JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

In August 2001, plaintiff, Willie B. Hadley, Jr., fileda pro se mandamus complaint in the circuit court of SangamonCounty, alleging that defendants, Jim Ryan, Donald N. Snyder,Jr., and Guy Pierce, failed to perform their ministerial duties. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state acause of action in mandamus. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

The record shows that on February 2, 2000, plaintiffwas transferred to the Pinckneyville Correctional Center (PCC)from Stateville Correctional Center. Two days later, plaintiffwas given a room key. On or about June 28, 2000, plaintiff gavethe key back because it was cracked. Officer Runge asked plaintiff if he was going to sign the "Request for Payment" for thecracked key. Plaintiff refused to sign, and Lt. Kolweier wrote"I/M refused to sign" on the signature line. John Batteau,business manager of PCC, then transferred the five dollars forthe key from plaintiff's trust fund account. Plaintiff sent JimRyan, then Attorney General, a complaint charging Batteau, Runge,and Kolweier with financial exploitation of a disabled person,deceptive practices, forgery, and official misconduct. TheAttorney General has not filed any charges in the matter.

On June 16, 2000, plaintiff filed a grievance reportconcerning events that had taken place that day. Plaintiffstated that two officers came into his room and informed him thatinmates were no longer allowed to have their headphones out oftheir property boxes and that inmates could not hang their towelson bed rails to dry. Plaintiff also stated in his grievancereport that since his arrival at PCC on February 2, 2000, correctional officers had entered his cell every morning and "shook itdown" without preparing a shake-down slip. The grievance officerrecommended that plaintiff's grievance be denied. DirectorSnyder also denied plaintiff's appeal of the grievance officer'sdecision.

On July 7, 2000, plaintiff requested to see a "computerprintout of all warehouse invoices and expenditures from October27, 1998, through July 3, 2000." Brian Fairchild, freedom ofinformation officer for the Illinois Department of Corrections(IDOC), replied to plaintiff that he needed to clarify hisrequest. Plaintiff replied and specified that he wanted aprintout of the PCC warehouse. Fairchild then denied plaintiff'srequest as burdensome and exempt under the Freedom of InformationAct (Act) (5 ILCS 140/1 through 11 (West 2000)). Plaintiffappealed this decision to Snyder, who denied plaintiff's request.

In August 2000, plaintiff filed a mandamus complaint inthe Sangamon County circuit court. Count I of the complaintalleged that defendant Ryan willfully and wantonly refused toinitiate criminal proceedings against three PCC prison officialsin violation of plaintiff's state constitutional and statutoryrights. Count II of the complaint alleged that defendant Snyderdenied plaintiff access to public information in violation of theAct. In count III, plaintiff alleged that Snyder allowed defendant Pierce to refuse to comply with departmental rules relatingto morning cell searches. On August 23, 2001, defendants Ryanand Snyder filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaintpursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)). On September 21, 2001, defendantPierce also filed a section 2-615 motion to dismiss the complaint. On October 12, 2001, plaintiff filed a motion to strikethe appearance of the Illinois Attorney General's office. OnNovember 21, 2001, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file anamended complaint, which contained an additional claim. On April11, 2002, following a telephone conference, the circuit courtdenied plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaintand dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause ofaction. This appeal followed.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the circuit courterred in dismissing his petition because his petition states anaction in mandamus and the facts presented support his petition.

The circuit court dismissed plaintiff's complaintpursuant to section 2-615 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West2002). The question presented by a section 2-615 motion iswhether the complaint sets forth sufficient facts which, ifestablished, could entitle the plaintiff to relief. Bryson v.News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86, 672 N.E.2d1207, 1214 (1996). In ruling on a section 2-615 motion, acircuit court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaintas true and draw reasonable inferences from those facts that arefavorable to the pleader. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 86, 672 N.E.2dat 1213-14. A cause of action should not be dismissed on thepleadings unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can beproved under the pleadings that will entitle the plaintiff torecover. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Brauer, 275 Ill. App. 3d300, 302, 655 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (1995). The issue of whether acomplaint states a cause of action is reviewed de novo. Vernonv. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344, 688 N.E.2d 1172, 1175 (1997).

Defendants also asserted the affirmative defense oflaches in their section 2-615 motion to dismiss. This assertioncan be made in a section 2-615 motion to dismiss if from thepleadings (1) an unreasonable delay appears, (2) no sufficientexcuse for the delay is pleaded, and (3) the section 2-615 motionalleges there is a defect. Senese v. Climatemp, Inc., 222 Ill.App. 3d 302, 317, 582 N.E.2d 1180, 1190 (1991). Section 2-615motions to dismiss are subject to a de novo standard of review. Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112,116, 619 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1993).

We also note that the trial court failed to specify thegrounds upon which it relied in granting defendants' motion todismiss. When this situation occurs, we will presume the trialcourt granted the motion upon one of the grounds urged by defendants. Zielinski v. Miller, 277 Ill. App. 3d 735, 739, 660 N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (1995).

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Dismissing
Plaintiff's Mandamus Complaint

Mandamus is a civil proceeding governed by sections 14-101 through 14-109 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/14-101 through 14-109(West 2002)). Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy used todirect a public official or body to perform a ministerial dutythat does not involve the exercise of judgment or discretion. Romero v. O'Sullivan, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1034, 707 N.E.2d986, 988 (1999). Mandamus is appropriate relief only where apetitioner can demonstrate a clear right to the requested relief,the respondent's clear duty to act, and the respondent's clearauthority to comply with the terms of the writ. Romero, 302 Ill.App. 3d at 1034, 707 N.E.2d at 988. "Mandamus cannot be used todirect a public official or body to reach a particular decisionor to exercise its discretion in a particular manner, even if thejudgment or discretion has been erroneously exercised." Crump v.Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 181 Ill. App. 3d 58, 60, 536N.E.2d 875, 877 (1989), citing Daley v. Hett, 113 Ill. 2d 75, 80,495 N.E.2d 513, 515-16 (1986). Moreover, the state supreme courthas implied that mandamus would be appropriate to compel prisonofficials to follow their own rules. Taylor v. Franzen, 93 Ill.App. 3d 758, 765, 417 N.E.2d 242, 247 (1981); see People ex rel.Johnson v. Pate, 47 Ill. 2d 172, 177, 265 N.E.2d 144, 147-48(1970).

1. Attorney General Ryan Performed a Discretionary Duty

Plaintiff's count I alleged that Attorney General Ryanfailed to perform a ministerial duty by not prosecuting defendants named in plaintiff's criminal complaint. Article 5,section 15, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 states that the"Attorney General shall be the legal officer of the State, andshall have the duties and powers that may be prescribed by law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. V,