JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

The question raised in this case is whether an amendedcomplaint adding additional parties is properly filed within theperiod of the statute of limitations when the clerk tells counselthe order granting leave to file the amended complaint will beentered by the court as a routine matter, but that is not done. The trial court answered the question in the negative and grantedthe motions to dismiss filed by the additional defendants. Wereverse and remand.

Plaintiff Patricia Fischer is the independentadministratrix of the estate of Laveda Mary Zara, who diedDecember 29, 1998. An action for the death of a person arisingout of patient care shall not be brought more than two yearsafter knowledge of the death. 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 2000). Under section 13-212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code),the last day for filing an action in this case was December 29,2000.

On June 30, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint againstdefendant Senior Living Properties, L.L.C., d/b/a Westabbe HealthCare Center (Senior Living). Summons was issued and SeniorLiving filed its entry of appearance. Plaintiff obtained leaveof court for additional time to file the affidavit and reportrequired by section 2-622 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-622 (West2000)). Senior Living had not filed an answer as of December 29,2000.

On December 27, 2000, plaintiff's attorney, officed inEffingham County, filed an amended complaint with the circuitclerk of Sangamon County. The amended complaint added twodefendants, defendant St. John's Hospital of the Hospital ofSisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, d/b/a St. John'sHospital of Springfield (St. John's), and defendant Joseph J.Maurer, M.D. Plaintiff's attorney personally delivered thefollowing documents to the circuit clerk: a certificate ofservice on Senior Living, a motion for leave to file the amendedcomplaint instanter, a proposed order granting leave to file theamended complaint instanter, and summons accompanied by copies ofthe amended complaint. The circuit clerk advised plaintiff'sattorney that the order for leave would be tendered to the judgethat day as a routine matter unless plaintiff's attorney wasinformed otherwise. The documents were all file-stamped onDecember 27, 2000, summons was issued, and St. John's and Dr.Maurer were served on January 3, 2001.

On January 30, 2001, Dr. Maurer's attorney told plaintiff's attorney the court file failed to reflect entry of theorder granting leave to file the amended complaint instanter. Without objection the order was entered following a hearing onFebruary 13, 2001. Dr. Maurer filed a motion to dismiss on March23, 2001, alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause ofaction and was not filed within the two-year statute of limitations, because the complaint was not filed until after December29, 2000.

On June 5, 2001, after a hearing, the trial courtentered an order allowing St. John's to adopt Dr. Maurer's motionto dismiss, allowing plaintiff's counsel to file an affidavit tosupplement the record as to the statements made by the clerk'soffice personnel, and allowing the motions to dismiss on thebasis that the statute of limitations had expired on December 29,2000. The trial court subsequently made a finding under Rule304(a) (155 Ill 2d R. 304(a)) that there was no just reason fordelaying either enforcement or appeal.

Motions to dismiss, both under sections 2-615 and 2-619of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2000)), presentquestions of law which we review de novo. Illinois Graphics Co.v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 494, 639 N.E.2d 1282, 1293-94 (1994).

This court has stated that "an amended complaint,adding additional parties, filed without leave of the court is anullity." Allen v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 129 Ill. App. 3d783, 786, 473 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1985). We had previously recognized that there are problems when leave of court must be obtained to amend a complaint near the end of a limitations period. Clark v. Brokaw Hospital, 126 Ill. App. 3d 779, 782-83, 467N.E.2d 652, 655 (1984) (motion to convert respondent in discoveryto a defendant sufficient if motion made within six-month periodeven though the motion is not heard and ruled on until after six-month period). The customary deliberate method of setting andhearing motions may not be appropriate where the statute oflimitations is about to expire. In Allen, we declined to consider the procedure mentioned in Clark because there was noevidence that the motion for leave to amend was filed within theperiod of limitations. Allen, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 786, 473N.E.2d at 139. Allen and Clark both recognize that strictcompliance is not always required in obtaining leave to amend acomplaint.

Petrella v. Leisky, 92 Ill. App. 3d 880, 417 N.E.2d 134(1981), the case relied upon by Allen for the "nullity" languagequoted above, involved the filing of a complaint as a supplemental pleading under section 2-609 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-609(West 2000)). Section 2-609 specifically requires that a supplemental pleading be "by leave of court and upon terms." 735 ILCS5/2-609 (West 2000). The complaint in Petrella was not a propersupplemental pleading because supplemental pleadings are onlyemployed to set forth matters arising after the original pleadinghas been filed. Petrella, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 881, 417 N.E.2d at136. There was apparently no motion for leave to amend filed inPetrella. The case cited by Petrella for the proposition that anineffective attempt to amend a complaint is a nullity had applied"prior law" to an attempt to amend made without leave of courtand after judgment. Register Gazette Co. v. Larash, 109 Ill.App. 236, 237-38 (1903); Petrella, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 883, 417N.E.2d at 137. Clearly a defendant who is added after judgmentand without any opportunity to defend is unfairly prejudiced bythe amendment.

Section 2-616 of the Code, dealing with amendments"introducing any party who ought to have been joined," containsno specific requirement that leave of court be obtained. 735ILCS 5/2-616(a) (West 2000). The section simply provides that"[a]t any time before final judgment amendments may be allowed onjust and reasonable terms." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-616(a) (West 2000). Perhaps the legislature could lay down aninflexible rule that no amendment adding parties could ever beeffective without a signed order granting leave to amend. Thevery general language of section 2-616, however, does not establish such a rule. The provisions of section 2-616 requiringleave of court are directory, not mandatory. In re Estate ofZander, 242 Ill. App. 3d 774, 777, 611 N.E.2d 86, 88 (1993).

Defendants cite a number of cases in support of thetrial court's order. All those cases recite the statement that"[a]n amended complaint adding additional parties filed withoutleave of court is a nullity." Callaghan Paving, Inc. v.Keeneyville Construction Co., 197 Ill. App. 3d 937, 939, 557N.E.2d 228, 229 (1990) (plaintiff's amendment adding a defendantwithout leave of court was a nullity and it must be disregardedon review); First Robinson Savings & Loan v. Ledo ConstructionCo., 210 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892-93, 569 N.E.2d 304, 307 (1991) (anorder adding a defendant obtained ex parte and without notice isvoid); Greene v. Helis, 252 Ill. App. 3d 957, 960, 625 N.E.2d162, 165 (1993) (leave to amend must be expressly granted bycourt order and will not be implied).

However, the holdings in all those cases have beenrejected by subsequent decisions of the supreme court and of thiscourt. In Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d342, 701 N.E.2d 493 (1998), the supreme court considered a casewhere the plaintiff had amended his complaint without leave ofcourt to add a prayer for prejudgment interest. The defendantdid not object and filed a response, and prejudgment interest wasawarded, but defendant raised the argument in the appellate courtthat the trial court had no jurisdiction over the amended complaint, citing Greene and other cases. The supreme court distinguished those cases because they involved an amendment that wouldadd a party but also found the cases "unpersuasive." Ragan, 183Ill. 2d at 354, 701 N.E.2d at 498. "[Section 2-616 of t]he Codeof Civil Procedure provides that technical defects in pleadingsshould not prevent the courts from doing justice between theparties." Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 354, 701 N.E.2d at 498.

The idea that the filing of an amended complaint was avoid act because it was done without statutory authority, was anullity, and constituted error that was "jurisdictional" has beenrejected by this court. Ganci v. Blauvelt, 294 Ill. App. 3d 508,515-16, 690 N.E.2d 649, 654 (1998) (failure to obtain leave tofile a third-party complaint seeking contribution was waived andcould not be raised for the first time on appeal). "[T]reatingobtaining of leave as an element of jurisdiction is contrary tothe most recent theories of circuit court jurisdiction." Ganci,294 Ill. App. 3d at 516, 690 N.E.2d at 654. Under the 1970Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,