Gekas v. Williamson

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Gekas v. Williamson

State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-08-0733 Rel

Case Date: 07/20/2009

Preview:Filed 7/20/09

NO. 4-08-0733 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

G. MARK GEKAS, D.D.S., ) Appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee and ) Circuit Court of Cross-Appellant, ) Sangamon County v. ) No. 07MR37 NEIL M. WILLIAMSON, in His Official Capacity as ) Sheriff of Sangamon County, Illinois, ) Honorable Defendant-Appellant and ) Kenneth R. Deihl, Cross-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding. ____________________________________________________________ JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff, G. Mark Gekas, D.D.S., lodged a complaint with the Sangamon County sheriff's office. He complained that a deputy sheriff, John Gillette, had mistreated him during a traffic stop. The Division of Professional Standards (Division), i.e., the internal-affairs branch of the sheriff's office, performed an investigation and concluded that Gillette had done nothing wrong. Plaintiff disagreed. He decided to perform an investigation of his own. Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (Act) (5 ILCS 140/1 through 11 (West 2006)), he requested the sheriff's office to provide him a copy of all complaints that citizens had made against Gillette, together with all records relevant to those complaints. Defendant, Neil M. Williamson, the sheriff of Sangamon County, refused the request in toto. His stated reason for the refusal was that all of the requested records were part of Gillette's personnel file, which, under section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Act (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(ii) (West 2006)), was exempt from disclosure.

After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, plaintiff sued defendant to compel his compliance with the Act. The circuit court performed an in camera inspection of 27 investigative files and concluded that plaintiff was entitled to only 4 of the files. The court allowed defendant to withhold the remaining 23 files either because the Division had found the complaints therein to be unfounded or because the complaints did not resemble the complaint plaintiff had made against Gillette. Defendant appeals from the portion of the order requiring him to disclose the four files. Plaintiff crossappeals from the portion of the order denying him access to the other 23 files. We interpret section 7(b)(1)(ii) (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(ii) (West 2006)) as exempting only "personal information" in personnel files. Insomuch as the 23 files document investigations of alleged wrongdoing by Gillette in the course of his public duties, they are not his personal information, and the disclosure of those files would not invade his personal privacy. See 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2006). We know that, at a minimum, the file pertaining to plaintiff's internal-affairs complaint against Gillette falls into this category, and, therefore, the circuit court erred in allowing defendant to withhold it. The same would be true of other files as well, if they related to Gillette's performance of his public duties. See 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2006). Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's judgment in part and reverse it in part. We affirm the part of the judgment requiring defendant to produce the four files. We reverse the part of the judgment allowing defendant to withhold the file pertaining to plaintiff's allegations against Gillette. We also remand this case with the following directions. Of the remaining files, the court shall identify, and order defendant to provide to plaintiff, all files that relate to allegations of wrongdoing by Gillette in the -2-

performance of his duties as deputy sheriff. Pursuant to section 8 (5 ILCS 140/8 (West 2006)), the court shall allow the redaction of exempt information. I. BACKGROUND In his complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, plaintiff alleges that on August 22, 2006, Gillette "subjected [him] to police brutality *** during a routine traffic stop." Plaintiff complained to defendant in writing. He told defendant that Gillette had stuck a pistol in his face, called him an obscene name, and handcuffed him to the steering wheel of his (plaintiff's) car, knowing, at the time, that plaintiff was in extreme agony from a kidney stone and that, on his doctor's orders, he had been en route to the emergency room of Memorial Medical Center. On November 20, 2006, plaintiff received a letter from Tony Sacco, chief deputy sheriff, informing him that the Division had investigated his complaint and that "[a]fter reviewing reports[] [and] dispatch tapes and interviewing [10] witnesses, [the Division] ha[d] determined [the] complaint to be unsubstantiated." According to Sacco, "Deputy [Sheriff] Gillette [had] performed his duties in accordance with the laws of the State of Illinois and the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office Rules and Regulations." On November 28, 2006, pursuant to section 3(b) of the Act (5 ILCS 140/3(b) (West 2006)), plaintiff sent defendant a request for information. The request sought the following records: "[(1)] copies of all materials, including[,] but not limited to[,] reports, dispatch tapes, interview transcripts, interview recordings, and notes and recommendations of your [i]nternal[-][a]ffairs investigator, pertaining to your -3-

office's investigation of the complaint of [plaintiff] against Deputy [Sheriff] Gillette; [(2)] all documents pertaining to alleged or demonstrated steroid use by your deputies; [(3)] all citizens' complaints against Deputy [Sheriff] Gillette[;] and [(4)] copies of all materials relating to any prior disciplinary investigation of Deputy [Sheriff] Gillette[] and copies of any court documents filed in any litigation involving the conduct of Deputy [Sheriff] Gillette, along with any settlement agreements with respect to such litigation." On December 12, 2006, on defendant's behalf, Assistant State's Attorney James A. Grohne replied to plaintiff's request for information. Grohne stated: "With the exception of actual litigation involving Gillette, the information you have requested is exempt under [s]ection 7(1)(a)(ii) of the *** Act. [(Actually, there was no section 7(1)(a)(ii). Grohne evidently meant section 7(1)(b)(i i) (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(ii) (West 2006)), the exemption for 'personnel files and personal information maintained with respect to employees.')] With respect to litigation, no comprehensive list of litigation involving county employees is maintained. I will, however, search individual files for lawsuits involving -4-

Gillette." In a letter dated December 13, 2006, plaintiff appealed to "the head of the public body," namely, defendant. 5 ILCS 140/10(a) (West 2006). Plaintiff argued in his letter: "Non[]exempt materials cannot be magically transformed into exempt materials by hiding them in a personnel file. Self-evidently, most of the materials sought here pertain to 'public duties' of Mr. Gillette[] and[,] more particularly, his performance of those duties. [5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2006).] Self-evidently, most of the materials do not invade Mr. Gillette's privacy in any way, shape[,] or form. Materials that do (such as his social security number) can easily be redacted[] and the remainder of the materials produced, as required by [s]ection 8 of [the Act (5 ILCS 140/8 (West 2006))]." On December 15, 2006, defendant denied the appeal. He said that "[t]he Sangamon County Sheriff's Office relie[d] on the advice of the Sangamon County State['s] Attorney in matters of this nature." Plaintiff requested the circuit court to award him the following relief: "(a) That the [c]ourt order production by [defendant] of an [i]ndex of [w]ithheld [d]ocuments and a statement of reasons for withholding each document, pursuant to [s]ection 11(e) [(5 ILCS 140/11(e) (West 2006))]; -5-

(b) That the [c]ourt conduct an in camera inspection of the withheld documents pursuant to [s]ection 11(f) [(5 ILCS 140/11(f) (West 2006))]; (c) That the [c]ourt enter an injunction to prevent [defendant] from withholding public records and *** ordering the production of all records sought [by] [p]laintiff's *** request dated December 13, 2006; [and] (d) That the [c]ourt award [p]laintiff his reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to [s]ection 11(i) [(5 ILCS 140/11(i) (West 2006))]." In his answer to plaintiff's complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, defendant again invoked the exemption for personnel files: "[T]he documents requested in the first paragraph of [plaintiff's] request are related to the internal[-]affairs investigation requested by the [p]laintiff. *** Clearly, any documents acquired or generated during this process are for determining the propriety of disciplinary action and are[,] thus[,] personnel records[,] which are exempt from disclosure by [s]ection 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Act [(5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(ii) (West 2006))]. There are no records relating to the second paragraph of the *** request[,] [i.e., records of steroid use by deputy sheriffs]. -6-

All documents in paragraph 3 of the *** request[,] [i.e., all citizens' complaints against Gillette,] would also be disciplinary records contained in the personnel records and [would be] exempt from disclosure under the above section of the Act. The documents requested in the first part of paragraph 4 of the *** request[,] [i.e., copies of all materials relating to any prior disciplinary investigations of Gillette,] are also disciplinary records contained in the personnel files and[,] thus[,] [are] protected from disclosure by the above section of the Act. The remaining documents[,] [i.e., court documents and settlement agreements regarding any conduct by Gillette,] are not maintained by the [s]heriff's [o]ffice but are in files in the possession of third[-]party entities, such as outside counsel or insurance claims adjusters. Notwithstanding this, the Sangamon County State's Attorney['s] [o]ffice is attempting to identify and locate said information as an accommodation to [p]laintiff's attorney." Along with his answer, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the exemption for personnel files. The circuit court construed the motion for dismissal as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, heard arguments, and on July 3, 2007, ordered defendant to prepare an index of withheld documents. The index revealed that defendant was withholding 27 internal-affairs files. -7-

On June 30, 2008, after performing an in camera inspection of the withheld documents, the circuit court entered a docket order requiring defendant to provide plaintiff a copy of 4 of the 27 internal-affairs files. Because of the inadvertent omission of an attached list to which the order made reference, it was impossible to know which four files the court meant. Defendant filed a motion for clarification. On September 5, 2008, the court granted the motion for clarification and on September 12, 2008, filed a final judgment order, which, in its concluding section, stated as follows: "The [p]laintiff requests copies of all of the internal[-]affairs files, and the State claims the statutory exemption from disclosing them[;] plus [it] raises the defense of unwarranted invasion of Deputy [Sheriff] Gillette's personal[-]privacy rights. The applicable statute is not clear and definitive, and the legislative intent is not sufficiently instructive. Neither is the case law [that has been] submitted. The [c]ourt is left to ponder several questions. Should all internal[-]affairs files be exempt? The answer is indisputably 'no.' If not, what internal[-]affairs files, if any, are 'per se' exempt? Should all internal[-]affairs files be exempt under the 'confidential source/information rule' enunciated in Copley Press[,] [Inc.,] v. City of Springfield[,] [266 Ill. App. 3d 421, 639 N.E.2d 913] (1994)? If not, what records, if any, are exempt under this rule? Thus, the [c]ourt was faced -8-

with performing a series of balancing tests[,] given that both principles of law and equity can, and do, apply here. Also, there is another important provision of [s]ection 7: 'The disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy ***.' [(Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2006).] [Plaintiff] complains of certain of Deputy [Sheriff] Gillette's speech and actions in the course of official public duties. Internal[-]affairs files which are 'unfounded' should be excluded (including [the file pertaining to plaintiff's complaint]) in order to protect the deputy's privacy. It would seem an unwarranted invasion of his privacy right to allow litigants wholesale review of his 'unfounded' internal[-] affairs records. As to 'founded' files, this [c]ourt, using its in camera exam[ination], chose those files which include facts closely similar to the type of conduct [plaintiff] complains of in his affidavit [that he sent to the sheriff's office as part of his internal-affairs complaint]. And[,] so, this [c]ourt ordered [four] of Deputy [Sheriff] Gillette's internal[-]affairs files, and only these [four] files, disclosed to [plaintiff] after redaction of the complainants' names and addresses. The [four] internal[-]affairs cases on Deputy [Sheriff] Gillette -9-

are: [Nos.] IA[-]07-24-06A (January 2000), IA[-]06-28-06B (November 1999), IA[-]05-19-06A (July 1999), and IA[-]06-24-04A (April 1998). Obviously, the disciplinary action taken (if any) by [defendant] against Deputy [Sheriff] Gillette, in these [four] instances, is exempt from disclosure under [s]ection 7." (Emphases in original.) Defendant appeals from the order to disclose the four internal-affairs files. Plaintiff cross-appeals from the finding that the remaining 23 internal-affairs files are exempt from disclosure. II. ANALYSIS A. General Principles of Statutory Interpretation We interpret statutes de novo (Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 339 Ill. App. 3d 78, 81, 792 N.E.2d 15, 18 (2003)), and our sole objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent (Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 216, 886 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 (2008)). The best evidence of legislative intent is the text of the statute. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 216, 886 N.E.2d at 1021. Except when the statute provides a special definition, we give words their plain and ordinary meaning, including words in the special definitions. Wahlman v. C. Becker Milling Co., 279 Ill. 612, 622, 117 N.E. 140, 144 (1917); Gerwin v. Livingston County Board, 345 Ill. App. 3d 352, 361, 802 N.E.2d 410, 417 (2003). We must not deviate from the plain language of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that have no basis in the text. MidAmerica Bank, FSB v. Charter One Bank, FSB, 232 Ill. 2d 560, 565-66, 905 N.E.2d - 10 -

839, 842 (2009). We interpret the statute as a whole, considering each part in the context of other parts. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 216-17, 886 N.E.2d at 1021-22. B. An Overview of the Relevant Provisions of the Act Section 2(a) of the Act defines "public body" to include any executive body (or subsidiary thereof) of a county. 5 ILCS 140/2(a) (West 2006). The parties do not dispute that the Sangamon County sheriff's office meets the definition of a "public body." See 70 Am. Jur. 2d Sheriffs, Police, & Constables

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