14 April 2000

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In August 1997, plaintiff, the City of Springfield (thecity), filed a petition to condemn certain property owned bydefendant West Koke Mill Development Corporation (Koke Mill) andmortgaged to defendant First of America Bank-Springfield, N.A.(First of America), to make roadway improvements. In April 1999,after a trial, a jury awarded Koke Mill $54,925 as justcompensation. Koke Mill and First of America appeal, arguingthat (1) the city's appraisal witness used methods that violatedthe so-called "unit rule" in evaluating the condemned property,and (2) the city failed to make a bona fide effort to negotiate aprice prior to bringing this suit. We affirm.

Throughout this litigation, Koke Mill and First ofAmerica have been represented by the same attorneys and, in everyway relevant for the issues presented in this appeal, have actedas though they were a single party. To simplify our discussion,we will refer to both defendants simply as Koke Mill.

Koke Mill owns an approximately square, six-acre tractof land in Springfield. The property's southern border runsalong Iles Avenue, and its eastern border runs down the center ofKoke Mill Road. Prior to this litigation, a 20-foot-wide,perpetual right-of-way easement for Koke Mill Road ran along theeastern edge of the property. The strip of land next to thateasement was used primarily for drainage. In its August 1997complaint, the city sought to condemn a 50-foot strip along IlesAvenue and a 60-foot strip along Koke Mill Road, including theexisting right-of-way, for the purpose of widening the two roads.

In November 1998, the city filed a motion to amend itscomplaint, which the trial court ultimately granted. In theamended complaint, the city continued to seek the 60-foot stripto widen Koke Mill Road but no longer sought the strip along IlesAvenue. The city sought just under one acre of Koke Mill's six-acre lot.

At the April 1999 jury trial, the city called GaryLarson, a professional real estate appraiser, to testifyregarding (1) what the city should pay Koke Mill for the land thecity took, and (2) how he made that determination. He used the"market" approach, which entailed researching recent sales ofproperty he deemed comparable to Koke Mill's six-acre tract. Hethen determined a value for the portion of the property to becondemned in the following manner. First, Larson arrived at avalue for the entire six-acre parcel by comparing its physicalcharacteristics and location to the properties he found in hismarket research. Second, using the same technique, he determinedthe value of the remainder property--that is, the Koke Millproperty that Koke Mill had left after the city's taking. Hebased his valuation of the remainder, in part, on his opinionthat the portion to be taken by the city contributed less to thevalue of the overall parcel than the portion remaining did. Finally, Larson subtracted the value of the remainder from thevalue of the whole to arrive at the amount of just compensationfor the portion the city was condemning. Larson recommended$31,500 as just compensation.

Koke Mill moved to strike Larson's testimony, arguingthat his appraisal method was contrary to law. The court deniedKoke Mill's motion.

Charles Johnson, another professional real estateappraiser, testified for Koke Mill. Like Larson, Johnsonresearched comparable transactions in the area of the subjectproperty. However, Johnson used that information to determine aper-square-foot price for Koke Mill's six-acre tract. He thencalculated the value of the portion to be condemned bymultiplying the same per-square-foot figure by the number ofsquare feet that the city sought. The resulting figure was$146,496.

On this evidence, the jury awarded Koke Mill $54,925,as stated. This appeal followed.

First, Koke Mill argues that the trial court erred byrefusing to strike Larson's appraisal testimony. Specifically,Koke Mill points out that, in determining the value of theremainder property, Larson took into account his opinion that thearea to be condemned contributed less to the value of the overallparcel than other portions of that property. Koke Mill arguesthat Larson's methodology violated the rule governing partialcondemnation cases, which requires that the area to be condemnedbe evaluated as a part of the original lot and not as a separateparcel. We disagree.

Article I, section 15, of the Illinois Constitutionprovides, in relevant part, that "[p]rivate property shall not betaken or damaged for public use without just compensation asprovided by law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,