JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Governmental Interinsurance Exchange (GIE) is an Illinois reciprocalinsurance corporation with its principal place of business in Bloomington, McLean County,Illinois. Plaintiff Kendall County (County), Illinois, is an Illinois municipal entity. In November1995, GIE retained defendant Mary E. Dickson to represent its insured, the County, in an autoaccident case. In May 1996, GIE hired defendants Jay S. Judge (Judge) and Judge, James &Dutton, Ltd. (Judge firm), and in June 1997, GIE retained defendant Bond, Mork & Dickson,P.C. (Dickson firm) to represent the County.

In April 2001, plaintiffs filed this legal malpractice action against defendants,claiming defendants' failure to perfect the appeal caused plaintiffs' loss of a meritorious appeal inthe auto accident case. In March 2003, the trial court entered partial summary judgment forplaintiffs, finding defendants breached their duty to perfect the appeal.

In June 2003, defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the proximatecause issue, arguing that regardless of whether defendants had perfected the appeal, the appeal inthe auto accident case would not have been successful. In so contending, defendants claimed thequestion of whether the appeal would have been successful was a question of law and should bedecided by the trial court. In October 2003, the court ruled that the question of proximate causein this appellate malpractice case is a question of law that should be decided by the court. InMarch 2004, the court granted defendants' partial summary judgment motion, finding plaintiffs'malpractice action lacked the proximate cause element. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing (1) the courterred in its ruling that the issue of proximate cause in appellate malpractice cases was a questionof law; and (2) assuming that the proximate cause issue was a question of law, the court erred inits finding that the element of proximate cause was lacking in this case. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The case underlying this legal malpractice appeal arose out of an auto accident onGalena Road in the County. Galena Road is a two-lane road that runs generally east to west. In1978, the County assumed the ownership of Galena Road from Little Rock Township. At thattime, the County commissioned a preconstruction profile of the road and developed animprovement plan. The County then resurfaced the road and striped the center of the road with askip-dash yellow line that permitted passing.

Expert testimony established that the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices(MUTCD) provides guidelines on adequate sight distances. Under the MUTCD guideline,passing is only permissible where sight distances are adequate. If an engineering study has beenperformed and if sight distances are inadequate, a no-passing zone must be installed. In 1984, theMUTCD guideline lowered the minimal adequate sight distance. As a result of the reduction, thesight distance on Galena Road where the accident later occurred was inadequate. In 1993, theCounty resurfaced Galena Road and restriped the center of the road with the same skip-dashingyellow line that it had placed in 1978.

On the evening of November 1, 1994, Aaron Gesell was involved in a head-oncollision with a car driven by Sandra Wittenmyer as he was traveling eastbound on Galena Road. As a result of the collision, Sandra Wittenmyer suffered severe and permanent injuries. Thecollision occurred entirely in the westbound line as Gesell was passing another vehicle traveling inthe eastbound line. The two cars collided at the apex of a rise in Galena Road. According toseveral witnesses, Gesell was traveling at a speed significantly higher than the posted 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. Gesell stated the reason that he passed the other vehicle in the westbound linewas because he knew a skip-dash yellow line permitted vehicles to pass and he was not aware therise in Galena Road would have obstructed his view of oncoming traffic.

In January 1995, Sandra Wittenmyer and her husband Rex Wittenmyer filed alawsuit against Gesell. In October 1995, the Wittenmyers added the County as a defendant, andGesell filed a third-party contribution complaint against the County.

In February 1998, the County, through its attorneys, Judge, the Judge firm,Dickson, and the Dickson firm, moved for summary judgment in the auto accident case, claimingthat "pursuant to section 3-104 of the [Local Governmental and Governmental Employees TortImmunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/3-104 (West 1994))], [the] County wasabsolutely immune from liability." On September 24, 1998, the trial court denied the County'smotion for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. On October 30, 1998, thejury returned a verdict in favor of the Wittenmyers. Specifically, the jury awarded $4.5 million indamages to Sandra against Gesell and the County, apportioning 20% of the fault to Gesell and80% of the fault to the County. The jury also awarded $500,000 in damages to Rex. On Gesell'scounterclaim against the County, the jury found the County 50% at fault.

On November 25, 1998, the County filed a posttrial motion and a motion to file asupplemental posttrial motion, alleging its attorneys did not receive the proceedings report untilNovember 24, 1998. On December 1, 1998, the Wittenmyers objected to the County's request tofile the supplemental motion, stating the County was represented by two law firms and hadsufficient time to file a complete posttrial motion. On December 3, 1998, the trial court deniedboth of the County's motions.

On December 31, 1998, the County filed a notice of appeal from the judgmententered on the jury verdict and from the trial court's December 3, 1998, denial of its posttrialmotions. On the same day, the County filed an emergency motion for leave to file a supplementposttrial motion, stating that, "in light of the impending [January 4, 1999,] appeal deadline, it wasnecessary for the County to seek, by way of an emergency motion, leave to file its supplementalpost[]trial motion, which contained five additional grounds for reversal based upon errorcommitted during the trial." The trial court granted the motion and set a briefing schedule on thesupplemental posttrial motion. The last paragraph of the order stated: "Final orders not havingbeen entered in this cause, the time for filing notice of appeal in this matter is hereby extendeduntil a final order is entered."

On January 12, 1999, the County filed an amended supplemental posttrial motion. On February 16, 1999, the trial court denied the amended supplemental posttrial motion, stating:"A. Court has no jurisdiction to hear cause, and alternatively B. Said motion is denied as a matterof substance."

On March 15, 1999, the County filed a motion with the Illinois Appellate Court,Second District, seeking leave to amend its notice of appeal to include the trial court's February16, 1999, order which denied the County's supplemental postttrial motion. On April 12, 1999,the Second District Appellate Court granted the motion. On May 7, 1999, the Second DistrictAppellate Court vacated its April 12, 1999, order and struck the County's March 15, 1999,amended notice of appeal, stating the grounds raised in the second posttrial motion wereuntimely. The Second District Appellate Court also denied Gesell and Wittenmyer's motions todismiss the appeal, finding the County's December 31, 1998, notice of appeal preserved thegrounds raised in the County's first posttrial motion.

On July 16, 1999, Gesell filed a motion in the Second District Appellate Court,arguing the County's December 31, 1998, notice of appeal was prematurely filed and the Countynever filed a new notice of appeal. On December 14, 1999, the Second District Appellate Courtissued an unpublished order that reversed its prior ruling that the December 31, 1998, notice ofappeal was timely. Wittenmyer v. Gesell, No. 2-99-0041 (December 14, 1999) (unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23). In its order, the Second District Appellate Court statedthat the County was required to withdraw its notice of appeal when it filed its December 31,1998, supplemental posttrial motion. Further, after the trial court denied the County's posttrialmotion on February 16, 1998, the County failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Therefore, theSecond District Appellate Court held the County's original notice of appeal was premature andineffectual, and as a result, the County's March 15, 1999, motion to amend its notice of appealwas also without effect. After the Second District Appellate Court denied the County's requestfor reconsideration, the County filed a petition for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court ofIllinois. On May 31, 2000, the supreme court denied the County's petition. Wittenmyer v. Gesell,189 Ill. 2d 683, 731 N.E.2d 773 (2000).

On April 27, 2001, the County and GIE brought the malpractice suit againstdefendant attorneys and law firms. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants' failure "to preserve theCounty's appeal right was a breach of [defendants'] duty to exercise reasonable care, skill[,] anddiligence on behalf of plaintiffs, and but for [defendants'] negligence, the appeal would have beensuccessful, and the judgment against the County would have been overturned."

On August 5, 2002, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issues ofwhether defendants owed a duty to plaintiffs and whether defendants breached such a duty. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the trial court could determine defendants' duty as a matter oflaw based solely upon the Second District Appellate Court's order in Wittenmyer v. Gesell, No. 2-99-0041 (December 14, 1999) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendantsresponded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, contending that the issue of duty wasone of fact for the jury and could not be proved without expert testimony. On March 20, 2003,after a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court grantedplaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, finding defendants owed plaintiffs a duty toperfect the appeal and defendants' failure to do so breached such a duty. The court then set thecase for further proceedings on proximate cause and damages issues.

On May 16, 2003, the trial court entered a detailed case-management ordergoverning discovery, dispositive motion practice, and trial dates. On June 22, 2003, defendantsmoved for partial summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause, arguing that regardless ofwhether defendants had perfected the appeal, the appeal in the auto accident case would not havebeen successful. Specifically, defendants claimed that, had the Second District Appellate Courtreviewed the County's appeal on the merits, it would not have overturned the Wittenmyerjudgment on section 3-104 of the Tort Immunity Act grounds. See 745 ILCS 10/1-101 through10-101 (West 1994). Defendants also claimed that the trial court should decide the question ofwhether the appeal would have been successful. On July 16, 2003, plaintiffs filed their response,claiming that they retained Judge for "his expertise in Illinois tort immunity law and road andsignage cases" and defendants "knew the tort immunity defense was and is meritorious." Plaintiffsargued that the court should deny defendants' motion for partial summary judgment because thequestion of the hypothetical outcome of the County's dismissed appeal was a question of fact forthe jury.

On October 17, 2003, after a hearing, the trial court ruled that the question ofproximate cause in the instant appellate malpractice case is a question of law that should bedecided by the court. Specifically, the court stated "it is my view after reading everything hereand relying in part on the [Environmental Control Systems, Inc. v. Long, 301 Ill. App. 3d 612,703 N.E.2d 1001 (1998),] case and on the Michigan [Charles Reinhart Co. v. Winiemko, 444Mich. 579, 513 N.W.2d 773 (1994),] case, that [a]ppellate malpractice is a law issue whichinherently deprives a plaintiff of a jury trial, as plaintiff suggests, because juries should not bedeciding whether or not a party has established it is more likely than not that an [a]ppellate [c]ourtwould do something." Following the ruling, the parties agreed that the trial court would set thecase for an oral argument consistent with an appellate oral argument and that the court confine itsreview to the written briefs that were filed during the dismissed appeal.

On January 16, 2004, the trial court held a hearing, and the parties advocated theimmunity arguments that had been presented in the appellate briefs to the Second DistrictAppellate Court. On March 17, 2004, the trial court issued a written opinion granting defendants'partial summary judgment motion, finding plaintiffs' malpractice action lacked the proximate causeelement. The court in its order stated as follows: "this court agrees with the defendant[s]'argument that *** plaintiffs are asking this court [to] ignore the language in [section] 3-104 [ofthe Tort Immunity Act] which protects municipalities only from the failure to initially providetraffic[-]control devices. The protection in [section] 3-104 [of the Tort Immunity Act] refers [sic]to a lack of traffic[-] control devices at the particular intersection or roadway[,] not the incorrectplacement of those devices." The court concluded that "if [the] County failed to stripe at all [it]would have an immunity under [section] 3-104 [of the Tort Immunity Act], but when [it] acted bystriping the road[,] [it] had an obligation to do so in compliance with MUTCD and [it] did not. Therefore, the trial court was correct in denying the *** County [the section] 3-104 immunity. Further, the Second District Appellate Court, in reviewing *** [the trial court's] ruling de novo,would have affirmed [the trial court's] decision on immunity." This appeal followed.II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that (1) the trial court erred in its ruling that the issue ofproximate cause in appellate malpractice cases was a question of law; and (2) assuming theproximate cause issue was a question of law, the court erred in its finding that the proximatecause element was lacking.

A. Proximate Cause Issue Was an Issue of Law

In contending that the trial court erroneously determined that the proximate causeissue in appellate malpractice cases was a question of law, plaintiffs argue that such an issuepresented a "hypothetical factual inquiry" and was not, as the trial court determined, "a law issuewhich inherently deprives a plaintiff of a jury trial."

As plaintiff correctly points out, Illinois courts have established that in legalmalpractice actions, the issue of proximate causation is generally a question of fact to be decidedby the trier of fact. See Shehade v. Gerson, 148 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1031, 500 N.E.2d 510, 513(1986); Gelsomino v. Gorov, 149 Ill. App. 3d 809, 815, 502 N.E.2d 264, 268 (1986); Renshaw v.Black, 299 Ill. App. 3d 412, 417-18, 701 N.E.2d 553, 557 (1998); Environmental ControlSystems, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 621, 703 N.E.2d at 1008. Plaintiffs argue that in this case, thequestion of whether the alleged appellate malpractice proximately caused plaintiffs' damage wasalso an issue of fact, and as such, it should have been resolved by the jury. Defendants, however,contend that the proximate cause issue was a question of law because the underlying issue in thiscase was a question of law and the application of principles of law is inherently a judicial function. We agree with defendants.

As this court stated in Nika v. Danz, 199 Ill. App. 3d 296, 308, 556 N.E.2d 873,882 (1990), to succeed in a cause of action for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove that butfor the defendant's attorney's negligence, he would have been successful in the prosecution ordefense of a cause of action involving a third party. The accepted procedure for presentingevidence regarding the underlying action in a legal malpractice action is known as a "'suit within asuit'" or "'trial-within-a-trial.'" Danz, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 308, 556 N.E.2d at 882, quoting 2 R.Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice