Dallas v. Cips

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Dallas v. Cips

State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-09-0753 Rel

Case Date: 06/21/2010

Preview:NO. 4-09-0753 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT CHARLES DALLAS, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. AMEREN CIPS, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

Filed 6/21/10

) Appeal from ) Circuit Court of ) Sangamon County ) No. 09MR123 ) ) Honorable ) Patrick W. Kelley, ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, Ameren CIPS, appeals an order of the circuit court entering judgment for plaintiff, Charles Dallas, pursuant to an application for entry of judgment filed by plaintiff under section 19(g) of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2008)). Plaintiff cross-appeals, seeking costs For the reasons that follow, we

and attorney fees on appeal.

affirm the circuit court and deny plaintiff's request for costs and attorney fees on appeal. I. BACKGROUND On December 14, 1998, plaintiff suffered an injury to his back while working for defendant. On June 24, 2004, follow-

ing a hearing, an arbitrator issued a decision granting plaintiff benefits under the Act. The arbitrator found plaintiff had a compensable injury

that resulted in two lumbar surgeries.

Permanent restrictions

placed on plaintiff precluded him from returning to his work with defendant as a lineman or his previous work as a farm laborer. Although the arbitrator found plaintiff did not meet his burden of proof in establishing permanent total disability, plaintiff did qualify for a wage differential (permanent wage loss) under section 8(d)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2002)). Specifically, the arbitrator made the following finding on the disputed issue of the nature and extent of the injury: "It is found [plaintiff] has sustained his burden of proof in establishing entitlement to a permanent wage loss under [s]ection 8(d)(1) of the Act as of [the] date of maximum medical improvement, January 9, 2003. This wage differential of $465.67 begins as of January 9, 2003[,] and shall apply as long as the disability lasts." The arbitrator ordered defendant to pay plaintiff temporary total disability benefits of $811.94 per week for 177 4/7 weeks (August 12, 1999, through January 9, 2003). The arbitrator also ordered

defendant to pay plaintiff as follows: "the sum of $456.67 [sic] per week for a further period of 68 6/7 weeks, as provided in section 8(d)(1) of the Act because the - 2 -

injuries sustained caused [w]age loss, limited to the maximum PPD rate as set forth above of $465.67, from 01/09/03 through the date of trial, and ongoing thereafter for the duration of the disability." (Emphasis in original.) Neither party filed a petition for review of the arbitrator's decision. The arbitrator's decision, therefore, became the

decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission). See 820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2002) (unless a petition

for review is filed within 30 days, the arbitrator's decision shall become the decision of the Commission and, absent fraud, shall be conclusive). (For the sake of clarity, this court will,

like the parties, continue to refer to the decision as the arbitrator's decision.) On March 25, 2009, plaintiff filed in the circuit court an application for entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2008)). In the application for

entry of judgment, plaintiff asserted that no review of the arbitrator's decision was pending and the time for review of the arbitrator's decision had passed. Plaintiff also alleged defen-

dant was "out of time to challenge the arbitrator's decision or pursue any action to assert the disability of the employee has subsequently recurred, increased, diminished, or ended." - 3 -

Plaintiff further alleged that defendant paid the weekly wage-differential benefits to plaintiff for several years in accordance with the arbitrator's decision. However, on

January 24, 2009, defendant informed plaintiff the weekly wagedifferential payments would be terminated. Plaintiff had not

received weekly wage-differential payments since the end of January 2009. Plaintiff sought entry of judgment and an award of

costs and attorney fees. On April 22, 2009, defendant filed a responsive pleading. Defendant agreed that (1) the time for review of the

arbitrator's decision had passed, (2) defendant had complied with the arbitrator's decision until "the recent developments, questioning how long the disability has lasted," (3) defendant notified plaintiff as to the basis and date of termination of the wage-differential benefits, and (4) no benefits had been paid as of the date of the termination of the wage-differential benefits. Defendant disputed that defendant was out of time to challenge the arbitrator's decision or pursue any remedy, "in view of evidence subsequently gathered questioning whether the disability, that served as premise for the [d]ecision, has continued." Defendant also disputed whether the failure to pay was improper and its responsibility for costs and attorney fees. On June 18, 2009, plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On that same date, defendant filed a motion - 4 -

for leave to file "[c]ounterclaim/[a]ffirmative [d]efenses for [e]quitable [r]elief" (hereinafter referred to as the counterclaim). Defendant attached to its motion for leave a proposed

counterclaim for equitable relief. In the motion for leave, defendant alleged that following plaintiff's injury, plaintiff was unable to return to work as a lineman for defendant. After expiration of the time for review

of the arbitrator's decision, plaintiff obtained full-time employment as a lineman at an hourly rate in excess of his rate of pay with defendant. Defendant believed plaintiff's alleged Therefore, in January 2009,

disability had ended or diminished.

defendant terminated plaintiff's wage-differential benefits. Defendant further asserted it had no adequate remedy at law because the time for review had passed. Defendant argued

plaintiff was entitled to the wage-differential benefits only so long as the disability lasted, and, because plaintiff was no longer incapacitated from working as a lineman, plaintiff was not entitled to receive the wage-differential benefits. Defendant's

proposed counterclaim sought an order that (1) defendant was no longer obligated to pay plaintiff wage-differential benefits and (2) the wage-differential benefits received by plaintiff after he became reemployed as a lineman should be held in constructive trust for the benefit of defendant and conveyed to defendant. Defendant also filed a motion seeking to stay entry or enforce- 5 -

ment of judgment under section 19(g) until the court determined whether defendant was entitled to equitable relief. On July 2, 2009, plaintiff filed a motion to strike defendant's motions for leave and for a stay. Plaintiff argued

the circuit court only had jurisdiction to determine whether the requirements of section 19(g) of the Act had been met and enter the workers' compensation award as a civil court judgment. On July 8, 2009, the circuit court held a hearing. transcript, bystander's report, or agreed statement of facts pertaining to this hearing has been provided on appeal. On September 1, 2009, the circuit court entered an order denying (1) defendant's motion for leave to file the counterclaim, (2) defendant's motion for stay, and (3) plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's motions. The court granted The court No

plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant (1) in accordance with the arbitrator's decision and (2) in the amount of $5,705.50 for attorney fees and costs. On October 1, 2009, defendant filed a notice of appeal. On October 7, 2009, plaintiff filed a notice of cross-appeal for the purpose of requesting additional fees and costs on appeal. II. ANALYSIS A. Issues Raised in Defendant's Appeal In its direct appeal, defendant argues (1) defendant is - 6 -

without an adequate remedy at law and a court of equity should determine whether defendant must continue to pay benefits to plaintiff and (2) defendant should have been granted leave to amend. Generally, a trial court's decision on whether to grant leave to file a counterclaim or an affirmative defense is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Todd W. Musburger,

Ltd. v. Meier, 394 Ill. App. 3d 781, 796, 914 N.E.2d 1195, 1210 (2009) (involving leave to file amended affirmative defenses); Trustees of Schools of Township 42 North, Range 11, East of Third Principal Meridian, Cook County, Illinois v. Schroeder, 8 Ill. App. 3d 122, 124, 289 N.E.2d 247, 249 (1972) (holding that the "trial court had discretion to allow or deny filing of the counterclaim" postdecree). Here, however, the issue raised by

defendant requires statutory construction--whether the Act permitted such a defense in an action under section 19(g) of the Act. Therefore, our review is de novo. See, e.g., Cassens

Transport Co. v. Illinois Industrial Comm'n, 218 Ill. 2d 519, 524-25, 844 N.E.2d 414, 418-19 (2006) (reviewing de novo whether the Commission had jurisdiction to reopen a 10-year-old wagedifferential award de novo because the case required interpretation of section 8(d)(1) of the Act). "Proceedings under the Workers' Compensation Act are purely statutory, and courts can obtain jurisdiction only in the - 7 -

manner provided by that Act."

Beasley v. Industrial Comm'n, 198

Ill. App. 3d 460, 464, 555 N.E.2d 1172, 1174 (1990); see also Kavonius v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 Ill. App. 3d 166, 169, 731 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (2000) (noting that circuit courts exercise special statutory jurisdiction in workers' compensation proceedings and strict compliance with the statute is required to vest the court with subject-matter jurisdiction). Section 19(g) of

the Act gives circuit courts the authority to render judgment in accordance with an award or decision of the Commission when a certified copy of the decision is presented to the court. Ahlers

v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 73 Ill. 2d 259, 264, 383 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1978). Section 19(g) provides as follows: "Except in the case of a claim against the State of Illinois, either party may present a certified copy of the award of the [a]rbitrator, or a certified copy of the decision of the Commission when the same has become final, when no proceedings for review are pending, providing for the payment of compensation according to this Act, to the Circuit Court of the county in which such accident occurred or either of the parties are residents, whereupon the court shall enter a judgment in accordance therewith. - 8 In

a case where the employer refuses to pay compensation according to such final award or such final decision upon which such judgment is entered[,] the court shall in entering judgment thereon, tax as costs against him the reasonable costs and attorney fees in the arbitration proceedings and in the court entering the judgment for the person in whose favor the judgment is entered, which judgment and costs taxed as herein provided shall, until and unless set aside, have the same effect as though duly entered in an action duly tried and determined by the court, and shall with like effect, be entered and docketed." 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2008).

Section 19(g) is "designed to permit speedy entry of judgment on an award." Aurora East School District v. Dover, 363 The circuit

Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1055, 846 N.E.2d 623, 629 (2006).

court's inquiry is limited to determining whether the requirements of section 19(g) have been met. 383 N.E.2d at 211. Ahlers, 73 Ill. 2d at 268,

The court cannot question the jurisdiction of

the Commission, question the legality of the Commission's actions, review the Commission's decision, or "otherwise construe the Act, even if the decision appears too large on its face." - 9 -

Aurora East School District, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 1055, 846 N.E.2d at 629; see also Ahlers, 73 Ill. 2d at 268, 383 N.E.2d at 211 (the court can refuse to "enter judgment only, for example, when a lack of jurisdiction appears on the face of the record"). The

only defense to a section 19(g) petition is full payment of the final award. Aurora East School District, 363 Ill. App. 3d at

1055, 846 N.E.2d at 630. In this appeal, defendant does not challenge whether the requirements of section 19(g) have been met; nor does defendant assert that full payment has been tendered. Defendant only

challenges the circuit court's refusal to consider defendant's claim that plaintiff was no longer entitled to a wage-differential payment. Such an argument is not appropriately raised in a section 19(g) proceeding. See McCormick v. McDougal-Hartmann

Co., 47 Ill. 2d 340, 343, 265 N.E.2d 610, 612 (1970) (employer could not raise, in an action to enforce an award of compensation under section 19(g), its claim that it was entitled to credit for recovery the employee received from a third party); Franklin v. Wellco Co., 5 Ill. App. 3d 731, 734, 283 N.E.2d 913, 915 (1972) ("An employer cannot have the award reviewed by filing an answer in an action brought by the employee under section 19(g) to enforce the award"). Therefore, the circuit court did not have

jurisdiction to review the award and did not err by denying - 10 -

defendant leave to file its counterclaim. Defendant was not without a remedy. As noted, the

arbitrator awarded plaintiff a wage differential pursuant to section 8(d)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2002)). Section 8(d)(1) of the Act "provides that an employee who is partially incapacitated from pursuing his usual and customary line of employment shall receive a portion of the difference between his former wages and the wages he earns or is able to earn in his new employment." Cassens, 218 Ill. 2d at 522, 844 "An

N.E.2d at 417, citing 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2002).

employee receiving an installment award under section 8(d)(1) is entitled to compensation 'for the duration of his disability.'" Cassens, 218 Ill. 2d at 522, 844 N.E.2d at 417, quoting 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2002). Section 8(d)(1) itself does not "authorize the Commission to reopen final installment awards for partial disability." Cassens, 218 Ill. 2d at 528, 844 N.E.2d at 421. However, under

section 19(h) of the Act, the Commission has the authority, for a proscribed period of time, to review an installment award. See

Alvarado v. Industrial Comm'n, 216 Ill. 2d 547, 555, 837 N.E.2d 909, 915 (2005) (under section 19(h), where the employee's disability has recurred, increased, diminished, or ended, the Commission may review an award); Eschbaugh v. Industrial Comm'n, 286 Ill. App. 3d 963, 966, 677 N.E.2d 438, 441 (1996) (finding - 11 -

section 19(h) of the Act gives the Commission continuing jurisdiction over an award providing for compensation in installments for a proscribed period of time, and the time provision of section 19(h) jurisdictional). Section 19(h) provides as follows: "An agreement or award under this Act providing for compensation in installments, may at any time within 18 months after such agreement or award be reviewed by the Commission at the request of either the employer or the employee, on the ground that the disability of the employee has subsequently recurred, increased, diminished[,] or ended. However, as to accidents occurring subsequent to July 1, 1955, which are covered by any agreement or award under this Act providing for compensation in installments made as a result of such accident, such agreement or award may at any time within 30 months, or 60 months in the case of an award under [s]ection 8(d)1, after such agreement or award be reviewed by the Commission at the request of either the employer or the employee on the ground that the disability of the employee - 12 -

has subsequently recurred, increased, diminished[,] or ended. On such review, compensation payments may be re-established, increased, diminished[,] or ended." 2008). As such, section 19(h) provides a period of time in which the Commission may consider whether an injury has recurred, increased, decreased, or ended. Behe v. Industrial Comm'n, 365 The 30-month 820 ILCS 305/19(h) (West

Ill. App. 3d 463, 466, 848 N.E.2d 611, 614 (2006).

time period applies here because the 60-month time period applies only to injuries that occurred on or after February 1, 2006. See

Pub. Act. 94-277,

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