16 August 2000

Plaintiffs, Vanessa Chaney, Ella Chaney, ElizabethChaney, and Terrance Chaney, through their parent, VanessaChaney, filed this tort action against Yetter ManufacturingCompany (Yetter) seeking damages for injuries that Vanessa Chaney(Chaney) sustained in a work-related accident. On February 14,1996, Chaney's right hand was severed at the wrist when her glovewas caught in a rotating drill at the Yetter plant. Chaney wasemployed by Genie Temporary and Executive Services (Genie) and,on the date in question, was assigned by Genie to work atYetter's plant. Chaney previously recovered workers' compensation benefits from Genie relating to the accident.

Genie supplied Yetter with temporary workers duringpeak demand periods. In exchange, Yetter paid Genie the employees' hourly wage plus a percentage fee. As is common withtemporary agencies, Genie handled its employees' payroll, taxwithholding and reporting, and insurance. Genie also providedworkers' compensation coverage for its employees. In fact, thecontract between Genie and Yetter specifically provided:

"(c) Supplier [(Genie)] is also responsible

for [w]orkers' [c]ompensation and [g]eneral

[l]iability insurance coverage for all tem-

porary employees, and will furnish Client

[(Yetter)] a [c]ertificate of [i]nsurance as

evidence of inforce coverage at all times

during this agreement.

(e) The Supplier [(Genie)] hereby indem-

nifies and holds harmless Client [(Yetter)]

from any judgment, finding, or assessment of

liability under the Workers' Compensation

Act or the laws of Illinois for injuries

allegedly suffered by a temporary employee."

In response to plaintiffs' complaint, Yetter filed severalaffirmative defenses, one of which raised the exclusive remedyprovisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS305/5(a) (West 1996) (employee has no common law right to recoverdamages other than those provided by the Act)). Yetter contendedthat it was a "borrowing employer" and Chaney was a "loanedemployee" at the time of the accident and, as such, Yetter wasentitled to the protections of the Act's exclusive remedy provision. 820 ILCS 305/1(a)(4) (West 1996) (borrowing employerscovered by Act). Yetter subsequently filed a motion for summaryjudgment on this same basis. The circuit court granted Yetter'smotion in a docket entry order. Chaney's motion for reconsideration was denied, and the court specifically ruled that Genie (asthe loaning employer) and Yetter (as the borrowing employer) wereprotected by the Act's exclusive remedy provisions. On appeal,Chaney argues that summary judgment was improper.

The Act is designed to provide financial protection toworkers for accidental injuries arising out of and in the courseof employment. Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill. 2d455, 462, 564 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (1990). Accordingly, the Actimposes liability without fault upon the employer and, in return,prohibits common-law suits by employees against the employer. The exclusive remedy provision "'is part of the quid pro quo inwhich the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are tosome extent put in balance, for, while the employer assumes a newliability without fault, he is relieved of the prospect of largedamage verdicts.'" Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 462, 564 N.E.2d at1225, quoting 2A A. Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation