JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

The Vermilion County sheriff and Vermilion County(hereinafter employers) petition for review of the decision ofthe Illinois State Labor Relations Board, State Panel (Board),finding that all full-time corrections sergeants (hereinaftersergeants) employed by the employers represent an appropriateunit for collective bargaining, as defined by section 3(s)(1) ofthe Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 ILCS 315/3(s)(1)(West 2000)). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2001, respondent, the Illinois FraternalOrder of Police Labor Council (hereinafter union), filed a"Representation/Certification Petition" with the Board, allegingthat 30% of the employers' employees in an appropriate unit, asdefined in section 3(s)(1)of the Act (5 ILCS 315/3(s)(1) (West2000)), request an election to determine whether the union shouldbe certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for the employeesin that unit. The union alleged that the appropriate unitincluded all full-time sergeants and excluded all other employeesof the employer.

In October 2001, an administrative law judge (ALJ) ofthe Board conducted a hearing on the union's petition. At thehearing, the employers did not agree to recognize the unit on theground that the sergeants are considered "supervisors," and,therefore, do not constitute an appropriate bargaining unit underthe Act. See 5 ILCS 315/3(s)(1) (West 2000) ("a bargaining unitdetermined by the Board shall not include both employees andsupervisors, or supervisors only"). Accordingly, the ALJ found,and the parties agreed, that the only issue was whether thesergeants are "supervisors" within the meaning of the Act. Theparties further agreed that should the sergeants be found not tobe supervisors within the meaning of the Act, they constitute anappropriate bargaining unit.

Vermilion County Sheriff William Patrick Hartshorntestified on the employers' behalf that the corrections divisionconsists of 1 captain, 1 administrative lieutenant, 5 sergeants,and 30 correctional officers. The captain and lieutenant bothwork the first shift only (from 7 a.m. until 3 p.m.), with thecaptain working Monday through Friday and the lieutenant workinga six-day work schedule with three days off on a rotating basis. One sergeant is assigned to the first shift, two sergeants areassigned to the second shift (from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m.), and twosergeants are assigned to the third shift (from 11 p.m. to 7a.m.). The sergeant is the only representative of the employerson the second and third shifts because no other managementpersonnel are in the correctional facility during those shifts. The sergeants are also the only representatives of the employerson the first shift on weekend days when the lieutenant's days offrotate to the weekend.

Hartshorn also testified regarding the sergeant jobdescription, which is provided to all employees of the correctional facility and was admitted into evidence. Sergeants (1)determine which correctional officers will work certain postsduring a shift, (2) assign correctional officers to do routinework (such as processing prisoners for court appearances, releasing work-release prisoners, and taking prisoners for medicalcare), and (3) ensure that work is done. Captains and lieutenants do not perform the same function. Correctional officers areobligated to follow the commands of the sergeant. If the minimumnumber of correctional officers are not present for a shift, thesergeants have independent authority to call an off-duty correctional officer to work and to force a correctional officer towork overtime until the shift roster is filled. When new prisoners arrive, the sergeant assures that enough personnel arepresent to receive prisoners and reviews each correctionalofficer's paperwork to ensure it is completed correctly. Sergeants oversee everything that a correctional officer does on adaily basis; however, they do not complete periodic writtenevaluations of those officers.

Hartshorn further testified that sergeants have theauthority to issue oral and written reprimands and have independent authority to send a correctional officer home for violating adirect order or for being unfit for duty. Following such action,the sergeant must submit a written report of the violation to thelieutenant or captain, who then reviews the report to determine"whether *** there's something that needs to be changed" and thenforwards the report to the sheriff "for the disciplinary action." The sergeant is not required to recommend any form of disciplinebut may do so. A written report from a sergeant is the firststep in the discipline process. A sergeant has discretion tohandle infractions at "his level" without submitting a writtenreport up the chain of command to the sheriff. The only infractions that a sergeant is required to report are the following:(1) a correctional officer is late for his shift; and (2) acorrectional officer engages in behavior that creates a "threatto the facility." The sergeants use their discretion to determine whether behavior creates a "threat to the facility." Correctional officers may appeal the sergeants' actions undertheir collective-bargaining agreement.

Hartshorn also testified that according to the grievance procedure in the collective-bargaining agreement, grievancesshould be submitted first to the sergeants. If the grievance canbe handled at the shift level, the sergeants have authority to doso without consulting the lieutenant, captain, or sheriff. (Thecorrectional officers' collective-bargaining agreement wasadmitted into evidence.)

Sergeant Stanley E. Rush testified on the union'sbehalf that he works the first shift. At the beginning of hisshift, Rush (1) confers with the previous shift sergeants todetermine if any incidents occurred, (2) determines that allfirst-shift correctional officers are present, and (3) assignstheir posts. Rush does not assign himself a post, although he iscounted when determining minimum staffing levels. Rush isusually on the fourth floor of the facility taking phone calls orhandling requests from the lieutenant or captain. He assignstasks to correctional officers, such as escorting attorneys tomeetings with prisoners or taking prisoners to get dressed forcourt. If needed, Rush will also perform these tasks himself.

Rush also testified that 75% of his shift is spentperforming correctional officer duties. He completes cellchecks, delivers money, dresses prisoners, releases work-releaseprisoners, helps process incoming prisoners, and escorts attorneys to meetings with prisoners. The remainder of his shift isspent performing tasks only sergeants perform. If he holdsofficers over or calls officers in, in accordance with thecollective-bargaining agreement, the additional work is offeredto senior officers first, and if none accept, the least seniorofficer is ordered to stay. In any emergency, officers can beheld over or called in. Such an emergency would be for a reasonother than falling below minimum staffing levels. In such acase, the sergeant would not need permission from the lieutenantor captain to hold over or call in officers. Rush had never heldover or called in additional officers for other than minimumstaffing levels without checking with the lieutenant or captainfirst, but he believed he has the authority to do so.

Rush further testified that he only receives requestsfor time off if the correctional officer needs to document thatthe request was made within the time limitation specified in thecollective-bargaining agreement. He does not grant or deny time-off requests. If Rush determines that the next shift will fallbelow minimum staffing levels, he notifies a union representative. The union representative determines which officer shouldbe called in (based on seniority) and informs the sergeant. Ifan officer brings to a sergeant a minor dispute between officers,the sergeant has authority to resolve it. However, he does nothandle written grievances. Rush did not recall ever issuing awritten reprimand but was aware of the captain's having issuedwritten reprimands based on Rush's written report.

Rush was not aware that he has authority to issue awritten reprimand. He occasionally verbally informs the lieutenant when he talks to officers about their mistakes. If someonecommits an act of misconduct on his shift, Rush is supposed toresolve the issue as best he can. If he cannot do so immediately, he writes a report to the captain. He has authority tosend someone home if he determines that action is warranted, buthe has never done so, and other sergeants have done so infrequently. No rules govern what behavior a sergeant must documentin a written report.

If a problem arises on Rush's shift, the correctionalofficers come to him for resolution. Rush does not always go tothe captain or lieutenant for advice when a problem arises, andhe has authority to resolve problems related to everyday workingconditions. If an employee needs additional training on aparticular skill, Rush has the responsibility as a sergeant toensure that the officer receive help or training.

Rush attends command meetings that are also attended bythe captain, lieutenant, other sergeants, and occasionally thesheriff, where overall shift performance is discussed. The jobdescription for sergeants differs from the correctional officers'job description in that sergeants have the duty to supervise andmanage correctional officers. Correctional officers cannot sendsomeone home or call someone back to work. Further, they aresupposed to report observations of misbehavior to the sergeant. If an employee is sick, correctional officers are required toreport that information to the sergeant, who then determineswhether to seek hospitalization. Rush described his principalduties as follows: "Making sure things are done at the propertime in the proper way as regards my personnel, and if they'renot available, then I'd do it."

In March 2002, the ALJ filed his recommended decisionand order, in which he (1) determined that the correctionalsergeants are "supervisors" within the meaning of the Act, and(2) recommended that the petition be dismissed.

In April 2002, the union timely filed exceptions to theALJ's recommended decision and order. The union argued that "thefocus is whether the [s]ergeants consistently exercise independent judgment with regard to disciplining, suspending, adjustinggrievances, and directing the corrections officers. The [u]nionlimits its exception to these areas." The employers did not filea response.

In August 2002, the Board issued its written order,concluding that the sergeants are not "supervisors" within themeaning of the Act and directing an election in the petitioned-for unit. Specifically, the Board found, in pertinent part, thefollowing: (1) the sergeants have authority, in the employer'sinterest, to perform 1 of the 11 statutorily enumerated supervisory functions--namely, the authority to suspend correctionsofficers; and (2) "the sergeants do not exercise [that] supervisory authority with consistent judgment a preponderance of theirwork time." In October 2002, the Board issued a "Certificate ofRepresentative," naming the union as the exclusive representativeof a unit consisting of all sergeants employed by the employers.

In November 2002, the employers filed in this court apetition for review of the Board's decision.

II. ANALYSIS

The employers argue that the Board erred by determiningthat the sergeants are not supervisors under section 3(r) of theAct (5 ILCS 315/3(r) (West 2000)). We disagree.

The Board, as the agency charged with administering andenforcing the Act, is empowered to determine whether an individual is a "supervisor" under the Act. City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 135 Ill. 2d 499, 507, 554N.E.2d 155, 159 (1990). This court's review of the Board'sdecision is governed by section 3-110 of the AdministrativeReview Law (Law) (735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2000)) and extends toall questions of law and fact presented in the record. Whilethis court must view the Board's findings of fact as prima facietrue and correct, we will reverse those findings if they areagainst the manifest weight of the evidence and it is clearlyevident the Board should have reached the opposite conclusion. Freeport, 135 Ill. 2d at 507, 554 N.E.2d at 159. Questions oflaw, such as the proper interpretation of a statute, are reviewedde novo. See Freeport, 135 Ill. 2d at 507, 554 N.E.2d at 159-60.

The Act provides a comprehensive system of collectivebargaining for those public employees and employers who fallwithin its scope. Freeport, 135 Ill. 2d at 505, 554 N.E.2d at158. The Act specifies that a bargaining unit determined by theBoard may not include both supervisors and nonsupervisors. 5ILCS 315/3(s)(1) (West 2000). Our supreme court has explainedthe underlying rationale for this rule as follows:

"Supervisors are excluded from bargaining units under the Act to avoid the conflictof interest which arises when supervisors,who must apply the employer's policies tosubordinates, are subject to control by thesame union representing those subordinates." Freeport, 135 Ill. 2d at 517, 554 N.E.2d at164.

"Supervisor" is defined in section 3(r) of the Act (5ILCS 315/3(r) (West 2000)) as follows:

"[A]n employee whose principal work issubstantially different from that of his orher subordinates and who has authority, inthe interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, direct, reward, or discipline employees, to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend any of those actions, if theexercise of that authority is not of a merelyroutine or clerical nature, but requires theconsistent use of independent judgment. Except with respect to police employment, theterm 'supervisor' includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of theiremployment time to exercising that authority."

Citing Freeport, the Board in this case stated that,when determining whether the sergeants are supervisors within themeaning of section 3(r) of the Act, it would consider whetherthey (1) performed principal work substantially different fromthat of their subordinates; (2) had authority in the interest ofthe employers to (a) "perform one or more of the 11 enumeratedsupervisory indicia" in section 3(r), or (b) effectively recommend such action; (3) consistently used independent judgment inthe performance of those functions; and (4) spent a preponderanceof their employment time engaged in supervisory activities. 5ILCS 315/3(r) (West 2000). However, the supreme court inFreeport made clear that in certain circumstances, the fourthprong of this analysis--the preponderance prong--does not apply:

"The Act specifically states that, inpolice employment, supervisory employees arenot required to meet the fourth part of theAct's supervisory definition. [Citation.]Thus, police employees may qualify assupervisors even if they do not devote apreponderance of their employment timeexercising their supervisory authority." Freeport, 135 Ill. 2d at 512, 554 N.E.2d at162.

In reversing the Board's determination that sergeantswith the City of Freeport police department were not supervisorswithin the meaning of section 3(r) of the Act, the court furtherstated as follows:

"The Board improperly gave dispositiveweight to the amount of time the rankingofficers spend exercising their supervisoryauthority. The Board essentially requiresthat the ranking officers be principallyinvolved in exercising supervisory functionsbefore it will find that their work issubstantially different from that of theirsubordinates. [Citation.] The Act expresslystates, however, that the fourth prong of thesupervisory test need not be satisfied withrespect to police employment. [Citation.]Thus, a police employee may be deemed asupervisor under the Act even if he does notdevote a preponderance of his work time toexercising supervisory authority." Freeport,135 Ill. 2d at 517, 554 N.E.2d at 164.

Thus, an important initial inquiry in this case seemsto be whether the employment of the sergeants at the VermilionCounty jail constitutes "police employment," as that term is usedin section 3(r) of the Act. 5 ILCS 315/3(r) (West 2000). Interestingly, we note that section 3(p) of the Act defines"security employee," in part, as one "who is responsible for thesupervision and control of inmates at correctional facilities." 5 ILCS 315/3(p) (West 2000). That definition surely encompassesthe sergeants at issue in this case. Further, section 3(k)defines "peace officer," in part, as one who has been appointedto a police force, department, "or agency and sworn orcommissioned to perform police duties." 5 ILCS 315/3(k) (West2000). Section 3(k) also contains a list of persons who are notincluded within the definition of "peace officer"; that list doesnot include security employees.

Most significantly, the term "police employment," asused in section 3(r) of the Act, is not defined therein, and wehave found no case construing the breadth of that term. Thesupreme court in Freeport referred to "police employment" but didso in the context of evaluating employees in a police department. Specifically, regarding the sergeants at issue here, we havefound no case that states--or even indicates--whether "policeemployment" might be broad enough to include these "securityemployees."

Clearly, if the sergeants in the present case wereengaged in "police employment," then both the Board and thiscourt would have to view the facts of this record through adifferent prism. The supreme court in Freeport explained why asfollows:

"If the ranking officers are not supervisors,the Freeport police department operatesentirely without supervision a large part ofthe time. In such circumstances, it is notunreasonable to conclude that even therelatively small amount of supervisory powerexercised by the ranking officers makes themrepresentatives of their employer." (Emphasis added.) Freeport, 135 Ill. 2d at522, 554 N.E.2d at 166.

Given the nature of the sergeants' duties and the othersimilarities between this case and Freeport (at least from thepoint of view of the employers), the sergeants' employment mayfit within the meaning of "police employment" under section 3(r),thus reducing the Board's inquiry from four prongs to three as itdetermines whether the sergeants are supervisors. 5 ILCS315/3(r) (West 2000). However, for two reasons, we decline toresolve this issue.

First, in deference to the Board's expertise as well asits fact-finding ability, we prefer that the Board address thisissue in the first instance. For example, due to size or otherfactors, sergeants at one jail might be viewed as being involvedin "police employment" within the meaning of section 3(r) of theAct, whereas sergeants at another jail would not. 5 ILCS315/3(r) (West 2000). The Board should have the opportunity toinitially draw such distinctions.

Second, the record reveals that the employers neverargued before the Board that the sergeants' employmentconstituted "police employment," as that term is used in section3(r) of the Act. 5 ILCS 315/3(r) (West 2000). Thus, theemployers' position in this case is similar to the position ofthe employers in American Federation of State, County, &Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois Local Labor RelationsBoard, 221 Ill. App. 3d 814, 582 N.E.2d 1202 (1991), where theFirst District reviewed a determination by the then-IllinoisLocal Labor Relations Board (hereinafter Local Board) (theprecursor of the present Board) that sergeants employed by theCook County Department of Corrections and the Sheriff of CookCounty were not supervisors within the meaning of section 3(r) ofthe Act (then Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 1603(r)). Thejoint employers in that case argued to the appellate court thatthe Local Board was mistaken because, in part, it incorrectlyheld that the sergeants needed to devote a preponderance of theiremployment time to exercising supervisory authority. LocalBoard, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 821, 582 N.E.2d at 1206. In supportof their argument, the joint employers appear to have assertedthat the sergeants were supervisors because they were engaged inpolice employment. However, the appellate court rejected thatargument because the joint employers failed to raise it beforethe Local Board or in their briefs to the appellate court. LocalBoard, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 821, 582 N.E.2d at 1206. Similarly,in this case, the employers did not raise the issue of "policeemployment" either before the Board or before this court.

In light of the above discussion, we now consider theBoard's application of the four-part test under the standard ofreview previously stated.

As the Board correctly noted, for the sergeants to bedeemed supervisors under the Act, the evidence needed to satisfyeach prong under section 3(r). See Northwest Mosquito AbatementDistrict v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 303 Ill. App.3d 735, 748, 708 N.E.2d 548, 557 (1999) (in which the FirstDistrict noted that (1) "[c]ourts apply a four-part test todetermine whether an employee is a supervisor" under section 3(r)of the Act, and (2) "[a]n employee must satisfy all four parts ofthis test to be a supervisor under the Act"); 5 ILCS 315/3(r)(West 1996). Thus, we need not examine each prong of the four-pronged test if we conclude that the Board correctly determinedthat the evidence in the present case failed to meet one of thefour prongs. We have so concluded.

The employers argue that the Board's determination thatthe supervisors do not spend a preponderance of their timeperforming supervisory functions was against the manifest weightof the evidence. We disagree.

In Freeport, the supreme court explained that in orderto satisfy the "preponderance test," it must be shown that "themost significant allotment of the employee's time" is spentexercising supervisory functions. "In other words, the employeemust spend more time on supervisory functions than on any onenonsupervisory function." Freeport, 135 Ill. 2d at 532, 554N.E.2d at 171. In Department of Central Management Services v.Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 278 Ill. App. 3d 79, 86,662 N.E.2d 131, 136 (1996), this court rejected a "strictlymathematical 'majority of time'" test and held that "[w]hether aperson is a 'supervisor' should be defined by the significance ofwhat that person does for the employer, regardless of the timespent on particular types of functions."

In this case, the Board found that the sergeants haveauthority to perform one supervisory function--namely, to suspendsubordinates under certain conditions. The Board also found thatunder either the Freeport test or the test enunciated by thiscourt in Central Management Services,

"the sergeants clearly do not satisfy [thepreponderance prong]. The record shows that,in the past year, two employees have beensuspended. The sergeants therefore do notspend more time on this supervisory functiontha[n] on their nonsupervisory activities,nor do they spend a majority of their timeengaged in this function. Their authority tosuspend is simply not superior in importanceto their nonsupervisory functions."

Reviewing the Board's determination under theappropriate standard of review, we conclude that itsdetermination was not contrary to the manifest weight of theevidence nor is it clearly evident that the Board should havereached the opposite conclusion.

In so concluding, we note that the employers do notappear to challenge the Board's determination directly, asserting instead that because the sergeants are often the only on-dutyemployees in a supervising capacity at the Vermilion County jail,they must necessarily be spending a preponderance of their timeengaged in supervision. We disagree that such a conclusionfollows where, as here, deciding whether a person is a"supervisor" must be made in accordance with the particularlegislative formula set forth in section 3(r) of the Act. 5 ILCS315/3(r) (West 2000).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the Board's order.

Affirmed.

KNECHT, P.J., and COOK, J., concur.