June 20, 2001

JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Beverly D. Ellis appeals from the trialcourt's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant AmericanFamily Mutual Insurance Company (American Family). We affirm.

American Family issued a motor vehicle insurance policyto Ellis effective from December 12, 1991, to June 12, 1992. Thepolicy contained an endorsement, the "Automobile Accidental Deathand Specific Dismemberment Benefits Coverage Endorsement." OnMay 15, 1992, Ellis' son Shaun was killed in an automobileaccident while driving Ellis' car. Ellis sought benefits underthe endorsement but American Family denied coverage.

On January 17, 1995, Ellis filed a complaint fordeclaratory judgment; American Family filed an answer and acounterclaim for declaratory judgment. The parties next filedcross-motions for summary judgment. Each was denied. The caselanguished for two years. Ellis then filed a second motion forsummary judgment; American Family filed a response and cross-motion for summary judgment. Ellis' motion was denied, AmericanFamily's was granted. From this ruling, Ellis appeals.

Three pertinent provisions of the policy are at issue. The first two provisions are found in the endorsement:

"Death Benefit: We will pay the maximum benefit shown in the declarations, if the insured person dies within 90 days of theaccident.

Insured person or insured persons means you or any relative while occupying, or when struck by, a land motor vehicle or trailer."

The third provision is found in the base policy, in a sectionentitled "Definitions Used Throughout the Policy":

"Relative means a person living in your household related to you by blood, marriage[,] or adoption. *** It excludes anyperson who, or whose spouse, owns a motor vehicle other than an off-road motor vehicle."

American Family offers two theories in support of thetrial court's ruling: (1) Shaun owned his own car, therebycoming under an exception to the policy definition of "relative"and (2) Shaun was not "living in [Ellis'] household" at the timeof his death.

The question whether an individual is a resident of, orliving in, a household commonly arises in other automobile policycontexts. The standard automobile policy covers "relatives" asinsureds, meaning persons living in the household and related tothe insured by blood or marriage. See 625 ILCS 5/7-317(a), (b)(West 2000); 215 ILCS 5/143.13(a) (West 2000). A number of casesconsider whether a person is a "relative" and accordingly coveredas an insured under an automobile liability policy. See, e.g.,State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Taussig, 227 Ill.App. 3d 913, 916, 592 N.E.2d 332, 334-35 (1992) (child whodropped out of school and had his own apartment not a relatedperson who lived with his parents); Kopier v. Harlow, 291 Ill.App. 3d 139, 142, 683 N.E.2d 536, 538 (1997) (liability coverageexclusion for bodily injury or property damage arising out of useof any vehicle owned by any "resident of the household"). Othercases have considered whether a person is a relative "resident ofthe household" and accordingly excluded from receiving benefitsunder a homeowner's or automobile liability policy. See, e.g.,Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Peoples Bank, 286 Ill. App. 3d356, 359-60, 675 N.E.2d 1031, 1033-34 (1997) (foster child underone-year placement agreement a "resident of the household"). Different factors may apply in cases interpreting coverageclauses than in cases involving exclusion clauses. The endorsement here, providing accidental death benefits, appears to besomewhat unusual, even though it employs language previouslyinterpreted in the cases. Why should a relative, traveling in aninsured vehicle, be covered under the endorsement if he does notown a motor vehicle, but not be covered if he does?

The policy definition of "insured persons" includes thepolicyholder's relatives. The policy definition of "relative"specifically excludes individuals who own their own vehicles. American Family states that Shaun owned his own vehicle andtherefore was not an insured person.

American Family mainly relies upon Ellis' response to arequest for admission tendered pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 216(134 Ill. 2d R. 216). American Family's request No. 7 stated:

"7. That on May 15, 1992, the decedent, SHAUN J. ELLIS, was the owner of his own vehicle and it was not the 1982Oldsmobile 88 Royale which was involved in this accident."

Ellis' response to the request did indeed explicitly admit thetruth of this fact. On appeal, Ellis refers to a portion of herdiscovery deposition wherein she contradicts her admission:

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: In May of 1992 did Shaun own his own vehicle?

PLAINTIFF: No, not at the time of the accident.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: In your answers to the [r]equest for [a]dmission of [f]acts you were asked whether Shaun was the owner of his own vehicle on May 15th of '92, and you admitted that. Was that wrong? He didn't have his own car?

PLAINTIFF: Not at the time he did not.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Had he at any time prior to-- 

PLAINTIFF: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: --the accident? Okay.  When was the last time that he owned a vehicle prior to the accident date of May 15th, '92?

PLAINTIFF: I don't honestly remember that.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you know the reason why Shaun was using your vehicle at that time?

PLAINTIFF: He did not have a car of his own at that time, so until he had decided what he was going to purchase he was using my car."

Ellis directs our attention to Supreme Court Rule201(j), which states that "[d]isclosure of any matter obtained bydiscovery is not conclusive, but may be contradicted by otherevidence." 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(j).

Rule 216(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 216(a)) allows a party torequest admission of "the truth of any specified relevant fact,"including an ultimate fact. See also P.R.S. International, Inc.,v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill. 2d 224, 237, 703 N.E.2d 71, 77(1998) (requests for admission of legal conclusions are improper). Requests to admit differ from other discovery devicesin that requests to admit are not designed to produce evidencebut to limit the issues at trial and withdraw admitted facts fromcontention. People v. Mindham, 253 Ill. App. 3d 792, 797, 625N.E.2d 835, 839 (1993). Through the request-to-admit procedure,a party is able to determine what facts remain disputed andaccordingly require further discovery. Mindham, 253 Ill. App. 3dat 798, 625 N.E.2d at 840.

"While these requests are designed to clarify and simplify evidentiary issues at trial rather than to further the goals of discovery, they are governed by Rule 216 and enforced in accord with the rules pertaining to discovery. Nevertheless, Rule 201(j),which provides that matter disclosed by discovery is not conclusive, should be inapplicable to these requests because theirpurpose is to obtain judicial admissions." 4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice