JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In February 2003, plaintiff, Cheryl Engstrom, filed acomplaint against defendant, Provena Hospitals, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, d/b/a Provena Covenant Medical Center,seeking damages for retaliatory discharge. In April 2003,Provena filed a motion to dismiss Engstrom's complaint undersection 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS5/2-615 (West 2002)), arguing that she had failed to state aclaim that her termination violated public policy. Following anOctober 2003 hearing, the trial court granted Provena's motionand dismissed Engstrom's complaint with prejudice.

Engstrom appeals, arguing that the trial court erred bygranting Provena's motion to dismiss. We disagree and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In February 1990, Engstrom began working for Provena. During her employment, she held various positions, includingemergency-room registration clerk. On October 25, 2001, Engstromreported to Provena's director of emergency services that (1)emergency-room staff were permitting an individual, diagnosedwith human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) to loiter in and aroundthe emergency room and (2) triage nurses were providing incorrecttriage times on medical records when patients were admitted tothe emergency room. On November 6, 2001, Engstrom was suspendedfrom her position, and on November 16, 2001, her employment withProvena was terminated.

In February 2003, Engstrom filed a complaint againstProvena, seeking damages for retaliatory discharge. Specifically, Engstrom alleged that (1) Provena had intentionallydischarged her in retaliation for her October 25, 2001, reportsto Provena's director of emergency services; (2) her reports were"in furtherance of the public policy of the State of Illinois toprovide for the safety and care of patients"; and (3) the discharge violated public policy.

In April 2003, Provena filed a section 2-615 motion todismiss Engstrom's complaint, arguing that the complaint failedto state a claim that her termination violated a public policy. In September 2003, Engstrom filed a memorandum in response toProvena's motion to dismiss, in which she argued that her complaint alleged that her discharge violated a clearly mandatedpublic policy. Specifically, Engstrom argued that her complaintalleged sufficient facts to establish that her discharge violatedpublic policy set forth in (1) the Hospital Licensing Act (Licensing Act) (210 ILCS 85/1 through 16 (West 2002)) and (2) thehospital licensing regulations of the Illinois AdministrativeCode (Administrative Code) (77 Ill. Adm. Code pt. 250 (ConwayGreene CD-ROM April 2001)). Following an October 2003 hearing,the trial court granted Provena's motion to dismiss and dismissedEngstrom's complaint with prejudice.

This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Engstrom's Claim That the Trial Court Erred
by Dismissing Her Complaint

Engstrom argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her complaint with prejudice because she stated a claim forretaliatory discharge. Specifically, she contends that hercomplaint sufficiently alleged that her termination for reporting(1) the presence of a nonemployee HIV-positive individual in theemergency room and (2) that emergency-room triage nurses hadrecorded incorrect triage times violated a clearly mandatedpublic policy. We disagree.

A section 2-615 motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-615(West 2002)) attacks the legal sufficiency of a complaint byalleging defects on the face of the complaint. Vitro v.Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81, 806 N.E.2d 632, 634 (2004);Armstrong v. Snyder, 336 Ill. App. 3d 567, 568, 783 N.E.2d 1101,1103 (2003). When ruling on a section 2-615 motion, a court mustaccept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and allreasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Vitro, 209Ill. 2d at 81, 806 N.E.2d at 634; Armstrong, 336 Ill. App. 3d at569, 783 N.E.2d at 1103. Our supreme court has determined thecritical inquiry regarding a section 2-615 motion to be "whetherthe allegations of the complaint, when construed in the lightmost favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish acause of action upon which relief may be granted." Vitro, 209Ill. 2d at 81, 806 N.E.2d at 634. We review de novo an ordergranting a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. Vitro, 209 Ill. 2dat 81, 806 N.E.2d at 634; Armstrong, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 569, 783N.E.2d at 1103.

"The tort of retaliatory discharge is a limited andnarrow exception to the general rule that an at-will employee isterminable at any time for any or no cause." Geary v. TelularCorp., 341 Ill. App. 3d 694, 700, 793 N.E.2d 128, 133 (2003);Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 128,421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981). Our supreme court has emphasized thegoal of restricting the tort of retaliatory discharge. SeeFisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455, 467, 722N.E.2d 1115, 1121 (1999) ("this court has consistently sought torestrict the common[-]law tort of retaliatory discharge"). Toestablish a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, a claimantmust show the following: (1) claimant was discharged inretaliation for claimant's activities and (2) the dischargeviolated a clearly mandated public policy. Jacobson v. Knepper &Moga, P.C., 185 Ill. 2d 372, 376, 706 N.E.2d 491, 493 (1998);Chicago Commons Ass'n v. Hancock, 346 Ill. App. 3d 326, 328, 804N.E.2d 703, 705 (2004). The supreme court's test for determiningif a complaint states a valid cause of action for retaliatorydischarge is "whether the public policy clearly mandated by thecited provisions is violated by the plaintiff's discharge." Barrv. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 527, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1357(1985).
 

1. Engstrom's Report Regarding the HIV-Positive
Individual in the Emergency Room

Engstrom first contends that her complaint sufficientlyalleged that her termination for reporting the presence of anHIV-positive individual in the emergency room violated a publicpolicy in Illinois that "patients at hospitals have a right toprivacy and confidentiality." Specifically, she asserts thatthis public policy is set forth in (1) the Medical Patient RightsAct (Patient Rights Act) (410 ILCS 50/0.01 through 99 (West2002)), (2) the Licensing Act (210 ILCS 85/1 through 16 (West2002)), and (3) certain hospital licensing requirements of theAdministrative Code (77 Ill. Adm. Code pt. 250 (Conway Greene CD-ROM April 2001)).

Initially, we note that Engstrom cites the PatientRights Act (410 ILCS 50/0.01 through 99 (West 2002)) for thefirst time in her brief to this court. She did not cite thePatient Rights Act in either her complaint or response toProvena's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Engstrom has forfeitedany argument on appeal regarding that act, and we will notaddress her argument further. See American Standard InsuranceCo. v. Basbagill, 333 Ill. App. 3d 11, 15, 775 N.E.2d 255, 259(2002) ("[a] party must recover, if at all, according to the casehe has made for himself by his pleadings"); see also Groark v.Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc., 231 Ill. App. 3d 61, 67, 596 N.E.2d78, 82 (1992) (providing that "[f]ailure to propose a particulartheory before the circuit court and then to advance it before theappellate court is unfair to the other party, who had noopportunity to present pertinent rebuttal evidence on such theorywhich could have had a bearing on the disposition of the case").

Engstrom also relies on sections 6.14b and 6.17 of theLicensing Act (210 ILCS 85/6.14b, 6.17 (West 2002)), as well ascertain hospital licensing regulations (77 Ill. Adm. Code