JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner, Brenda Dahman, seeks direct administrativereview of the decision of the chief legal counsel of the IllinoisDepartment of Human Rights (Department) sustaining the Department's dismissal of petitioner's charge of sexual harassmentagainst James McCaslin for lack of substantial evidence. Petitioner seeks review pursuant to section 8-111(A)(1) of theIllinois Human Rights Act (Human Rights Act) (775 ILCS 5/8-111(A)(1) (West 2000)) and Supreme Court Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R.335). Respondents moved to dismiss the petition for directreview due to petitioner's failure to name McCaslin, a party ofrecord in the administrative proceedings, as a respondent. Forthe reasons set forth below, we dismiss the petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 19, 2000, petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Department against her employer, the IllinoisSecretary of State, and James McCaslin, a fellow employee,alleging that between April 11 and April 13, 2000, McCaslinsexually harassed her. On January 5, 2001, following its investigation, the Department dismissed petitioner's charge for lackof substantial evidence. Petitioner requested review by theDepartment's chief legal counsel. On June 29, 2001, the chieflegal counsel issued an order sustaining the Department's dismissal of the charge. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

On August 3, 2001, petitioner filed a petition fordirect review with this court. Pursuant to section 8-111(A)(1)of the Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/8-111(A)(1) (West 2000)) andSupreme Court Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335), we have jurisdictionover this matter. However, petitioner failed to name McCaslin inthe petition for review, joining only the Department, chief legalcounsel, and the Secretary of State as respondents.

On November 20, 2001, respondents moved to dismiss thepetition due to petitioner's failure to name McCaslin, a necessary party, as a respondent. Respondents' motion alleged thatpetitioner's failure to name McCaslin as a respondent in herpetition for review was a fatal defect. We agree.

Section 8-111(A)(1) of the Human Rights Act (775 ILCS5/8-111(A)(1) (West 2000)) provides that a complainant may obtainjudicial review of any final order entered under the Human RightsAct by filing a petition for review in the appellate court. BothSupreme Court Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335) and section 3-113(b)of the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3-113(b) (West 2000)) govern statutory direct review of administrative orders by the appellate court and each provides that "[t]heagency and all other parties of record shall be named respondents" in the petition for review. It is undisputed thatMcCaslin was a party of record.

Our supreme court has held that administrative reviewactions taken directly to the appellate court involve the exercise of "special statutory jurisdiction." McGaughy v. IllinoisHuman Rights Comm'n, 165 Ill. 2d 1, 6-7, 649 N.E.2d 404, 407(1995). When a court is exercising special statutory jurisdiction, the language of the act conferring jurisdiction delimitsthe court's power to hear the case. A party seeking to invokespecial statutory jurisdiction thus "must strictly adhere to theprescribed procedures" in the statute. McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at12, 649 N.E.2d at 410. Accordingly, absent strict compliancewith the Human Rights Act, the provisions of the Review Law, andthe rules adopted pursuant thereto, the appellate court cannotconsider the appeal. ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board,191 Ill. 2d 26, 31, 727 N.E.2d 1022, 1025 (2000).

This case presents a factual scenario similar to thatpresent in McGaughy in which the supreme court held that dismissal was required for noncompliance with Rule 335. The petitioner, Barbara McGaughy, filed a charge with the Department inwhich she alleged that her employer had discriminated againsther. The Department dismissed the charge for lack of substantialevidence. McGaughy filed a request for review with the IllinoisHuman Rights Commission (Commission), which affirmed the dismissal. McGaughy then filed a petition for review in the appellate court. She named as respondents only the Commission and heremployer, failing to name the Department. The appellate courtheld that this failure did not deprive it of jurisdiction andreached the merits of the appeal. The supreme court reversed,vacating the appellate court's judgment and dismissing the appealbecause of McGaughy's failure to name the Department, a party ofrecord, as a respondent in her petition for review. McGaughy,165 Ill. 2d at 15, 649 N.E.2d at 411.

Section 3-113(b) of the Review Law and Supreme CourtRule 335 explicitly direct that, in a petition for review in theappellate court, "[t]he agency and all other parties of recordshall be named respondents." 735 ILCS 5/3-113(b) (West 2000);155 Ill. 2d R. 335(a). This language is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, a party seeking administrative review must strictlycomply with the statutes conferring jurisdiction and, because thestatutes require that all parties of record be named, failure todo so justifies dismissal. ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 36, 727N.E.2d at 1028.

Petitioner argues that the line of cases that supportsdismissal of a petition for review for failing to name allparties of record predates the amendment to section 3-107(a) ofthe Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2000)), which precludesdismissal of the petition even if an individual employee or agentacting in his official capacity on behalf of the agency is notnamed as long as the agency itself is named as a respondent. Petitioner's argument is without merit. Section 3-107(a) appliesonly to administrative review actions in the circuit court and,thus, is not applicable here. McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 8, 649N.E.2d at 408.

Because strict adherence to the procedures of theReview Law and the supreme court rules is required and becausepetitioner failed to comply with the same, we conclude petitioner's failure to name McCaslin, a party of record, as arespondent is a fatal defect and justifies dismissal of herpetition for review.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we dismiss petitioner's requestfor review.

Appeal dismissed.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., concurs.

COOK, J., dissents.

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent and would address this case onthe merits.

This Human Rights Act case involves an application forreview under section 8-111(A)(1) of the Human Rights Act. 775ILCS 5/8-111(A)(1) (West 2000). Direct review of such administrative orders is controlled by the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101through 3-113 (West 2000)). See 735 ILCS 5/3-113 (West 2000)("Direct review of administrative orders by the appellatecourt"). Section 8-111(A)(1) of the Human Rights Act formerlyprovided that judicial review under that section would be "inaccordance with Supreme Court Rule 335," but that language wasdeleted effective January 1, 1994. Pub. Act 88-1,