JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Ranardo Gilchrist, appeals the dismissal of hismandamus action against defendant, Donald N. Snyder, Director of theIllinois Department of Corrections (DOC). We reverse and remand.

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of DOC. On January9, 2002, he was issued a disciplinary report charging him withviolations of prison rules 105 (dangerous disturbance), 205 (gangactivity), and 601 (aiding and abetting, attempt, solicitation, orconspiracy) in connection with a prison disturbance that took placeon December 10, 2001.

According to the disciplinary report, plaintiff and aninmate named Harris are members of the Gangster Disciples, a gang. On the date in question, they entered a room with Kirby, a member ofa different gang, and partially closed the door. Other inmatesoutside believed that plaintiff and Harris were attacking Kirby. Harris and Kirby emerged from the room arguing and exchanged blows inview of other inmates. This incident drew a crowd of approximately50 inmates, composed of members of both gangs, before they weredispersed by prison staff.

Plaintiff's hearing on the allegations against him occurred on January 18, 2002, before the adjustment committee. Asection of the disciplinary report allowed plaintiff to requestwitnesses, but he did not request any. He provided a written statement and pleaded not guilty. The adjustment committee found himguilty and recommended that he be disciplined with one year ofsegregation, one year at C-grade status, and the loss of one year ofgood time. The chief administrative officer approved the recommendation. At this point, plaintiff apparently filed a grievance, whichdoes not appear in the record.

The administrative review board held a hearing on plaintiff's grievance on April 19, 2002. The board recommended as follows:

"Based on a review of all information and acompliance check of the procedural due processsafeguards outlined in [DOC] Rule 504, this[c]hairperson is recommending that the disciplinary report be remanded to Hill CorrectionalCenter to be rewritten to substantiate thecharges. The disciplinary report is to beforwarded to Pontiac Correctional Center to bereserved and reheard within appropriatetimeframes."

Defendant concurred in this recommendation.

Following the remand, plaintiff received a newdisciplinary report on June 1, 2002. The hearing on this report washeld on June 4, 2002. Plaintiff alleges that this time he requestedthat the adjustment committee call Harris and Kirby as witnesses. The committee did not allow these witnesses, noting that plaintiffhad not requested witnesses when the first case was heard, and thatplaintiff's grievance had asked "to have the ticket rewritten tosubstantiate the charges, not to list witnesses." The committeeagain found plaintiff guilty. By a letter dated July 30, 2002, theadministrative review board informed plaintiff that it was approvingthe adjustment committee's recommendation but reducing the revocationof good-conduct credits to six months.

On January 16, 2003, plaintiff filed an action in mandamusto compel defendant to provide him with a new disciplinary hearing. Defendant moved to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code of CivilProcedure, arguing that plaintiff had received all the process he wasdue and thus failed to state a claim for relief. See 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2002). The circuit court granted the motion. The docketsheet for March 31, 2003, reads: "Order dismissing case is entered. The [c]lerk is directed to send a copy of this entry and the [o]rderto ASA Straughn and to the [p]laintiff." The next entry is on June30, 2003, and states: "copy of docket entry sent to plaintiff perrequest."

According to plaintiff, he received a copy of the order onJuly 8, 2003. He filed a document entitled "late notice of appeal"with this court on July 23, 2003. We granted leave to file latenotice of appeal on August 4, 2003, and he filed a notice of appealon August 5, 2003.

Defendant contends that we do not have jurisdiction tohear this appeal because plaintiff failed to comply with SupremeCourt Rule 303 (155 Ill. 2d R. 303). Rule 303(a)(1) provides thatthe appellant must generally file a notice of appeal within 30 daysafter the entry of the final judgment appealed from. 155 Ill. 2d R.303(a)(1). An appellant may file a late notice of appeal for goodcause if leave is sought within 30 days of the expiration of thefirst 30- day period. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(d). If the orderdismissing the complaint in this case became final on March 31, 2003,as defendant argues, then the clock ran out on plaintiff at the endof May with the end of the late filing period. See 155 Ill. 2d R.303(a)(1), (d).

The appellate court has jurisdiction over an appeal onlyif it is timely filed under Rule 303. In re Marriage of Wisniewski,286 Ill. App. 3d 236, 242, 675 N.E.2d 1362, 1367 (1997). The supremecourt has made clear that a lack of notice of when an order becamefinal does not toll the period for filing a notice of appeal, "solong as the order appealed from was expressed publicly, in words andat the situs of the proceeding." Granite City Lodge No. 272, LoyalOrder of the Moose v. City of Granite City, 141 Ill. 2d 122, 123, 565N.E.2d 929, 929 (1990). The supreme court has also pointed out thatthe trial and appellate courts have no authority to excuse compliancewith the supreme court rules governing appeals. Mitchell v. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 143, 150, 632 N.E.2d 1010, 1012 (1994).

Plaintiff argues that the order dismissing his complaintbecame final on June 30, 2003, the date the clerk mailed it to him. He relies on Graves v. Pontiac Firefighters' Pension Board, 281 Ill.App. 3d 508, 667 N.E.2d 136 (1996), in which the trial court enteredan order taking the case under advisement and stating that the courtwould rule by mail. The court entered an order but inadvertentlyfailed to mail it to the parties. When it discovered the error twomonths later, the court entered a second order providing that theearlier order would be final and appealable on the day it was finallymailed. On appeal, this court found that the trial court's orderbecame final on the later date and we thus had jurisdiction over theappeal. Graves, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 516, 667 N.E.2d at 141.

We agree with plaintiff that the Graves analysis appliesin this case. As Graves demonstrates, the circuit court has thepower to make its order become final when mailed. Because plaintiffis incarcerated, the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss tookplace over the phone, with the court apparently telling the partiesit would notify them when it ruled. This hearing was not recorded,but defendant does not dispute plaintiff's version of what the courttold the parties. The docket entry makes clear that the courtdirected the clerk to send the parties a copy of the order. Althoughthe judge signed the order on March 31, 2003, it does not bear theclerk's file stamp, suggesting it was not meant to be final at thattime. See People v. Durley, 203 Ill. App. 3d 731, 736, 561 N.E.2d122, 126 (1990) (Fifth District) ("the commonly accepted manner ofdetermining a filing date is by the circuit clerk's file stamp"). Weconclude that the order became final when it was mailed on June 30,2003. Plaintiff's appeal was therefore timely filed.

We turn now to the merits of plaintiff's appeal. A motionto dismiss under section 2-615 challenges the legal sufficiency ofthe complaint. Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 208 Ill. 2d414, 421, 804 N.E.2d 519, 525 (2004). Dismissal is appropriate onlywhere, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to theplaintiff, it is clear that no set of facts can be proved under thepleadings that will entitle the plaintiff to relief. Bajwa, 208 Ill.2d at 421, 804 N.E.2d at 525. We review de novo a circuit court'sdecision to dismiss under section 2-615. People ex rel. Ryan v.World Church of the Creator, 198 Ill. 2d 115, 120, 760 N.E.2d 953,956 (2001).

Plaintiff alleged that he was denied due process at hissecond adjustment-committee hearing. The United States Supreme Courthas established several requirements that must be met at a prisonerdisciplinary hearing in order to provide due process, and theserequirements are incorporated into the DOC rules governing hearings. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 955-56,94 S. Ct. 2963, 2978-79 (1974); 20 Ill. Adm. Code