Gruchow v. White

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Illinois » 4th District Appellate » 2007 » Gruchow v. White

Gruchow v. White

State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-06-0898 Rel

Case Date: 08/22/2007

Preview:NO. 4-06-0898 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT ISAAC C. GRUCHOW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellant.

Filed 8/22/07

) Appeal from ) Circuit Court of ) Sangamon County ) No. 06MR61 ) ) Honorable ) Patrick J. Londrigan, ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, Secretary of State Jesse White (Secretary), appeals the order of the Sangamon County circuit court mandating he issue to plaintiff, Isaac C. Gruchow, a resident of North Carolina, a letter clearing Gruchow's Illinois driving record. On appeal, the Secretary argues section 6-208(b)(4) of the Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/6-208(b)(4) (West 2004)) prohibits him from giving Gruchow, who has four driving-under-the-influence (DUI) convictions, driving privileges for life. reverse the circuit court's order. We agree and

I. BACKGROUND At one time, Gruchow was a licensed driver in Illinois. In November 1996, Gruchow was arrested in Illinois for DUI. refused the chemical test and was granted court supervision. January 1999, Gruchow's Illinois driver's license and driving privileges were revoked after he was convicted of two other DUIs. Gruchow later had two DUI convictions in South Carolina in August 2001 and July 2003. Gruchow, now a resident of North Carolina, applied to the Secretary for clearance of his Illinois driving record and reinstatement of his driving privileges. Gruchow sought such He In

relief so he might apply for driving privileges in North Carolina. South Carolina issued Gruchow such a letter. After a hearing on Gruchow's Illinois application, the hearing officer found Gruchow satisfied the requirements for reinstatement and recommended reinstatement of his full driving privileges. The Secretary rejected the recommendation and denied The Secretary noted Gruchow's four DUI con-

Gruchow's petition.

victions and concluded under section 6-208(b)(4) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/6-208(b)(4) (West 2004)), Gruchow was not eligible for reinstatement of Illinois driving privileges during his lifetime. Gruchow petitioned the circuit court for administrative review of the Secretary's decision. The court concluded the

Secretary erred in denying reinstatement of Gruchow's full driv- 2 -

ing privileges.

The court found Gruchow satisfied the require-

ments for reinstatement and ordered the Secretary to issue a clearance letter to Gruchow. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS On appeal, the Secretary contends section 6-208(b)(4) prohibits him from reinstating Gruchow's driving privileges. Gruchow disagrees. First, Gruchow maintains section 6-704 of the

Code (625 ILCS 5/6-704 (West 2004)), part of the Driver License Compact, applies to him, a nonresident seeking reinstatement of driving privileges. Second, Gruchow contends section 6-208(b)(4)

prohibits issuing him a driver's license, but allows reinstatement of driving privileges. We begin with the governing standard of review, an issue the parties dispute. The Secretary contends his decision

involved a mixed question of law and fact and should be reviewed for clear error. Gruchow contends the issue on appeal is purely

a question of law to be reviewed de novo. A mixed question requires consideration of whether the administrative agency properly applied the facts to undisputed law. See AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment This

Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 391, 763 N.E.2d 272, 279 (2001).

case, however, does not present a mixed question of law and fact. The issue is not whether the Secretary properly applied the law - 3 -

to the facts.

The issue on appeal is whether the Secretary cor-

rectly interpreted the law, particularly sections 6-704 and 6208. Such matters involve statutory construction and are See In re Marriage of Waller, 339 Ill. App. 3d

reviewed de novo.

743, 747, 791 N.E.2d 674, 678 (2003). Our task in construing a statute is to ascertain the legislature's intent. Department of Public Aid ex rel. Schmid v.

Williams, 336 Ill. App. 3d 553, 556, 784 N.E.2d 416, 418 (2003). "[T]he surest indicator" of such intent is the language of the statute. Williams, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 556, 784 N.E.2d at 418.

In addition to the language of the statute, this court should consider "the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects and purposes sought." General Motors Corp. v.

State of Illinois Motor Vehicle Review Board, 224 Ill. 2d 1, 13, 862 N.E.2d 209, 219 (2007). If there is reasonable debate as to

the meaning of these statutes, this court will give deference to the Secretary's interpretation. General Motors, 224 Ill. 2d at

13, 862 N.E.2d at 219 ("The construction of a statute by an agency charged with its administration will be given deference where there is a reasonable debate about the meaning of the statute"). We note the Secretary's interpretation is not binding. 224 Ill. 2d at 13, 862 N.E.2d at 219. Section 6-

See General Motors,

We begin with the language of the statutes.

208(b)(4) states a person convicted of four or more DUIs "may not - 4 -

make application for a license." 2004).

625 ILCS 5/6-208(b)(4) (West

Gruchow first argues subsection 6-208(b)(4) does not apply to him. Gruchow maintains because he is a nonresident

seeking reinstatement of driving privileges, section 6-704, part of the Driver License Compact, applies. Gruchow also contends to

the extent section 6-208(b) and section 6-704 cannot be reconciled, section 6-704 supersedes and controls. Section 6-704(2) states the following: "Applications for new licenses. Upon

application for a license to drive, the licensing authority in a party state shall ascertain whether the applicant has ever held, or is the holder of a license to drive issued by any other party state. The licens-

ing authority in the state where application is made shall not issue a license to drive to the applicant if: *** 2. The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been revoked by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such revocation has not terminated, except that after the expiration of one year - 5 -

from the date the license was revoked, such person may make application for a new license if permitted by law. The licensing authority

may refuse to issue a license to any such applicant if, after investigation, the licensing authority determines that it will not be safe to grant to such person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways." 625 ILCS 5/6-704(2) (West 2004).

A plain reading of section 6-704 establishes the section does not apply to Gruchow and his application for reinstatement. Section 6-704 applies to individuals whose out-of-state

licenses were revoked and who seek Illinois licenses after those revocations. Gruchow's Illinois license was revoked. He seeks

from Illinois, the "member state," reinstatement of those Illinois privileges. The language of section 6-704 does not require

the Secretary to consider Gruchow's request for reinstatement. Gruchow cites no case law to support his interpretation of section 6-704. Instead, Gruchow relies on a number of cases

to establish the supremacy of the Driver License Compact over conflicting state law. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S.

554, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1, 103 S. Ct. 2558 (1983); People v. Hutson, 178 Ill. App. 3d 836, 533 N.E.2d 1128 (1989); People v. Klaub, 130 Ill. App. 3d 704, 474 N.E.2d 851 (1985); Aveline v. Pennsyl- 6 -

vania Board of Probation & Parole, 729 A.2d 1254 (Pa. Commw. 1999). Because section 6-704 does not apply, the case law re-

garding the supremacy of the Driver License Compact is irrelevant. Gruchow next argues section 6-208(b) does not prevent a nonresident from seeking reinstatement of driving privileges. Gruchow contends the plain language of section 6-208(b) reveals its lifetime ban applies only to resident applications for driver's licenses. The Secretary maintains the term "license"

encompasses both the actual document as well as the privilege to drive. Section 6-208(b)(4) provides the following: "Any person whose license, permit[,] or privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the highways has been revoked shall not be entitled to have such license, permit[,] or privilege renewed or restored. However, such

person may, except as provided under subsection (d) of [s]ection 6-205, make application for a license pursuant to [s]ection 6-106 (i) if the revocation was for a cause which has been removed or (ii) as provided in the following subparagraphs: * * * - 7 -

(4) The person may not make application for a license if the person is convicted of committing a fourth or subsequent violation of [s]ection 11-501 of this Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance, [s]ection 11-401 of this Code, [s]ection 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, or a combination of these offenses or similar provisions of local ordinances or similar out-of-state offenses." 625 ILCS 5/6-208(b) (West 2004). Gruchow focuses on the word "license" and maintains there is a distinction between a physical "license" and "privilege to drive." In support of his argument, Gruchow emphasizes

section 6-208's reference to section 6-106, which establishes the prerequisites for obtaining a physical "license." 5/6-106 (West 2004). See 625 ILCS

Gruchow also emphasizes the statute's dif-

ferentiation of a "license," "permit," or "privilege," as establishing the intent to ban only the issuance of a license in subsection 6-208(b)(4) and not the reinstatement of driving privileges for nonresidents. Gruchow also cites provisions of the

Illinois Administrative Code concerning out-of-state petitioners - 8 -

for driving privileges (see 92 Ill. Adm. Code

Download Gruchow v. White.pdf