JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

In February 2000, petitioner, Jerry Deen, filed acharge of discrimination in violation of the Illinois HumanRights Act (Human Rights Act) (775 ILCS 5/1-101 through 10-103(West 2000)) against the Illinois State Police (State Police). In March 2001, the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department of Human Rights) dismissed Deen's charge for lack of jurisdiction and lack of substantial evidence. In April 2001, Deenrequested review by the chief legal counsel for the IllinoisDepartment of Human Rights (Chief Legal Counsel). In April 2001,the Chief Legal Counsel vacated the dismissal and directed theDepartment of Human Rights to perform further work as necessaryand other further proceedings by the Department of Human Rights. In November 2001, the Department of Human Rights again dismissedDeen's charge for lack of jurisdiction and lack of substantialevidence. In November 2001, Deen again requested review by theChief Legal Counsel. In April 2002, the Chief Legal Counselsustained the dismissal. Deen appeals directly to this courtpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335), arguingthe order of the Chief Legal Counsel sustaining the dismissal ofhis charge of discrimination as to the allegation the StatePolice failed to return him to work for reason of a mentalhandicap was an abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.

Deen began employment with the State Police in October1972. In June 1997, Larry D. Drager, Deputy Director of theState Police, sent a letter titled "Official Action" to Deen. This letter listed six incidents, between May 1996 and January1997, that led Drager to order Deen to present himself to Dr.Michael Campion for a mandatory psychological evaluation todetermine Deen's suitability as a sergeant. The letter read asfollows:

"On January 20, 1997, you telephoned Constance Humphrey, secretary to WilliamCellini. During this conversation, you disclosed inappropriate information [in] reference [to] your personal and professionallife.

On January 20, 1997, during your conversationwith Ms. Humphrey, you used your officialposition with the ISP by reminding Ms.Humphrey you were the agent who favorablycompleted Mr. Cellini's Illinois Gaming Boardbackground investigation. You attempted toobtain personal gain in the form of employment for yourself and your niece who hadapplied for a position on the Altonriverboat.

On January 20, 1997, during your conversationwith Ms. Humphrey, you publicly criticizedthe department and ISP command officers withreckless disregard for the truth.

On January 20, 1997, during your conversationwith Ms. Humphrey, and on March 14, 1997,during your administrative review, youfalsely accused your ISP command of unfairtreatment against you resulting from yourfavorable completion of Mr. Cellini's Illinois Gaming Board background investigationand because of ISP command officers' personalfriendship with your ex-wife.

On October 16, 1996, you violated an order ofa superior officer by pursuing official information for personal reasons in the courseof performing your official duties.

On May 8, 1996, you became involved in anargument with an insurance representativewhile attending an insurance fair. You madederogatory comments as to the reputation ofthe insurance carrier and were asked to leaveby another ISP employee."

Also in June 1997, the State Police revoked Deen's firearmowner's identification (FOID) card because he was found to be aclear and present danger to others. In July 1997, the StatePolice informed Deen that Dr. Campion had determined Deen wasincapable of performing the duties of an Illinois State Policeofficer.

On October 5, 1998, Dr. Joseph Bohlen wrote a letter tothe State Police in which he stated it was his medical opinion itwould be appropriate to reinstate Deen's FOID card. On October8, 1998, the State Police reinstated Deen's FOID card. OnSeptember 29, 1999, Deen presented himself to Douglas Brown,First Deputy Director of the State Police and advised Brown hewas ready to return to work with accommodations. The StatePolice refused to return Deen to active duty in September 1999. On January 24, 2000, Deen's counsel sent a letter to DeputyDirector Brown listing the accommodations Deen required. Deenrequested (1) continued use of Luvox upon his physician's prescription and direction, (2) future workday consultation with Dr.Bohlen, and (3) job reassignment that did not include overnighttravel. Deen alleges in his brief that in May 2000 he was placedin relieved-of-duty-with-pay status as a result of the StatePolice's May 2000 receipt of the medical release from Dr. Bohlen.

In November 2000, the State Police notified Deen hewould not be reinstated and that he could appeal the decision tothe State Police Medical Review Board. In January 2001, Deensought review of the decision by the State Police with theMedical Review Board. Deen asked that Dr. Marsh, the StatePolice medical expert, be present at the meeting of the MedicalReview Board, alleging Dr. Marsh released Deen for duty in July2000. The record fails to show what occurred at the MedicalReview Board meeting, but Deen alleges in his brief that as aresult of that meeting, he was removed from relieved-of-duty-with-pay status.

In February 2000, Deen filed a complaint with theDepartment of Human Rights charging the State Police with discrimination in violation of the Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/2-102(A) (West 2000)). In his complaint, Deen alleged the StatePolice relieved Deen of duty with pay and involuntarily transferred him to sick-leave status in January 1997. Deen furtheralleged after the evaluation by Dr. Campion, he underwent independent psychiatric consultation with his own doctor, Dr. Bohlen. Deen's basis for relief was the State Police's September 29,1999, refusal and continued refusal to reemploy Deen with therequested accommodations despite "[Deen's] significant recoveryfrom the mental/medical condition perceived of him by [the StatePolice]." Deen further alleged the accommodations he requested"are both necessary and reasonable in terms of economic consequence to [the State Police] and intra[]departmental disciplineof [the State Police's] other employees." In his charge, Deensought reinstatement to his former position or a similar positionfor which he is qualified, reinstatement of all sick leave andvacation leave Deen used between January 1997 and February 7,2000, reasonable attorney fees, and any "other make whole ordersas are proper."

The State Police filed a response in which it admittedDeen was ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, but deniedinvoluntarily transferring Deen to sick-leave status in January1997. The State Police took the position Deen could not performthe essential functions of a State Police officer with or withoutreasonable accommodations. The State Police also denied theaccommodations Deen requested are reasonable or necessary.

The Department of Human Rights identified four allegations raised in Deen's charge. The allegations were labeled (A)involuntary transfer to sick leave, (B) forced psychologicalevaluation, (C) failure to return Deen to work, and (D) failureto provide accommodations for return to work. The Department ofHuman Rights conducted an investigation, including a fact-findingconference, and on March 16, 2001, issued an investigationreport. In the investigation report, the Department of HumanRights found several facts as uncontested. Those relative tothis appeal are as follows: (1) Deen informed Deputy DirectorBrown he (Deen) was ready to return to work in September 1999,and (2) Deen has not been allowed to return to work because theState Police has not determined whether Deen is fit for duty. The Department of Human Rights found Deen filed his charge ofdiscrimination 1,091 days after January 27, 1999, the date of theviolation in allegation A. The Human Rights Act requires acharge be filed within 180 days of an alleged civil rightsviolation. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1) (West 2000). The Departmentof Human Rights held it therefore lacked jurisdiction over theallegation Deen was involuntarily transferred to sick leave onJanuary 27, 1999. The Department of Human Rights held it lackedjurisdiction over the allegation Deen was forced to undergo apsychological evaluation on June 5, 1997, for the same reason.

The Department of Human rights found Deen had, however,established a prima facie case of discrimination by showing thefollowing: (1) Deen is handicapped within the meaning of section1-103(I) of the Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/1-103(I) (West2000)), (2) the State Police was aware of Deen's handicap, (3)the State Police failed to return Deen to work following arelease from Deen's doctor, and (4) Deen's condition is unrelatedto his ability to perform the duties of his job with reasonableaccommodations. See Cisco Trucking Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n,274 Ill. App. 3d 72, 74, 653 N.E.2d 986, 988 (1995) ("In establishing a prima facie case of handicap discrimination under theAct, complainant was required to prove (1) that he is handicappedwithin the definition of section 1-103(I) of the Act; (2) thathis handicap is unrelated to his ability to perform the functionsof the job he was hired to perform; and (3) an adverse job actionwas taken against him related to his handicap"). The investigation report found State Police policy requires a medical releasefrom the employee's physician before an employee will be returnedto duty, and the only medical documentation of Deen's fitness asof September 29, 1999, is the 1997 evaluation finding Deen unfitfor duty. Therefore, documentation supported the State Police'sposition Deen cannot perform the essential functions of a StatePolice officer with or without reasonable accommodations. TheDepartment of Human Rights recommended a finding of lack ofsubstantial evidence because "there is insufficient evidence toshow that the defenses are pretextual." The Department of HumanRights also recommended a finding of lack of substantial evidenceas to Deen's allegation the State Police failed to accommodatehis return to work because Deen's request for no overnight travelwas not job related, Deen did not need any special accommodationto see his doctor or take his medication, and there was noevidence similarly situated employees in Deen's protected classwere treated differently. On March 19, 2001, the Department ofHuman Rights issued a notice of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and lack of substantial evidence for the reasons shown inits investigation report.

On April 2, 2001, Deen filed a request for review bythe Chief Legal Counsel. See 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(D)(2)(a) (West2000). As reasons why the charge should not have been dismissed,relevant to this appeal, Deen alleged (1) the decision to dismissthe charge was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2)the decision ignored the medical report of Dr. Bohlen, whichstated Deen is "ready, willing[,] and able to return to work";(3) the report of the Department of Human Rights incorrectlystates a psychiatric evaluation found Deen not fit to return toduty because he should be watched when under stress, and (4) theDepartment of Human Rights incorrectly relied upon the July 1997evaluation of Deen because later and more accurate medicalreports are available. On July 30, 2001, the Chief Legal Counselissued an order pursuant to section 2520.587 of the Department ofHuman Rights' rules and regulations (56 Ill. Adm. Code