Hadley v. Montes

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Hadley v. Montes

State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-07-0506 Rel

Case Date: 02/26/2008

Preview:NO. 4-07-0506 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT WILLIE B. HADLEY, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JORGE MONTES, Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, and All Members, Defendants-Appellees.

Filed 2/26/08

) Appeal from ) Circuit Court of ) Sangamon County ) No. 07MR60 ) ) Honorable ) Leslie J. Graves, ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________ JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court: In February 2007, plaintiff, Willie B. Hadley, Jr., an inmate at Lawrence Correctional Center, filed a complaint for injunctive, declaratory, and mandamus relief against defendants, Jorge Montes, Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (Board), and all members, concerning the requirement that he submit to electronic monitoring while on parole. In April 2007,

defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion to dismiss. I. BACKGROUND In February 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint for injunctive, declaratory, and mandamus relief against defendants based on the requirement that he submit to electronic monitoring while on parole. Plaintiff was convicted of murder in 1976 and We affirm.

sentenced to 24 to 74 years in prison.

In January 2007, plain-

tiff was told his mandatory parole term would include two conditions: (1) close supervision and (2) electronic home monitoring.

Plaintiff was released on parole in May 2007 with the condition that he submit to electronic monitoring. In his complaint, plaintiff noted the Electronic Home Detention Law became effective in January 1991. See Ill. Rev. As he was

Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 1005-8A-1 through 1005-8A-5.

convicted prior to the enactment of the law, he argued the electronic-monitoring condition during his parole term violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Plaintiff claimed the condition could not be

legally applied retroactively to his crime and defendants were prohibited from making his punishment more onerous through application of the condition. Plaintiff asked the trial court to

find defendants' retroactive application of the electronicmonitoring law violated the ex post facto clauses, direct defendants not to impose the electronic-monitoring condition, and order any other relief deemed appropriate. a motion for preliminary injunction. In March 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging no genuine issues of material fact existed. In April 2007, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Procedure Code) - 2 Plaintiff also filed

(735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2006)).

Defendants argued the imposition

of electronic home detention was not ex post facto because it was merely a means to ensure that conditions of parole were being followed. dismiss. In May 2007, the trial court granted the motion to This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS Plaintiff argues defendants violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions when they conditioned his parole on the requirement that he submit to electronic monitoring. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review "Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy traditionally used to compel a public official to perform a ministerial duty." People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457, 464, 804 N.E.2d 546, 552 (2004). A court will award a writ of mandamus

"only if a plaintiff establishes a clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear duty of the public official to act, and a clear authority in the public official to comply with the writ." People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe, 201 Ill. 2d 552, 555, 778 N.E.2d 701, 703 (2002). "A plaintiff must set forth every material fact

necessary to show he or she is entitled to a writ of mandamus, and the plaintiff bears the burden to establish a clear, legal right to it." Lucas v. Taylor, 349 Ill. App. 3d 995, 998, 812

N.E.2d 72, 75 (2004), citing Chicago Ass'n of Commerce & Industry - 3 -

v. Regional Transportation Authority, 86 Ill. 2d 179, 185, 427 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1981). In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2619 of the Procedure Code, "the trial court must interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," and it should grant the motion "if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would support a cause of action." Rodriguez v. Sheriff's Merit Comm'n of Kane County, 218 On appeal, this

Ill. 2d 342, 349, 843 N.E.2d 379, 382 (2006).

court reviews de novo the granting of a motion to dismiss a petition for mandamus. Howell v. Snyder, 326 Ill. App. 3d 450,

453, 760 N.E.2d 1009, 1011 (2001). When a trial court is confronted with a motion for declaratory judgment, section 2-701 of the Procedure Code states, in part, as follows: "The court may, in cases of actual controversy, make binding declarations of rights, having the force of final judgments, whether or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed, including the determination, at the instance of anyone interested in the controversy, of the construction of any statute, municipal ordinance, or other governmental regulation, *** and a declaration of the - 4 -

rights of the parties interested." 5/2-701(a) (West 2006).

735 ILCS

"The essential requirements of a declaratory judgment action are: (1) a plaintiff with a legal tangible interest; (2) a defendant having an opposing interest; and (3) an actual controversy between the parties concerning such interests." Beahringer v. A

Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 372, 789 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (2003).

court's decision to dismiss a declaratory judgment action under section 2-619 of the Procedure Code is subject to de novo review. Northern Trust Co. v. County of Lake, 353 Ill. App. 3d 268, 275, 818 N.E.2d 389, 395 (2004). B. The Electronic Home Detention Law The Electronic Home Detention Law, which went into effect on January 1, 1991, allows certain offenders to serve a portion of the parole term in the community but subject to electronic monitoring. 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 (West 2006). A parti-

cipant in electronic monitoring must maintain a working telephone in his residence and keep a monitoring device on his person. ILCS 5/5-8A-4(E) (West 2006). The participant is required to 730

remain within the interior premises or within the property boundaries of the residence at all times except during approved absences, including employment, medical appointments, educational programs, religious services, or any other "compelling reason consistent with the public interest." - 5 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-4(A) (West

2006). C. The Ex Post Facto Prohibition Under the United States Constitution, both Congress and the states are prohibited from enacting ex post facto laws. Const., art. I,

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