In September 2003, the American Federation of State,County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, AFL-CIO (AFSCME)filed petitions with the Illinois Labor Relations Board, StatePanel (Board), to be certified as the representative of certainpublic employees of the Champaign-Urbana Public Health District(District). In October 2003, a unit-preference election wasconducted, and voters favored a combined unit of professional andnonprofessional employees. In November 2003, the Board certifiedAFSCME as the exclusive representative of the employees. TheDistrict has sought review of that certification.

On review, the District argues (1) the Board's certification is void as a matter of law because the Board certified arepresentative under rules not lawfully adopted, (2) the Boardarbitrarily combined two separate petitions into a single petition for recognition in a combined unit, and (3) the Board'scertification of AFSCME as the bargaining representative waserroneous. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 4, 2003, AFSCME filed with the Board two"Request[s] for Voluntary Recognition Certification" with respectto nonprofessional and professional employees of the District incase Nos. S-VR-04-002 and S-VR-04-006. Each petition excludedthe employees covered by the other petition from the proposedbargaining unit. AFSCME indicated its request for recognitionfor the professional and nonprofessional employees of the District was based on "the recently-enacted legislation HB 3396." Further, an AFSCME organizer stated she had "submitted authorization cards as evidence of majority support."

On September 26, 2003, the Board sent a letter to theDistrict, advising that it had received "the attached representation petition, filed pursuant to [s]ection 9(a)(5) of theIllinois Public [Labor] Relations Act [(5 ILCS 315/9(a)(5) (West2002)) (Act)], as amended." (Emphasis in original.) The letteradvised the District that it was required to immediately submitan alphabetized list of names, job classifications, and signatureexemplars of the employees in the unit. The District was notified it must respond to the petition within 14 days, raising anyissues concerning the appropriateness of the bargaining unit andwhether any employees should be excluded from the unit. Further,if the District believed "the petitioner obtained its showing ofmajority support through the use of fraud or coercion, [it] mustprovide clear and convincing evidence of that fraud or coercion"at the time of filing the response. The Board also required theDistrict to post an enclosed "Notice to Employees" in conspicuousplaces for 14 consecutive days.

On October 1, 2003, the District's attorney, FredericM. Grosser, sent a letter to the Board, indicating he had previously sent a facsimile transmission on September 12, 2003,requesting he be furnished with "copies of the signed authorization cards" referenced in the requests for voluntary recognition. Grosser stated the information was necessary for the District todetermine an appropriate response. On October 6, 2003, theDistrict provided the Board with an updated alphabetical list ofnames and job classifications of the employees in the unitsdescribed in both of AFSCME's petitions and also included signatures from the added or new employees.

On October 14, 2003, the District sent a letter to theBoard, indicating it "generally agrees" with the bargaining unitas proposed. The District stated it concurred "with the petitionthat this proposed bargaining unit for professional employeesshould exclude all non[]professional employees" because eachgroup has "a different community of interest[s], includingskills, functions[,] and licensing requirements." The Districtnoted it had twice requested copies of signed authorization cardsbut had not received a response from the Board. Without therequested information, the District stated it was "unable to takeany position at this time with respect to the propriety of thepetition, except as otherwise set forth in this response." Alsoon October 14, 2003, the Board sent a letter to the District,indicating the Board "scheduled a unit[-]preference election" inthese cases to be held on October 24, 2003.

On October 23, 2003, the District sent a letter to theBoard, objecting to the Board's scheduled unit-preference election. The District stated the election appeared "contrary to thepetitions filed by AFSCME" and it had "not been apprised ofwhether either petition [was] supported by a proper showing ofinterest." The District alleged it could "not find the basis inIllinois statutes or rules for the *** Board to initiate such aunit-preference election without first determining whether or nota majority of each proposed bargaining unit supports unionrepresentation."

The "Notice of Election" issued by the Board was postedby the District (certified on October 22, 2003) and indicated itspurpose was to determine whether the employees named in thepetition "wish to be represented in a single bargaining unitcontaining both professional and nonprofessional employees, or inseparate bargaining units of professional or nonprofessionalemployees." The notice described two units: "Unit A (professional employees) and Unit B (nonprofessional employees)."

The "Tally of Ballots," dated October 24, 2003, indicated that of the 51 eligible voters in group A (professionalemployees), 33 votes were cast in favor of a combined unit, while13 were cast against a combined unit. Of the 27 eligible votersin group B (nonprofessional employees), 17 votes were cast infavor of a combined unit, while 5 were cast against it.

On November 21, 2003, the Board issued a "Tally ofMajority Interest," finding of the 85 employees in the appropriate unit, 49 signed valid cards for AFSCME, declaring AFSCME hadprevailed in the determination of majority support. The Boardthereby certified that a majority of the employees in thepetitioned-for unit had indicated support for AFSCME and thatlabor organization was the exclusive representative of all theemployees in the unit. On December 23, 2003, the Districtpetitioned this court for administrative review of thecertification-of-representative order certifying AFSCME as theexclusive representative of all employees in the unit.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

The Board argues this court lacks jurisdiction in thismatter. We disagree.

Section 9(i) of the Act (5 ILCS 315/9(i) (West 2002))provides for direct review by the appellate court of the Board'scertification that a labor organization has been fairly andfreely chosen by a majority of employees in an appropriatebargaining unit. Any direct appeal by an aggrieved party shallbe filed within 35 days from the date a copy of the decisionsought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by thedecision. 5 ILCS 315/9(i) (West 2002).

In the case sub judice, the Board issued its certification of representative on November 21, 2003. The Districtindicated it received the order on November 24, 2003. The proofof service signed by the District's attorney certified he servedthe petition for administrative review by mail on December 23,2003. The Board stamped December 23 and 24, 2003, as the datesof receipt of the petition. The petition was filed in this courton December 29, 2003.

Under Supreme Court Rule 373 (155 Ill. 2d R. 373), thetime of filing materials required to be filed within a specifiedtime will be the date they are received by the clerk of thereviewing court. However, if the materials are received afterthe due date, "the time of mailing shall be deemed the time offiling." 155 Ill. 2d R. 373. In this case, the District'sattorney certified he served the petition for administrativereview by depositing copies in the mail on December 23, 2003. Asthat date falls within the 35-day time limit for filing a directappeal, we have jurisdiction over this matter.

B. Standing

AFSCME argues the District lacks standing to raise theissues on appeal. We disagree.

According to the Act, any person aggrieved by a finalorder certifying a representative may apply for and obtainjudicial review. 5 ILCS 315/9(i) (West 2002). In this case, theDistrict was a party to the representation proceeding, and thecertification binds the District to a collective-bargainingrelationship with AFSCME. Thus, the District has standing toappeal the Board's final order.

AFSCME argues the District has no cognizable legalinterest to give it standing. However, AFSCME's reliance onAmerican Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees,Council 31 v. Ryan, 347 Ill. App. 3d 732, 807 N.E.2d 1235 (2004),and American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees,Council 31 v. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d 866, 773 N.E.2d 739 (2002),is unpersuasive. Those cases dealt with the Illinois HealthFacilities Planning Act (Planning Act) (20 ILCS 3960/1 through19.6 (West 2000)) and whether private lawsuits could be utilizedto enforce the Planning Act's permit requirements. AFSCME hasoffered no argument on how the analysis of the Planning Act inthose cases translates into a lack of standing for the Districtunder the Act here.

AFSCME attempts to highlight the "statutory languageand the historical background" of section 9(a-5) of the Act (5ILCS 315/9(a-5) (West Supp. 2003)) as reason for the District'salleged lack of standing. AFSCME's argument is again unpersuasive. Section 9(a-5), which took effect on August 5, 2003, dealswith the designation of an exclusive representative and how theBoard may ascertain the employees' choice of employee organization. Section 9(a-5) did not change section 9(i) and its provision for an aggrieved party to seek judicial review in theappellate court as to issues involving a certification of arepresentative. As the Act provides for appeal of a certification of representative and the District's interests are implicated in this case, the District has standing, and this courtwill hear its appeal.

C. Standard of Review

Judicial review of an agency's decisions is governed bythe Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3-101through 113 (West 2000)). 5 ILCS 315/9(i) (West 2002); City ofBelvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d191, 204, 692 N.E.2d 295, 301-02 (1998). The Review Law specifies that judicial review of a final administrative decisionextends to all questions of law and fact presented in the record. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2002).

The Board's findings of fact are held prima facie trueand correct and will only be reversed on appeal if they areagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. Illinois FraternalOrder of Police Labor Council v. Illinois Local Labor RelationsBoard, 319 Ill. App. 3d 729, 736, 745 N.E.2d 647, 653 (2001). Adecision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only ifthe opposite conclusion is clearly evident. City of Tuscola v.Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 314 Ill. App. 3d 731, 733-34, 732 N.E.2d 784, 786 (2000). Where the issue before thereviewing court involves the Board's conclusions of law, however,the court's review is de novo. Illinois Fraternal Order ofPolice, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 745 N.E.2d at 653.

D. The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act

When it became effective in July 1984, the Act had thestated policy "to grant public employees full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives oftheir own choosing for the purpose of negotiating wages, hours[,]and other conditions of employment or other mutual aid or protection." 5 ILCS 315/2 (West 2002). The Act created the IllinoisLabor Relations Board (5 ILCS 315/5 (West 2002)) and set forththe relationship parameters between public employers and exclusive representatives regarding, inter alia, the duty to bargaincollectively (5 ILCS 315/7 (West 2002)), grievance procedures (5ILCS 315/8 (West 2002)), elections (5 ILCS 315/9 (West 2002)),unfair labor practices (5 ILCS 315/10 (West 2002)), and the rightto strike (5 ILCS 315/17 (West 2002)).

Since 1984, an "exclusive representative" meant a labororganization that had been historically recognized by the publicemployer prior to the Act, voluntarily recognized by a publicemployer after the effective date of the Act, or determined bymeans of an election. 5 ILCS 315/3(f), 9(a) (West 2002). Undersection 9(a)(1) of the Act (5 ILCS 315/9(a)(1) (West 2002)), alabor organization may petition for an election by demonstratingthat 30% of the public employees in an appropriate unit wish tobe represented by a labor organization as exclusive representative.

Effective August 5, 2003, Public Act 93-444 took effectand added subsection (a-5) to section 9 of the Act. Pub. Act 93-444,