves only part of the status of acoterminous city: its status with respect to governance. Thestatute does not so provide. "When the language of a statute isplain and unambiguous, courts may not read in exceptions, limitations, or other conditions." In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 419,752 N.E.2d 1112, 1120 (2001). When the legislature intended tosignify governance alone, it knew how to do so in fitting language. In section 15-20, all of the sentences preceding thefinal one clearly and explicitly pertain to governance. NameokiTownship, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 144, 610 N.E.2d at 113. The finalsentence speaks not of governance but of the status of a coterminous city.

We derive support for our interpretation from NameokiTownship. The facts in that case are similar to those in thepresent case. However, the events in Nameoki Township occurredbefore the adoption of Public Act 86-1299 (Pub. Act 86-1299, eff.January 1, 1991 (1990 Ill. Laws 2331-34) (amending Ill. Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 139, par. 127)), which added the final sentenceof section 15-20 to the statute. When the Fifth District decidedNameoki Township, the amendment was in force, but the FifthDistrict had to decide the case under the statute as it existedbefore the effective date of the amendment.

In Nameoki Township, Granite City and Granite CityTownship were coterminous. Nameoki Township, 242 Ill. App. 3d at142, 610 N.E.2d at 111. Granite City annexed the Gorbe subdivision in Nameoki Township, and in a referendum the voters inNameoki Township voted against disconnecting the subdivision. Nameoki Township, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 142, 610 N.E.2d at 111-12. As a result, the subdivision remained a part of Nameoki Township,and Granite City and Granite City Township no longer had identical boundaries. Nameoki Township, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43,610 N.E.2d at 112. Granite City afterward annexed additionalterritory. Nameoki Township, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 142, 610 N.E.2dat 112. The defendants argued that Granite City retained itsstatus as a coterminous city, even though it was no longercoterminous with the township, and that the additional territoryhad been automatically annexed to Granite City Township. NameokiTownship, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 143, 610 N.E.2d at 112.

The defendants in that case relied upon the followingstatutory provision (now the first sentence of section 15-20):

"'Where the proposition to disconnect theterritory fails and it remains with the adjacent township, the status quo and operationof a township and the officers of a townshipcoterminous with a city at the time providedfor herein shall not be affected.'" NameokiTownship, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 144, 610 N.E.2dat 113, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch.139, par. 127.

The defendants argued that because the statute provided that thestatus quo would be unchanged, the city's status as a coterminouscity also would be unchanged. Nameoki Township, 242 Ill. App. 3dat 144, 610 N.E.2d at 113.

The Fifth District disagreed with the defendants. Thesentence on which the defendants relied pertained only to thegovernance of the townships. Nameoki Township, 242 Ill. App. 3dat 144, 610 N.E.2d at 113. "Had the legislature intended coterminous townships and cities to maintain such status even thoughthey in fact did not have identical boundaries, the legislaturecould have included express language to that effect." NameokiTownship, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 145, 610 N.E.2d at 113. In the1991 amendment, the legislature added the express language to thestatute. If one accepted the defendants' interpretation, "therewould have been no reason to add the 1991 amendment[,] whichdeals not with 'status quo and operation' but with the 'status asa city with a coterminous township.'" Nameoki Township, 242 Ill.App. 3d at 146, 610 N.E.2d at 114. Every statutory amendmentpresumably had a purpose. Nameoki Township, 242 Ill. App. 3d at146, 610 N.E.2d at 114. "The amendment *** allows a city andtownship whose boundaries are not identical to annex propertyunder the statute as if they were coterminous if they had previously been coterminous." Nameoki Township, 242 Ill. App. 3d at146, 610 N.E.2d at 114.

The last-quoted sentence is not dicta, contrary to thewest township's assertion. It is essential to the court'sreasoning. The Fifth District held, in Nameoki Township, thatprior to the 1991 amendment, the statute did not preserve thestatus of a coterminous city after the city's and township'sboundaries diverged. The Fifth District found support for thatholding in the 1991 amendment itself, reasoning that thereotherwise would have been no purpose for the amendment.

We need not resort to the legislative debates on the1991 amendment. The west township concedes that the legislatorssometimes contradicted themselves in their remarks and that thedebates generally are ambiguous. Nevertheless, the west townshipquotes from the debates in an attempt to convince us that thefinal sentence of section 15-20 refers only to governance ratherthan (as it plainly says) to status as a coterminous city. Someremarks by legislators arguably support the west township'sposition, but other remarks do not. We will not try to distillthe collective intent of the legislature from the remarks of twoor three legislators when we have a far clearer and more reliablesource for ascertaining that intent: the statute itself. SeeSavory, 197 Ill. 2d at 213, 756 N.E.2d at 810. "[L]egislators donot make laws by making speeches on the floor of the legislativechamber ***. *** Neither the disclosed nor undisclosed intent ofa legislator *** becomes law; only the bill as it reads whenpassed becomes law." (Emphasis in original.) Town of the Cityof Bloomington v. Bloomington Township, 233 Ill. App. 3d 724,736, 599 N.E.2d 62, 70 (1992).

Invoking the rule that statutes should be interpretedin a reasonable manner, the west township argues that the trialcourt's interpretation of section 15-20 would yield impracticaland absurd results and that the interpretation, therefore, mustbe incorrect. For example, if the City still had the power ofautomatic annexation, it theoretically could annex the territorysurrounding Baytowne Apartments and thereby turn Baytowne Apartments into an "island," "with resulting confusion, inefficiency[,] and difficulty in" providing local governmental services. We do not consider this result to be so "absurd" as tojustify a court's disregarding the plain meaning of the statutein the belief that the legislature meant something different. Weassume that the legislature foresaw the possible formation of"islands" when it provided that a city "does not relinquish itsstatus as a city with a coterminous township." 60 ILCS 1/15-20(West 1998). The benefit of automatic annexation is reducing thenumber of city and township officials providing overlappingservices. See People ex rel. Village of Hinsdale v. Board ofSupervisors, 309 Ill. App. 609, 616, 33 N.E.2d 761, 764 (1941). See 60 ILCS 1/15-50, 15-55 (West 1998). Redundant officers andexpenses arguably are "absurd," even when the boundaries of thecity and township no longer strictly coincide. Apparently thelegislature thought that eliminating one "absurdity" was worthrisking the other. It is the legislature's job, not ours, tomake public policy. See Michigan Avenue National Bank v. Countyof Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 522, 732 N.E.2d 528, 544 (2000)("'[C]ourts may not legislate, rewrite[,] or extend legislation. If the statute as enacted seems to operate in certain casesunjustly or inappropriately, the appeal must be to the GeneralAssembly, and not to the court.' [Citation.]").

The west township next argues that preserving the powerof automatic annexation would thwart the General Assembly'sintent in providing for referenda on proposed disconnections. See 60 ILCS 1/15-15 (West 1998). That intent, according to thewest township, was "to provide adjacent townships a mechanism bywhich to halt the loss of [equalized assessed value]." As someof the defendants point out, the General Assembly obviously neverintended to halt the disconnection of territory from the adjacenttownship. If the legislature had so intended, it could havesimply repealed article 15. The legislature intended merely toslow down the process and give the adjacent townships time toadjust. A city still can whittle away an adjacent township inincrements smaller than 1% of its equalized assessed value over12 months, without the challenge of a referendum. 60 ILCS 1/15-25 (West 1998); see also 60 ILCS 1/15-30 (West 1998) (providingthat for 10 years after the disconnection, the city must compensate the adjacent township for the resulting loss of real estatetaxes).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

MYERSCOUGH and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.